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Aims of the research  
In January 2011, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) commissioned 
the Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute at London Metropolitan 
University to conduct research on „understanding equality and human rights in 
relation to religion or belief‟ in England and Wales.  
 
The aims were to explore:  
 
 the state of the law in relation to equality, human rights and religion or belief and 
different groups‟ responses to the law;  
 
 approaches to achieving freedom of religion or belief and preventing 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the workplace and in public 
services;  
 
 situations where interests conflict (or are perceived to conflict) between the 
different equality „strands‟ or different human rights;  
 
 principles or approaches that might pre-empt or resolve dilemmas or disputes 
relating to religion or belief; and 
 
 equality or human rights concerns that arise in relation to the role of religion or 
belief groups in the formation of law and public policy.  
 
Methodology  
The research comprised: 
 
 a literature review covering relevant case law (primarily domestic and 
European) and wider British and international research; 
 
 67 semi-structured interviews with religion or belief groups, employers, service 
providers and groups concerned with other equality strands, as well as legal 
experts and academics; 
 
 roundtable discussion events, one in London involving academics, legal 
practitioners and policy experts and one in Cardiff involving practitioners and 
voluntary sector organisations in the fields of health and social care; and 
 






 two online surveys, one aimed at people responsible for managing issues 
associated with religion or belief in their workplace and the other aimed at all 
other interested groups.  
Main findings 
The religion or belief landscape in England and Wales  
Evidence relating to the religion or belief „landscape‟ is contradictory and contested 
(especially Census data) (section 2.2). However, some trends are clear: a decline in 
affiliation to historic churches; a rise in those stating that they have no religion; and 
(particularly in England) an increase in faiths associated with post-war and post-
colonial immigration, especially Islam. Other trends are also apparent: for example, 
the growth of independent and black majority churches and the greater significance 
attached to their religion by minority religious communities compared to those that 
state a Christian affiliation. Overall, the landscape is complex and geographically 
variable; it is not possible to establish a clear trend towards the population or social 
institutions of Britain as a whole becoming either more or less „religious‟ or „secular‟. 
 
Discrimination on grounds of religion or belief 
Measurements of discrimination are complicated by the fact that they generally rely 
on perceived or reported experience of discrimination, which may differ from legal 
definitions (section 3.2). Moreover, individuals may experience different forms of 
discrimination simultaneously. There is scant evidence about whether there is 
discrimination against „belief‟. One clear trend is the greater prevalence of 
discrimination (by any measure) against Muslims compared to other groups defined 
by their religion (sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5). There has been an increase in concerns 
and claims relating to discrimination against Christians; however, evidence has not 
been adduced to substantiate such claims at a structural level (section 3.4). 
Equality and human rights in a multi-faith society  
Debate about multiculturalism has become intertwined with concerns about Islamic 
„extremism‟ and the perceived segregation of communities with distinct social values 
- one response to which is said to be a „muscular‟ liberal politics in which minorities 
are required to live according to the presumed shared social norms of the indigenous 
majority (section 2.3). By contrast, „progressive‟ notions of multiculturalism seek to 
address the powerlessness both of minority groups in relation to the centralised state 
and of individuals within those groups whose interests may conflict with those of 
dominant members of the group. This research suggests that, in matters of public 
policy, the emphasis should be on identifying asymmetries of power and engaging 
with vulnerable individuals to prevent harm. Such an approach recognises and 






respects individuals‟ membership of a cultural or religious community, whilst also 
recognising the internal diversity of most such communities and ensuring that all their 
putative members are able to be full citizens of a liberal political community. 
 
Minority legal orders 
The potential vulnerability of „minorities within minorities‟ is brought into sharp focus 
by the existence of systems of normative and legal regulation rooted in religious 
communities (section 2.3). There is a need for further empirical research to examine 
the impact of minority legal orders on those that use them or are affected by them, 
particularly groups that may be relatively powerless within their communities such as 
women and children. In addition, there is a need to strengthen the protections 
presently offered by the Arbitration Act 1996 to users of religious tribunals to ensure 
that they are not deprived of their right to equality at law.  
 
Religion or belief and the formation of law and policy 
 
Different understandings of ‘secularism’  
Among our interviewees, the faultline between the „religious‟ and the „secular‟ was 
generally perceived to be greater than that between religious faiths - and was 
certainly more vehemently expressed by some (section 2.4). Some interviewees 
affiliated to religious groups perceive there to be a combative „secular agenda‟. 
According to this perspective, secularism is not about neutrality; it is itself a belief 
with its own „equalities identity‟ and an intention to diminish the importance of religion 
in society. Other interviewees, including some affiliated to religious organisations as 
well as those situated in the „belief‟ strand, did not share this view. It was noted that 
hostility towards „secularism‟ stems in part from its becoming confused with atheism 
or „secularisation‟ (that is, the subordination or rejection of religious values and 
beliefs). For these interviewees, secularism is a philosophy of the separation of 
religion and state: it is respectful of all religions and beliefs and privileges none, and 
is the best guarantor of everyone‟s right to manifest or be free from religion or belief. 
This debate suggests that careful use of language is required by all parties, since the 
term secularism may be used to mean radically different things.  
 
In some instances, discussion about religion or belief in the public sphere involves 
assumptions on each side which appear to be mutually unintelligible (such as the 
observation by a Sikh interviewee that „secularists‟ concerned about the 
representativeness of religious community leaders do not understand „how religions 
work‟). This may explain why debate has at times become so acrimonious, as 
specific legal cases or policy matters act as a lightning rod for a broader perceived 
gulf between the religious and the secular.  






At the same time, it is important not to overstate this division. Our interviews 
suggested a degree of consensus among groups situated in both the „religion‟ and 
„belief‟ strands (as well as groups concerned with other equality strands) that religion 
or belief groups are legitimate interest groups like any other but should have no 
privileged role in the formation of law and policy. In particular, the majority of 
interviewees stated that in matters of law and policy, there is no room for „truth 
claims‟ based upon religious doctrine or claims of moral superiority based upon a 
particular religion or belief. This suggests a broadly-held desire to maintain an 
appropriate balance between religion or belief and democratic debate. 
 
Government engagement with religion or belief groups 
Many religion and belief groups do not consider themselves to operate on a „level 
playing field‟ when it comes to law- and policy-making (section 2.5). Groups situated 
in the „belief‟ strand perceive there to be a tendency among public authorities to 
focus solely or principally on the „religion‟ strand with their focus on engagement with 
„faith communities‟. Some minority religious organisations, in particular Muslim 
groups, also felt at a disadvantage. 
 
Communities based upon a religion or belief tend to be highly differentiated. 
Divergent views may exist within religion or belief groups and there is a need to avoid 
the misattribution of views to whole groups. Differentiation within religion or belief 
groups has implications for public authorities seeking to identify authentic or 
authoritative voices that represent different groups (or denominations, sects or social 
structures within them) (section 2.6). This raises important issues in relation to 
equality and human rights since religion or belief groups may discriminate as well as 
being discriminated against. Who „speaks for‟ a group matters greatly where power is 
unevenly distributed within it in ways that may not always be obvious to those outside 
the group. Who government chooses to speak to also matters, because it may confer 
legitimacy or resources that may affect the balance of power within a community. 
Several interviewees commented that religious hierarchies tend to be more orthodox 
and conservative around matters of doctrine and social policy than the wider public 
and even than the majority of their adherents. It was also suggested that policy-
makers should be mindful of the differential resources and power of certain groups, 
which can make their views appear more widespread than they actually are. 
 
The law on equality, human rights and religion or belief  
 
The new and unsettled nature of the law 
The law in relation to equality, human rights and religion or belief is relatively new 
and far from settled. In the past decade in Britain, both the quantity and the reach of 






the law have expanded as the state seeks both to facilitate and regulate the activities 
and practices of religious bodies in the context of a multi-faith society. There has 
been a considerable amount of litigation, much of which has been controversial. 
 
The importance of contextualising legal cases 
Legal judgments may raise important matters of principle. However, being highly 
context-specific, they are not necessarily representative of common experience or a 
reliable indicator of the place of religion or belief (or particular religions or beliefs) in 
society (section 4.4). There are invariably contingent reasons why certain cases 
come to court and others do not. Moreover, the outcome of cases is often 
unpredictable and may appear contradictory. This is partly due to the heavy reliance 
on the principle of proportionality in balancing competing factors in each case. This 
makes it hard to „read across‟ from one case to another because each is fact-
specific. In addition, public responses to high-profile cases may make conflicts 
between religion or belief and other interests appear more intractable or prevalent 
than they actually are - especially when understanding is reliant upon media reports 
or the views of lobby groups and is not also informed about the detailed 
circumstances and legal reasoning in each case. Thus, considerable caution is 
required when seeking to generalise from specific cases or assess their social, as 
well as legal, significance. 
 
The definition of ‘belief’  
A number of Employment Tribunal decisions have created a lack of clarity among 
employers about the definition of „belief‟; for example, anti-hunting sentiments and a 
belief in the moral imperatives arising from man-made climate change were found to 
fall within the definition. There is consequent uncertainty among employers as to 
which beliefs warrant legal protection and which do not (section 5.2).     
 
Legal protection of religion or belief  
Overall, the law on equality, human rights and religion or belief has been interpreted 
cautiously in domestic courts and tribunals (section 5.3). While some indirect 
discrimination claims concerning dress codes and working hours have succeeded, 
most claims based on religion or belief have failed. This is largely because courts 
have generally found that interference with freedom of religion or belief under Article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is not easily established. 
Concern exists about the tendency of courts and tribunals to exclude religion or belief 
claims at an early stage by stating that there has been no interference with the 
protected right; this precludes a detailed assessment of the merits of each case in 
relation to the justification for interference (section 5.4). In particular, the 
requirement to show group (rather than solitary) disadvantage in discrimination cases 






is viewed by the EHRC and other legal specialists as failing to provide sufficient 
protection for individual believers. 
 
Some claims have been filtered out on the grounds that an individual has voluntarily 
put themselves in a situation (for example, in a job or a school) that limits their ability 
to manifest their religion or belief and can choose to leave that restrictive context, 
even if doing so requires some personal sacrifice. Another filter that courts have 
applied is the requirement that the claimant‟s actions relate to a prescribed practice 
of their religion or belief.  
 
There is broad agreement that courts and tribunals should assess justification for 
restrictions on the manifestation of religion or belief using sociological arguments 
based upon the context of the case, rather than arguments about whether, for 
example, particular beliefs or practices are prescribed by a religion or belief. This 
does not preclude legal scrutiny of the nature of beliefs and practices, but recognises 
the inherent difficulty for secular courts in adjudicating doctrinal matters. Courts have 
traditionally been careful not to make determinations on matters of belief or practice. 
However, some commentators suggest that in both Article 9 and religious 
discrimination cases, the courts‟ previous reticence has given way to a greater 
willingness to adjudicate issues that touch upon matters of doctrine. 
 
The extent and limits of reasonable accommodation of religion or belief 
This was an area in which there was a relatively high degree of consensus among 
our interviewees and roundtable participants (section 5.5). Virtually all agreed that 
individuals whose religion or belief is important to them have a responsibility to make 
sensible professional choices and may have to make personal sacrifices to avoid 
conflict with the law or professional guidelines. We also found broad consensus 
among our participants about the type of criteria which might reasonably restrict the 
manifestation of religion or belief in particular instances. These include genuine 
health or safety concerns; business efficiency and requirements for uniformity; 
detrimental impact on colleagues (excluding pure offence); the capacity to 
communicate; and the relative institutional power of the parties involved.  
 
We found an equally strong presumption towards the accommodation of religion or 
belief where these criteria do not apply or are not compelling. This was sometimes 
expressed in terms of the principle of personal autonomy and the inherent value of 
diversity in social settings. It was also viewed as making good business sense. This 
presumption towards accommodation applied principally to matters of dress and 
flexibility over working patterns; by contrast, the provision of facilities to permit 
religious observance was viewed as more likely to cause undue hardship to 






employers. Views differed (including between individuals of the same religious 
background) as to what was „reasonable‟ in particular instances. Nevertheless, these 
findings indicate a high degree of acceptance of what might be termed „routine‟ 
accommodation of religion or belief, in stark contrast to approaches elsewhere in 
Europe.  
 
Interviewees generally acknowledged that decisions about what it is reasonable to 
accommodate are always fact-specific and may involve nuanced judgments as to the 
social context involved. It is arguable that the introduction of a duty of reasonable 
accommodation would not necessarily produce greater certainty than the present 
indirect discrimination model, since the proportionality calculation has to be made in 
each case, whatever the legal model adopted. 
 
Competing interests in equality law  
The inclusion of religion or belief alongside other protected characteristics in the 
Equality Act 2010 has stretched legal concepts in often uncomfortable ways (section 
6.3). One effect has been to magnify conflicts - especially between the „religion‟ 
strand and sexual orientation - which might not otherwise have become so visible or 
so fraught. Cases concerning tension between religion and sexual orientation have 
been exceptionally high profile and were the most contentious of those we reviewed. 
Some (but not all) Christian participants spoke of sexual orientation claims routinely 
„trumping‟ those based on religion. However, the prominence of these cases does not 
mean that such disputes are prevalent or entrenched in society or that they are 
insuperable.  
 
The issue of conscientious objection 
Tensions between the religion and sexual orientation strands have prompted calls, 
mainly from some Christians, for an extension of the right to conscientious objection 
to new and diverse situations, such as that of a registrar who wishes to abstain from 
officiating at a civil partnership (section 6.5). By this account, conscience (especially 
when religiously inspired) deserves special protection and can in most cases be 
accommodated without harming others. Other (both religious and non-religious) 
voices object to extending protection for conscientious objection where it allows an 
individual, on the basis of their religion or belief, to discriminate against others on 
another equality ground, even where there are no significant practical obstacles to 
doing so. A key principle established in case law is that employees or organisations 
that deliver public (and especially symbolic) functions cannot choose who they serve 
on the basis of their beliefs. This principle was supported by a broad range of our 
interviewees, including some situated in the „religion‟ strand, who viewed the ethos, 
reputation and reliability of services as being at stake. It has also been endorsed by 






the EHRC in relation to two prominent cases concerning individuals‟ right 
conscientiously to object to delivering services to same-sex couples (Ladele and 
McFarlane).   
 
However, the difference in these perspectives should not be overstated. No 
participant in our research argued either for an unrestricted right to conscientious 
objection or enforced uniformity in every instance. Interviewees generally agreed on 
the desirability of avoiding disciplinary action or litigation. In public debate, arguments 
coalesce around the criteria by which to decide which exercises of conscientious 
objection are acceptable and should be accommodated in laws and procedures, and 
which not. This is an area of unresolved difficulty which requires further discussion.  
 
While public debate is frequently couched in terms of protection (or not) for 
conscientious objection, legal judgments are not. In Ladele and McFarlane, the Court 
of Appeal focused its reasoning on the proportionality of the restriction of their right to 
freedom of religion or belief and the nature of a reasonable accommodation in each 
situation. These judgments suggest that conscientious objection should be viewed 
as, at most, a residual form of protection, to be invoked only if situations have not 
been resolved through the usual considerations of proportionality or accommodation.  
 
Legal exceptions  
The exceptions in the Equality Act 2010, which permit discrimination on grounds of 
sex, marriage and sexual orientation in the context of employment for the purposes 
of organised religion, are controversial. They are also subject to legal uncertainty due 
to ambiguities in their wording and discrepancies between the text of the Act and the 
Explanatory Notes (section 6.6). In particular, the employment exceptions do not 
expressly require that their application is proportionate; this makes them vulnerable 
to challenge under European Union law. In addition, there is a disjuncture between, 
on the one hand, a view among some religion or belief groups that the exceptions are 
too narrow and, on the other, a perception based on largely anecdotal evidence that 
they are applied too broadly in practice. The lack of clarity surrounding the 
exceptions creates potential for them to be misunderstood and misapplied. Further 
litigation concerning the employment exceptions cannot be ruled out.  
 
The religion or belief exceptions relating to goods and services have also proved 
contentious (section 6.7). Controversy has centred on the principle (established in 
the Catholic Care adoption agency case) that organisations relating to a religion or 
belief cannot discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation if they are contracted to 
provide a public service. Again, the suggestion that the discourse of equality and gay 
rights had „trumped‟ sincerely held faith-based views created palpable anxiety among 






some, mainly Christian, participants in this research. However, that view was not 
universally shared, either by Christians or by other religion or belief groups.  
 
The nature of religion or belief as a characteristic 
Underlying discussion of the more contentious legal cases are contested 
understandings about the nature of religion or belief as a protected characteristic 
under equality law (section 6.4). The lack of consensus is particularly evident in 
relation to whether religion or belief is chosen or immutable. Less contestable is the 
observation that religion or belief is distinct from other characteristics in having 
intellectual content and both proscribing and prescribing certain behaviour which 
impacts on adherents to the religion or belief and, indirectly, on others. As a result, 
some commentators suggest that religion or belief should enjoy an attenuated form 
of protection. By this account, a hierarchy between characteristics is inevitable - and 
is desirable if it prevents a levelling down of protection on other grounds; for 
example, if business needs can be used to justify indirect discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief, then the same justification might in theory be introduced to justify 
sex or race discrimination (sections 6.4 and 6.8). For others, the idea of prioritising 
some characteristics over others is anathema: the legal form of protection may differ, 
but the aim is to provide equivalence of protection.       
 
The interplay of Article 9 and equality provisions  
There is a lack of clarity about the relationship between, on the one hand, protection 
for the manifestation of religion or belief under Article 9 and, on the other, protection 
against direct and indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 (section 6.8). 
Confusion arises partly from a disjuncture between the understanding of freedom of 
religion or belief in the domestic and international contexts. In the international arena, 
the preoccupation is with the persecution of religious individuals or groups and the 
protection against persecution afforded by Article 9 ECHR. In the domestic context, 
the preoccupation is with discrimination that emerges primarily in the context of 
social exclusion. The (international) Article 9 „persecution‟ analysis and the 
(domestic) discrimination law „social exclusion‟ analysis are essentially different, yet 
these differences are often elided in domestic public discourse. Consequently, there 
is a need to differentiate more clearly those situations that are most appropriately 
addressed on the basis of freedom of religion or belief and those that are best 
addressed on the basis of non-discrimination.  
 
Greater clarity about this distinction will also enhance understanding of the debate 
being framed by some Christian groups, which characterises the deployment of 
equality law in some instances as a form of religious persecution. This argument 






portrays equality and human rights law as being in conflict with each other, again 
illustrating the uncomfortable stretching of the law in the area of religion or belief.   
 
Responses to the law 
 
‘Religious’ versus ‘secular’ perspectives  
While some interviewees suggested that „conflict‟ cases pitch „religious‟ against 
„secular‟ perspectives, our research suggests that the lines are not so clearly drawn. 
Members of religion or belief groups (including co-religionists) argued both for and 
against extending protection for religiously-inspired conscientious objection (section 
6.5). Some Christian interviewees supported the Catholic Care judgment, while 
others deplored it (section 6.7). This is not surprising since legal cases reflect 
ideological and theological disputes that are also taking place within some religious 
organisations. The rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender believers are 
centrally at stake in this debate - a consideration that is overlooked in debates 
framed as religious versus secular. 
 
Further, recognition of the foundational differences between religious and non-
religious perspectives on human rights should not mask their shared concern about 
social injustice and commitment to a set of human rights standards and principles 
enshrined in law. There is much scope for dialogue between these two perspectives; 
for example, about the meaning of human dignity and what it means to live an 
authentic and flourishing life.  
 
Feelings of marginalisation among some Christian groups 
Communities defined by religion or belief appear to have markedly different attitudes 
towards equality and human rights law. Interviewees from minority communities 
tended to view the law as a guarantor of a „level playing field‟ and an „ally‟ of 
communities that face particular disadvantage (section 7.2) At worst, the law was 
deemed by some of these interviewees to be irrelevant to the achievement of 
substantive equality.  
 
By contrast, some strands of Christian opinion are intensely concerned that equality 
law has become the primary vehicle by which Christianity is being marginalised and 
penalised in modern Britain (section 7.3). The deployment of equality law is thus 
characterised as a form of religious persecution. This view is disputed, not only by 
those of another, or no, religious faith, but also between and within different Christian 
traditions. Some Christians view the „marginalisation‟ narrative as a response by a 
dominant, conservative Christian tradition to a loss of privilege. There is concern that 
too vociferous a movement against the perceived sidelining of Christianity and the 






excessive or misguided pursuit of litigation could, paradoxically, decrease the 
effectiveness of efforts to uphold the rights of Christians to manifest their religion 
(section 7.4).   
  
Participants who think that Christianity is being marginalised appear to view specific 
legal cases as the principal evidence for this claim. However, since legal cases may 
be unrepresentative of common experience, it is not possible to interpret whether 
they do, in fact, indicate a trend towards anti-Christian discrimination. The evidence 
base concerning discrimination against Christians is incomplete; however, the 
evidence that does exist suggests the need for a more nuanced analysis of the 
incidence and seriousness of discrimination against Christians than the generalised 
„marginalisation‟ narrative presently articulates.  
 
The limitations of the law 
Allied to concern that there has been excessive litigation concerning religion or belief 
is a view that the law is limited in its capacity to address complex questions of 
multiculturalism and social identity in modern Britain (section 7.5). Interviewees 
situated in both the religion and belief and other equality strands argued that equality 
law has produced unintended consequences. In particular, it was seen as having 
sometimes encouraged an undue insistence on the assertion of competing identities 
and set different groups on an „intellectual collision course‟. This had occurred both 
between different religions or beliefs and between claims based on religion or belief 
and sexual orientation. Several interviewees spoke of the need to lower the 
emotional temperature of public discussion about religion or belief since „copy-cat‟ or 
„me too‟ claims for legal recognition and protection were divisive and suppressive of 
debate. Interviewees overwhelmingly viewed litigation as a „weapon of last resort‟ 
and symptomatic of failure, whoever instigated it. Some interviewees were concerned 
about the „collateral damage‟ that might be done to claimants whose cases had 
become particularly high-profile as a result of campaigning. 
 
The role of the Equality and Human Rights Commission  
A number of interviewees were critical of what they knew of the EHRC‟s track record 
on religion or belief (section 7.6). Strong criticism came from Christian participants 
who objected to the Commission‟s intervention in particular cases concerning religion 
or belief and sexual orientation. Groups situated in the „belief‟ strand were also 
critical, suggesting that the EHRC had not responded adequately to aspects of the 
law which permit discrimination by religious organisations in ways that are vulnerable 
to challenge under European Union law. Interviewees suggested three broad areas 
in which the EHRC could play a constructive role: „myth-busting‟ about specific 
cases; developing guidance; and developing its „good relations‟ mandate. These 






roles were viewed as inter-linked as a means of avoiding litigation through improved 
decision-making and greater use of conciliation and mediation. 
 
Principles underpinning dispute resolution 
Interviewees proposed principles or „rules of thumb‟ as a basis for pre-empting or 
resolving disputes in the workplace or community (section 7.7). These were 
congruent with principles in human rights law, though they were commonly 
expressed in non-legal terms. The most commonly invoked was the principle of „do 
no harm‟. This principle suggests a position of mutual restraint, according to which 
individuals or groups refrain from asserting claims if to do so entails harm to others. 
In the context of the workplace, the principle was considered a useful means of 
distinguishing situations in which claims for reasonable accommodation are refused 
for compelling reasons as opposed to merely a disinclination to embrace religious or 
cultural difference. Proportionality (or the „least restrictive‟ approach) was also 
frequently invoked.  
 
Some interviewees situated in the religion strand proposed, as a general principle, 
respect for the intrinsic value of religions or beliefs to their adherents; however, it was 
acknowledged that this does not necessarily entail protection from offence. The 
principles of personal and institutional autonomy were also endorsed by several 
interviewees, though it was recognised that these might sometimes conflict. Several 
interviewees also commented that diversity is an inherent social good; this added 
ballast to the argument that institutions should bear a degree of cost or 
inconvenience in order to accommodate religion or belief within reasonable limits.  
 
Ground rules for public debate 
A persistent theme of this research was that public discussion of equality, human 
rights and religion or belief is often unduly intemperate and tends to accentuate 
conflict (section 7.8). This concern has prompted proposals for a set of „ethical rules 
of engagement‟, acceptance of which is a minimum requirement for groups or 
individuals who seek to negotiate a particular outcome in a context where competing 
interests are at stake. Among the ground rules proposed was the requirement to 
respect the integrity and legitimacy of the position of each party to a dispute since 
impugning others‟ motives tends to preclude any possibility of dialogue. Also 
important are good faith and openness to those whose viewpoints are 
incomprehensible to oneself. Interviewees pointed to examples where mediation or 
negotiation had successfully resolved disputes concerning religion or belief without 
resort to litigation. It was emphasised that the resolution of disputes concerning 
religion or belief is not a „zero sum‟ game. Negotiation of differences may require the 
creation of safe spaces for discussion within workplaces and communities.  






These „ground rules‟ are likely to become increasingly important in view of the 
contentious legal and policy issues which are currently under debate, not least that of  
legal reform to allow civil marriage for same-sex couples. 
  
Implementing equality and human rights in the workplace 
Studies of management experience of handling religion or belief in the workplace 
indicate a prevailing uncertainty about how to respond to instances where an 
employee‟s religious belief appears to conflict with others‟ protection from 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (section 8.2). However, evidence from 
participants and the literature suggest that such instances are rare; they can be 
prevented or mitigated by the development of policies which integrate equality and 
human rights principles and are promoted as part of a tolerant and inclusive 
workplace culture. An anticipatory approach is preferable to a reactive one.  
 
Some studies suggest that managers‟ uncertainty extends to the handling of religion 
or belief more generally, but this appears not to be uniform across different types and 
sizes of employer. A fear of litigation was viewed by interviewees as a barrier to 
principled decision-making; it tended to produce knee jerk decisions which may 
complicate the resolution of grievances (section 8.4). Managers also lamented the 
lack of certainty created by fact-specific and apparently contradictory legal 
judgments; however, interviewees and roundtable participants acknowledged that 
„blanket‟ rules create only an illusion of certainty and militate against dialogue and 
negotiation.  
 
Participants advocated the integration of human rights and equality principles in the 
handling of religion or belief (and indeed all equality strands). Indeed, this research 
suggests that an approach based on human rights is likely to be more satisfactory in 
the longer term than one based principally on equality. Participants noted that the 
equality „lens‟ can produce a narrow focus on legal compliance based on single (and 
sometimes competing) characteristics while human rights encourage a holistic focus 
on individual flourishing. The human rights principle of proportionality is paramount, 
as it provides a framework for decision-making which balances competing interests 
and identifies the least restrictive alternative in each circumstance.    
 
Guidance for decision-makers 
Some interviewees expressed a need for more accessible practice-based guidance 
on the handling of religion or belief in the workplace (section 8.5). Equality specialists 
suggest that this should establish „rules of thumb‟ for easily achievable good practice 
in order to realise freedom of religion or belief and prevent discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief in the workplace. It should also explain principles 






emerging from case law as to the limited circumstances in which indirect 
discrimination may be justified. Guidance which integrates human rights and equality 
principles would address the limitations of using the equality „lens‟ in isolation.  
 
There is also a need for more detailed and accessible guidance which might assist 
managers to achieve clarity and consistency in matters of definition of „belief‟ (section 
5.2). A web-based source which gathered existing sources in one place would be a 
valuable contribution to more confident and consistent management practice.  
 
Implementing equality and human rights in public services 
 
The ethics of self-disclosure 
Ethical concerns may arise when practitioners discuss their personal beliefs with a 
service user (section 9.2). The vast majority of participants who expressed a view on 
this issue suggested that the justification for self-disclosure rests entirely on the 
therapeutic value to the service user in the particular context in which it occurs; they 
did not view it as a matter of the practitioner‟s right to freedom of expression or 
freedom of religion or belief. Incidents where practitioners are considered to have 
transgressed professional guidelines in relation to self-disclosure are rare, though 
intensely controversial when they do occur. 
 
The value of a proactive approach to equality and human rights  
Participants emphasised the value of using equality and human rights proactively to 
shape policy and practice and to carry out a holistic appraisal of individuals‟ needs, 
whether related to their religion or belief or any other characteristic (section 9.2). 
Equality and human rights impact assessments have been used to increase uptake 
of services and identify and address needs arising from patients‟ religion or belief. 
They had created opportunities for practitioners to discuss sensitive issues with 
greater confidence and balance competing interests, including those of staff. They 
were viewed as particularly valuable in the context of expenditure cuts since they 
enable decision-makers to make informed, principled and transparent decisions 
about the allocation of resources. 
 
Religion or belief in schools 
There are several areas in which law and practice concerning religion or belief in 
schools is in tension with equality and human rights (section 9.3). One concern 
identified in this research relates to the necessity and proportionality of faith-based 
admissions policies. Another was the wide discretion given to voluntary-aided 
schools to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in the employment of all 
teachers, without any requirement to demonstrate that a genuine, legitimate and 






justified occupational requirement exists. The law also appears out of step in not 
expressly protecting the rights of the child; for example, in relation to religious 
education (RE) and collective worship. The entry into the education system of new 
religious providers setting up „free‟ schools and academies, and the likely expansion 
in the number of voluntary-aided schools, heightens these concerns.  
 
There is a need to monitor the practical impact of discrimination that is permitted 
within the education system, in relation to admissions; employment; and the broad 
exemption for the content of the curriculum and RE from the prohibition of 
discrimination, particularly in relation to sexual orientation. This role might be taken 
on by the EHRC or the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, as well as 
by civil society and academic organisations. 
 
The public sector equality duty 
Participants expressed strongly divergent views about the extension of the public 
sector equality duty to include religion or belief. Some were opposed in principle 
and/or felt that the duty in relation to religion or belief would in practice be divisive or 
unworkable. Concerns included the potential for vociferous religion or belief groups to 
„browbeat‟ public authorities and the difficulty of identifying authentic representatives 
of religious communities. Other participants were more positive about the potential 
for using the new single duty to address persistent disadvantage among particular 
communities associated with religion or belief and focus on the exclusionary effects 
of policies or practices. This perception rests on a substantive understanding of 
equality as a vehicle to address social exclusion and promote participation among 
marginalised groups defined by religion or belief, rather than one which emphasises 
the recognition or celebration of different religious identities. 
 
Advancing debate about religion or belief  
A persistent theme of this research has been the intemperate nature of much public 
debate about equality, human rights and religion or belief. In particular, there is 
palpable anxiety about specific cases which are viewed by some groups as both 
demonstrating and perpetuating an anti-religious (or, more commonly, a specifically 
anti-Christian) bias. However, it is important that this divisive current of debate does 
not obscure the areas where there is (or is potential for) consensus. Debate is likely 
to be advanced if these areas can be identified and, as far as possible, insulated 
from the more rancorous tone which has characterised public debate about equality, 
human rights and religion or belief in recent years.  
 
This research found broad agreement between different types of participant in favour 
of the accommodation of religion or belief in the workplace within reasonable limits. 






There was also a high degree of consensus as to how these limits should be 
determined. The majority of participants also shared the view that claims based on 
religion or belief should be pursued wherever possible through forms of social action 
such as mediation, negotiation and guidance, with legal action reserved for cases of 
real strategic importance. There was a significant degree of overlap between the 
principles or „rules of thumb‟ proposed by participants as a basis for pre-empting or 
resolving disputes outside the courtroom.   
 
The law on equality, human rights and religion or belief is likely to remain unsettled. 
There are a number of areas in which the law is unclear, under strain or vulnerable to 
challenge. Overall, our research suggests that the most productive level of 
engagement for those who wish to advance debate, practice and understanding in 
relation to religion or belief is with those on the „front line‟ of decision-making, such as 
policy-makers, practitioners and workplace managers. This places the focus on the 
use of equality law and human rights standards and principles as a framework for 
day-to-day decision-making - on implementation rather than litigation. Where the 
principles established in legal cases are contested, it is important that public debate 
is conducted in good faith and with respect for the integrity of different perspectives, 





1.1 Aims of the report 
In January 2011, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) commissioned 
the Human Rights and Social Justice Research Institute at London Metropolitan 
University to conduct research on „understanding equality and human rights in 
relation to religion or belief‟ in England and Wales. 
 
The aim was to explore:  
 
 the state of the law in relation to equality, human rights and religion or belief and 
different groups‟ responses to the law;  
 
 approaches to achieving freedom of religion or belief and preventing 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in the workplace and in public 
services;  
 
 situations where interests conflict (or are perceived to conflict) between the 
different equality „strands‟ or different human rights;  
 
 principles or approaches that might pre-empt or resolve dilemmas or disputes 
relating to religion or belief; and 
 
 equality or human rights concerns that arise in relation to the role of religion or 
belief groups in the formation of law and public policy.  
 
The research team invited participation from groups that have a direct stake in these 
issues: religion or belief groups, employers, service providers and groups concerned 
with other equality strands, as well as legal practitioners and academics (see 1.4).  
  
1.2 Note on terminology  
„Religion‟ and „belief‟ are notoriously difficult to define. Definitions are contested and 
invariably context dependent. Numerous different definitions are used in academic, 
legal and social contexts and, for example, in the design of survey instruments. It is 
beyond our scope to examine the rich academic literature on matters of definition (for 
useful overviews see Weller, 2011; Woodhead with Catto, 2009). Section 5.2 
discusses definitional issues that arise in legal contexts in relation to religion or belief.  
 
The Equality Act 2010 defines „religion‟ as meaning „any religion‟ and „belief‟ as „any 
religious or philosophical belief‟. This includes a lack of religion or belief. This report 






adopts the same usage except where the meaning dictates otherwise. It is important 
not to use the term „religion or belief‟ as a synonym for religious belief, as sometimes 
happens in public usage.  
 
Religion or belief is known as a „protected characteristic‟ under the Equality Act, 
along with age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
pregnancy and maternity, race, sex and sexual orientation. These categories were 
previously referred to as equality „strands‟. They can also be referred to as „grounds‟ 
for discrimination. This report uses all of these terms. 
 
1.3 Context of the report  
The law in relation to equality, human rights and religion or belief is relatively new 
and is far from settled or uncontested. It has frequently caused controversy in its 
interpretation and application, both in domestic courts and at the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). As McCrudden (2011: 38) notes, „The architecture of human 
rights and its relationship to religion is in the course of being constructed‟. This sense 
of instability has spread to public policy and debate about equality, human rights and 
religion or belief in Britain, which has at times become highly polarised and 
rancorous.  
 
The unsettled nature of the debate points to the significance and topicality of this 
research but has also presented challenges to it. There were important 
developments within the lifetime of the project, which meant that participants 
interviewed later in the main fieldwork period (March-August 2011) were able to 
respond to certain issues which those interviewed earlier were not.1 We do not 
consider that this affects the integrity of our findings, but illustrates the dynamic 
nature of the discussion. The text of this report was largely completed by December 
2011, but selected developments in early 2012 (up to 27 February) are briefly 
described in the report.  
 
Notable developments in this period include the following: 
 
 In April 2011, the Leeds-based adoption agency Catholic Care lost its much 
publicised two-year legal battle to be made exempt from equality legislation, 
which requires it to consider same-sex couples as prospective parents (see 
section 6.7).2  
                                               
1  One interview was conducted on 2 December 2011. 
 
2  Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales) 




 The Catholic Care case coincided with continuing controversy over two others 
in which religious beliefs conflicted with others‟ rights to receive equal 
treatment. The first, in January 2011, concerned two gay men who were civil 
partners and who won their claim that they suffered discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation when they were refused a double room by Christian hotel 
owners who said they only let out double rooms to heterosexual married 
couples.3 The second, in February 2011, concerned a Christian couple who lost 
their claim that they were discriminated against by a local authority because 
they insisted on their right to tell young foster children that they believe 
homosexuality is morally wrong.4  
 
 In May 2011, the ECtHR asked the UK government to respond to cases brought 
by four Christian claimants - Nadia Eweida, Shirley Chaplin, Lillian Ladele and 
Gary McFarlane.5 Each of the claimants had lost claims of workplace 
discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief in domestic courts. Their 
cases have achieved particular prominence in Britain. Eweida and Chaplin 
concerned the claimants‟ wish to wear a visible cross or crucifix on a neck chain 
contrary to their employers‟ dress codes. In Ladele and McFarlane the 
employees‟ Christian beliefs concerning homosexuality were in conflict with 
their duties as, respectively, a civil registrar and a counsellor. The claimants 
argue that their right to freedom of religion or belief under Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is not sufficiently protected in 
UK law.  
 
 In July 2011, the Equality and Human Rights Commission announced that it had 
been granted permission by the ECtHR to intervene in the four cases. It did so 
in September, submitting that in the cases of Eweida and Chaplin the courts 
may not have given sufficient weight to the claimants‟ right to manifest their 
                                               
3    Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull [2011] EW Misc 2 (CC). This case went to the Court of 
Appeal in November 2011. The Bulls lost their appeal. See Bull and Bull v Hall and 
Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83.
 
4  R (Johns) v Derby City Council [2011] EWHC Admin 375. 
 
5   Eweida and Chaplin v UK Nos. 48420/10 and 59842/10, 12.4.2011; Ladele and McFarlane 
v UK Nos. 51671/10 and 36516/10, 12.4.2011. 
 






religion or belief; and in the cases of Ladele and McFarlane that the domestic 
courts came to the correct conclusions.6  
 
 In August 2011, the All Party Parliamentary Group „Christians in Parliament‟ 
launched an inquiry „to seek clarity regarding what Christians can and cannot do 
within the law‟.7 The inquiry, chaired by Gary Streeter MP, promised to „cut 
through the claims made in the media and by opposing campaign groups to 
consider whether Christians are finding their freedoms eroded‟.  
 
 In an indication of the unsettled nature of debate about religion or belief at the 
European level, in March 2011 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled that the 
compulsory display of crucifixes in Italian classrooms does not restrict the right 
of parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions and the 
right of schoolchildren to believe or not believe.8 The Grand Chamber judgment 
provoked highly polarised comment in Britain.9  
 
These developments occurred against a background of often controversial debate 
about public policy that relates to religion or belief. Debate has centred on, among 
other issues: the efforts led by Nadine Dorries MP to prevent existing abortion 
                                               
6  The EHRC made its submission after an informal public consultation that invited 
stakeholders to provide their thoughts on its intended position. A summary of responses to 
the consultation and the EHRC's submission are available at: 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/legal-and-policy/human-rights-legal-powers/legal-
intervention-on-religion-or-belief-rights/. In an indication of the volatility of public debate on 
the Ladele and McFarlane cases, the EHRC had in July 2011 felt it necessary to issue a 
statement to its stakeholders clarifying that „under no circumstances would the 
Commission condone or permit the refusal of public services to lesbian or gay people‟. 
This followed an earlier public statement by the Commission that stated that judges in the 
UK had „set the bar too high for someone to prove that they have been discriminated 
against because of their religion or belief‟. This had been reported by several media 
organisations and other groups as indicating a new approach by the EHRC to its work to 
prevent discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (for a useful summary, see 
Henderson, 2011).  
 
7  The Evangelical Alliance acted as the secretariat for the inquiry, which issued its 
preliminary report in February 2012, after interviews for this project had been completed 
(Christians in Parliament, 2012).  
  
8  Lautsi v Italy, No. 30814/06, 18.3.2011. See 'European Court of Human Rights, „Crucifixes 
in Italian State-school classrooms: the Court finds no violation‟, 18 March 2011. Available 
at: http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/Lautsi_pr_enG.pdf See also McGoldrick 
(2011). 
 
9  For a useful summary of responses, see 
http://www.religlaw.org/index.php?blurb_id=1216&page_id=19. For a critique of the 





services from offering counselling and to create a greater role for „independent‟ 
counsellors, including those from religious anti-abortion groups;10 a government 
commitment, following consultation, to implement section 202 of the Equality Act 
2010 so as to allow those religious organisations that wish to do so to host civil 
partnership registrations on their religious premises (Government Equalities Office, 
2011a, 2011b);11 a consultation in 2012 on changing the law to allow civil (but not 
religious) marriage for same sex couples (Government Equalities Office, 2012);12 the 
role of religious providers in „free schools‟ and academies which are outside local 
authority education structures;13 and the greater involvement of religious 
organisations in delivering other public services as part of the coalition‟s „Big Society‟ 
initiative.14   
 
In addition, two government initiatives have placed the very architecture of equality 
and human rights law in the UK on an uncertain footing. In March 2011, the 
Commission on a Bill of Rights was established to investigate the creation of a new 
UK Bill of Rights that might subsume or replace the Human Rights Act (HRA).15 This 
Commission has conducted its work against a background of frequent and vehement 
                                               
10  See „Nadine Dorries‟s abortion proposals heavily defeated in Commons‟, The Guardian, 7 
September 2011.  
 
11  In December 2011, the House of Lords debated the Marriage and Civil Partnerships 
(Approved Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, which establish the procedure for 
approving the voluntary registration of civil partnerships on religious premises. The debate 
was secured after the Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee drew to the attention of 
the House arguments that the regulations do not fulfil the Government‟s pledge properly to 
protect faith groups from being compelled to register civil partnerships where it is against 
their beliefs (House of Lords Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, 2011). The 
Committee had received submissions from the Evangelical Alliance, the Christian Institute 
and CARE and a legal opinion from Professor Mark Hill QC, which stated that the 
regulations were „bound to lead to long and costly litigation for faith groups and individual 
resident or officiating ministers‟. See http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/merits-statutory-instruments/Professor-Mark-Hill-QC-Legal-Opinion-to-Merits-
Committee-on-Marriages-and-Civil-Partnerships-%28Approved-Premises%29-
%28Amendment%29-Regulations%202011.pdf. The Lords rejected these arguments and 
a motion which would have reintroduced a ban on civil partnerships in religious premises 
was withdrawn before a vote.  
 
12  See also Sandberg (2011b: 166-69). 
 
13  Of the 281 applications to set up a „free school‟ from September 2012, 29 per cent 




14  See „Ministers talk Big Society with Faith Leaders‟, Communities and Local Government 
press release, 19 July 2010. 
 
15  See http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/cbr/index.htm. 






criticism of the HRA by some senior Conservative politicians, arguments which have 
been challenged by other politicians and commentators.16 In April 2011, the UK 
Government launched its Red Tape Challenge, inviting views on whether the Equality 
Act (among other law and regulation) should be simplified or even scrapped.17  
 
This digest of developments, which is not exhaustive, serves to illustrate the fluidity 
and, at times, volatility of public debate about the themes covered by this research. It 
also illustrates the exceptionally high profile achieved by certain legal cases. The 
issues raised by these cases are discussed in detail in Chapters 5-7. 
 
1.4 Methodology  
Our methodology comprised: 
 
 A literature review covering relevant case law (primarily domestic and 
European) and wider British and international research.  
 
 67 semi-structured interviews, mainly conducted by telephone or Skype, with 
religion or belief organisations; groups concerned with other equality „strands‟ 
(gender or sexual orientation); groups concerned with employment and/or 
service provision (employers, trade unions, service providers and advisory 
bodies); and legal practitioners and academics. See Appendix 1 for a list of 
interviewees and Appendix 4 for the questionnaire.  
 
 Two roundtable discussion events, one in London involving academics, legal 
practitioners and policy experts and one in Cardiff involving practitioners and 
voluntary sector organisations in the field of health (including mental health) and 
social care. 
 
 Two online surveys, one aimed specifically at people responsible for managing 
issues associated with religion or belief in their workplace (the „workplace 
survey‟), and another aimed at other stakeholders (the „general survey‟). 
  
The interviews and roundtables were recorded and transcribed. Interviewees had the 
option of remaining anonymous or of making certain remarks non-attributable. All 
attributions in this report were circulated to participants for their final approval. The 
roundtables were held under the Chatham House rule and therefore material from 
                                               
16  See, for example, suggestions that the HRA was a contributory cause of the English riots 
in August 2011: „David Cameron: Human rights in my sights‟, Sunday Express, 21 August 
2011. For a counter-argument, see Smith (2011). 
 




these discussions is not attributed. No representative of the EHRC was present at 
the roundtables.  
 
Selection of interviewees  
In this section, we explain the criteria by which interviewees and roundtable 
participants were selected and our approach to the methodological dilemmas we 
encountered.  
 
This table provides a breakdown of the 67 interviews by the type of individual or 
group that they work for or represent (see also Appendix 1).18 These categories are 
not watertight but merely indicate the primary affiliation or specialism of the 
interviewee. For example, the „employment and/or service provision‟ category 
includes trade union officers who specialise in LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual or 
transgender) or gender equality in the workplace, while the religion or belief category 
contains individuals who are also legal practitioners. We have identified a separate 
category of groups that straddle religion or belief and another equality strand (for 
example, a Muslim women‟s organisation).  
 
Religion or belief  36 
Other equality strand 4 
Religion or belief and another equality strand 4 
Employment and/or service provision 16 
Academic or legal practitioner  7 
 
Interviewees concerned with religion or belief  
We recognised from the outset of this research that it would be impossible to capture 
a truly representative spectrum of opinion either within or between religion or belief 
groups in England and Wales.  
 
We did not consider it practicable or desirable to include interviewees from the 
greatest possible range of religions or beliefs in England and Wales for its own sake 
(the „one of each‟ approach). Therefore, some religions or belief groups with small 
minorities of adherents were not invited to be interviewed; however, these groups or 
their members had the option of contributing to the research via the general survey. 
Nor did we select interviewees in direct proportion to the distribution of their religion 
or belief in the populations of England and Wales. As discussed in section 2.2, 
surveys produce significantly different results on the religiosity of Britain depending 
                                               
18  Note that Appendix 1 lists 66 interviewees as one wished both their name and 
organisation to remain anonymous. 






on the question asked. Moreover, reported religious affiliation does not necessarily 
correspond to active religious practice, particularly among those who report Christian 
affiliation. There are significant differences between religion or belief groups as 
regards the relative importance of their religion or belief to their identity, with religion 
more often a defining identity for minority communities. There are also important 
differences between religion or belief groups in relation to their (actual or perceived) 
experience of discrimination, prejudice or disadvantage, with Muslims faring worst on 
all counts (see Chapter 3). These factors created a case for selecting a higher 
proportion of interviewees from minority religion or belief groups in England and 
Wales - and especially from Muslim organisations - than their share of the population 
might otherwise have suggested.  
 
Taking all these factors together, we devised selection criteria that sought to achieve 
the best possible balance by capturing:  
 
 the perspective of groups or individuals with an overview of the principal issues 
in England and Wales relevant to this research e.g.:  
  
o inter-faith or national religion or belief groups that could reflect the 
experience of a wide membership; 
o religion or belief groups that are especially concerned with human rights 
and equality issues or, more broadly, the intersection of religion or belief 
and public life; 
o individuals who sit (or have sat) on consultative groups on relevant policy 
areas, e.g. Government Equalities Office senior stakeholders; the Faith 
Communities Consultative Council (which formerly sat under the 
Department for Communities and Local Government but was disbanded 
as of May 2011); and the (now defunct) Religion and Belief Consultative 
Group which from 2008 acted as the advisory body to the EHRC on 
religion or belief;  
 
 both orthodox and minority positions within religion or belief groups;  
 
 distinct and contrasting (or competing) strands of opinion within religion or belief 
groups that have a bearing on our research themes; and 
 
 the perspective of groups that are able to reflect the intersection of equality, 






Interviewees concerned with other equality strands  
We selected interviewees from groups concerned with gender and sexual orientation 
because of the greater potential for disputes relating to religion and belief and either 
gender or sexual orientation, compared to the other equality strands. Tensions have 
arisen between religion or belief and other strands; for example, in relation to 
religious beliefs which view disability as a consequence of sins from a previous life 
(Malik, 2008a: 15). However, such tensions are not as prominent in relation to law 
and public policy as those involving gender or sexual orientation. 
 
We also selected several interviewees for their knowledge and experience of both 
religion or belief and gender or sexual orientation. The notion of competing rights or 
equality grounds, and the need to balance them, is of particular relevance to groups 
or individuals who expressly identify with more than one protected characteristic.  
 
Interviewees concerned with employment and service provision  
This is a broad category which includes employers, service providers and bodies that 
advise them; central government actors; trade unions; and groups that seek to shape 
public policy in relation to service provision.  
 
In terms of public services, we chose to focus on health and social care and 
education in view of their size and relevance to all communities in Britain, and the 
known range of policies and practices where disputes have arisen in relation to 
religion or belief. The focus on health and social care was extended through the 
roundtable discussion in Cardiff (see below).  
 
Academics or legal practitioners  
We selected academics or legal practitioners that have expertise (legal and/or 
sociological) that straddles the fields of religion or belief, human rights and equality. 
Two legal specialists from outside Britain were also included due to their academic 
and professional work on approaches to competing rights or equality grounds.  
 
Selection of roundtable participants  
The London roundtable involving academics, legal practitioners and policy experts 
took place at Matrix Chambers in London on 10 June 2011 (see Appendix 3). 
Participants were invited on the same basis as the equivalent group of interviewees. 
Some of the participants have, additionally, acted as advisors to the project (see 
Acknowledgments).  
 
The Cardiff roundtable on health and social care took place at the office of the EHRC 
in Wales on 28 June 2011 (see Appendix 2). Participants were invited from different 






parts of Wales and included: equality professionals and practitioners working within 
the National Health Service; trade unions and arbitration bodies; voluntary sector 
organisations; and religion or belief groups.  
 
Online surveys 
Both surveys were anonymous and were „live‟ for around four weeks up to the 
closing date of 15 July 2011.  
 
The research team made multiple requests to relevant networks and organisations 
(beyond those from which our interviewees were drawn) to circulate the surveys 
and/or promote them on their websites. It was not therefore possible to track the 
distribution in detail.19  
 
The workplace survey consisted primarily of closed questions with a prescribed 
range of options. It elicited 47 responses, mainly from large, public sector employers. 
The survey questions are presented in Appendix 6 and the results in Appendix 7. In 
addition, they are discussed alongside other evidence in section 8.3.  
 
The general survey consisted of open questions (except for those related to the 
respondent‟s organisational or other affiliation) (see Appendix 5). In this sense, it was 
akin to a „call for evidence‟ and its main purpose was to maximise the opportunity for 
participation in the research by religion or belief groups and groups representing 
other equality strands. It elicited 2,411 responses. The vast majority of these (around 
2,200) were received between 13 July 2011 and the closing date of 15 July. This 
followed an „Action Alert‟ circulated by Christian Concern on 13 July urging recipients 
to respond to the survey and suggesting points that they should emphasise in 
relation to particular questions.20 The volume of responses thereby generated is 
evident in the profile of respondents. Of the 2,411 responses, 99 per cent were from 
respondents who identified themselves as belonging to a religion or belief group. Of 
those that stated an affiliation, around 96 per cent identified themselves as Christian 
(of which 2 per cent were Catholic). This left small numbers of responses from 
minority religions or beliefs or other types of respondent (none of which reached 0.5 
per cent of the total). The impact of the Christian Concern „alert‟ is also evident in the 
content of the surveys. The vast majority of respondents who identified as Christian 
                                               
19  Known distributors of the workplace survey include the Employers Forum on Belief (now 
incorporated into the Employers Network for Equality & Inclusion). Known distributors of 
the general survey include the Interfaith Network for the UK and the Religion or Belief 
Network managed by the Equality and Human Rights Commission.  
 






raised similar concerns and employed similar (though not always identical) language 
to that used in the alert and consistently referred to the same legal cases identified in 
the alert.   
 
The surveys were deliberately not designed to yield statistically significant data. The 
open-ended nature of the general survey and the self-selecting nature of the 
respondents to both surveys mean that it is not possible to generalise from the 
responses. Rather, the responses provide a supplement to the „richer‟ data 
generated by the interviews and roundtable discussions. Survey responses are 
presented throughout the thematic chapters alongside the evidence from other 
sources.  
 
1.5 Scope of the report  
This report does not provide a comprehensive account of the law and case law in the 
area of equality, human rights and religion or belief.21 It deals selectively with legal 
issues and cases and focuses principally on the views and experiences of 
participants in this research. Appendix 8 provides summaries of the cases referred to 
and further references for readers who wish to find detailed legal analysis of these 
cases.  
 
This report is focused on England and Wales and does not cover Scotland or 
Northern Ireland. It refers selectively to cases related to religion or belief from the 
ECtHR and other non-European jurisdictions but does not attempt a comprehensive 
analysis of these (see Knights, 2007; Sandberg, 2011a). Nor does it examine in 
detail policy approaches towards religion or belief in other jurisdictions. 
 
The report does not examine the issue of discrimination on the basis of caste. Caste 
discrimination and harassment have not been explicitly covered by British 
discrimination legislation (Hepple, 2011: 27, 146). However, the Equality Act 2010 
includes the provision that, by order of a Minister, caste may be treated as an aspect 
of race. The UK government commissioned research to help inform it whether to 
exercise this power (Metcalf and Rolfe, 2010). The research found some evidence 
which suggested caste discrimination or harassment relevant to the Equality Act 
2010 could occur in the workplace and in the provision of services, as well as 
examples of pupil on pupil bullying; however, the extent of such discrimination could 
not be determined. It suggested that caste discrimination and harassment might be 
confronted by extending anti-discrimination legislation to cover caste (as an aspect of 
race) and/or through educative routes. As of January 2012, the government has not 
                                               
21  For which see: Bamforth et al. (2008); Knights (2007); Rivers (2010); Sandberg (2011a); 
Vickers (2008). 






formally responded to its findings. In August 2011, a couple who worked for a 
Coventry solicitors' firm were reported to be the first to make a claim of caste 
discrimination in an Employment Tribunal.22 
  
1.6  Guide to the report 
Each chapter integrates evidence from the literature review, interviews, roundtables 
and surveys.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 are primarily contextual. Chapter 2 examines the landscape of 
religion or belief in England and Wales with respect to affiliation and practice. It also 
examines the relationship between religion or belief and the state and the role of 
religion or belief in the formation of law and policy. Chapter 3 explores evidence 
about discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief in England and Wales.  
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are concerned with the law on equality, human rights and 
religion or belief. Chapter 4 introduces the main legal provisions and examines the 
importance of contextualising cases in order to determine their social, as well as 
legal, significance. Chapter 5 examines domestic case law concerning Article 9 and 
the law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. It explores debate 
about the institutional competence of courts and tribunals to rule on matters of 
religion or belief and to comprehend the significance of religions or beliefs to their 
adherents. It also discusses the idea of a duty of „reasonable accommodation‟ for 
religion or belief in the workplace. Chapter 6 examines the legal and conceptual 
debates about competing interests in relation to religion or belief. It explores the 
balancing of competing rights and equality grounds; debates about the nature of 
religion or belief as a protected characteristic; and the issue of conscientious 
objection. It also examines the legal exceptions to the Equality Act 2010. It concludes 
by examining the issue of legal „overstretch‟ caused by the inclusion of religion or 
belief alongside other equality grounds. 
 
Chapter 7 examines the impact of law, and responses to it, outside the courtroom. It 
identifies different „narratives‟ about the impact and significance of equality and 
human rights law in relation to religion or belief, including the Christian 
„marginalisation‟ narrative. It considers the role of the EHRC. The chapter also 
discusses the perceived problem of excessive litigation, as well as approaches to 
resolving disputes by non-legal means.  
 
                                               





Chapters 8 and 9 focus on implementation. Chapter 8 is concerned with managing 
religion or belief in the workplace; Chapter 9 focuses on the design and delivery of 
public services, with a focus on health and education. Each chapter presents 
examples of practical dilemmas and solutions relating to religion or belief.  
 
Chapter 10 draws together the main findings from preceding chapters and proposes 
ways of advancing debate in England and Wales about religion or belief. It also 
suggests options for further research. 
 






2.  Religion or belief in England and Wales 
    
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the demography of religion or belief in England and Wales 
and the role of religion or belief in the public sphere. It discusses different 
conceptions of „multiculturalism‟ and different attitudes towards the relationship 
between religion or belief and the state. It also examines the role of religion or belief 
in the formation of law and policy, including the difficulty of identifying and engaging 
with differentiated interests within religion or belief groups. 
 
2.2  The landscape of religion or belief in England and Wales  
This section summarises evidence about the landscape of religion or belief in 
England and Wales with respect to affiliation and practice.23 As Perfect (2011: 3) 
notes, statistical data sources tend only to cover religion/no religion and there are 
relatively few national statistics relating specifically to „belief‟. Surveys also vary as to 
their geographical coverage of the UK or its constituent parts.24  
 
Nye and Weller (2012: 50) describe the landscape in Britain as „three dimensional‟: 
Christian, secular and religiously plural. According to the 2001 Census, around 72 
per cent of adults in the UK reported Christian affiliation (Office for National Statistics, 
2004: 2). Muslims were the second largest group (2.8 per cent), comprising over half 
the non-Christian religious population, followed by Hindus, Sikhs, Jews and 
Buddhists. Around 15 per cent said they had no religion. England had a higher 
proportion affiliated to non-Christian religions (8.1 per cent) than Wales (2.7 per 
cent), with an especially marked disparity in the Muslim population (3.1 per cent in 
England compared to 0.8 per cent in Wales).  
 
The British Humanist Association criticised the wording of the 2001 and 2011 
Censuses (which asked the question „What is your religion?‟) for producing a 
misleading picture of the religiosity of the UK.25 Surveys using differently worded 
questions have produced significantly lower figures for religious affiliation. Since its 
inception in 1983, the annual British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey has asked: „Do 
you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion?‟ According to the latest 
                                               
23  See Perfect (2011) for a summary of recent statistical information on religious affiliation, 
religious practice and attendance, discrimination, and gender and church leadership 
positions. See also McAndrew and Voas (2011). 
  
24  See Winckler (2009: 9-10) for data relating to religion in Wales.  
 
25  See http://www.humanism.org.uk/campaigns/religion-and-belief-surveys-statistics. 
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BSA survey, those in Britain who profess no religion rose from one in three (31 per 
cent) in 1983 to one in two (50 per cent) in 2010 (Lee, 2011: 173).26 The number 
identifying as Christian fell from 63 per cent in 1983 to 44 per cent in 2010. The 
declining Christian share is largely attributable to a fall in the Church of 
England/Anglican percentage. The proportion identifying as belonging to other 
religions rose from 2 per cent in 1983 to 6 per cent in 2010. 
 
Other surveys, such as the Annual Population Survey (APS) in Britain and the 
Citizenship Survey, which covers England and Wales only, ask, „What is your religion 
even if you are not currently practising?‟ The latest APS and Citizenship Surveys 
produced results which were much closer to the Census data than the results of the 
BSA survey (Perfect, 2011: 4-5). The APS survey shows three trends: declines from 
2004-05 to 2008-09 in the Christian population (from 78 to 72 per cent); an increase 
in the Muslim population (from 3 to 4 per cent), and a rise in the „no religion‟ 
population (from 16 to 20 per cent) (Perfect, 2011: 5). In keeping with these trends, 
Woodhead with Catto (2009: 12) highlight the growth in Britain of charismatic, 
independent and black majority churches; faiths carried by post-war and post-colonial 
immigration (especially Islam); and a rise in other forms of „spirituality‟, at the 
expense of historic churches, as well as a rise in those stating that they have „no 
religion‟.  
 
Evidence is also available about the extent to which individuals who state that they 
have a religion consider whether or not they actively practise it. Beckford et al. (2006: 
7-8) find that the significance of religion for the individual and corporate life of 
Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus is relatively high compared to other groups. According to 
the Citizenship Survey in England and Wales, between two-thirds and four-fifths of 
Buddhists, Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims considered that they actively practised their 
religion in 2008-09, while only a third of Christians did so (Ferguson and Hussey, 
2010: 35). The BSA survey confirms this trend. Of those who affiliate to the Church of 
England/Anglicanism, only around half ever attend religious services or meetings 
while less than one in ten do so at least once a week (Lee, 2011: 177). Attendance is 
considerably higher for followers of religions other than Christianity: less than a 
quarter never attend and almost four in ten attend at least weekly. 
 
The precise meaning of the statistical evidence from the Census and other sources 
remains contested. In particular, there are ongoing debates about whether Britain 
remains a religious society or has become a secular one and whether or not 
„secularisation‟ has been succeeded by „desecularisation‟, reflecting a revival of 
                                               
26  Data are also available at: http://ir2.flife.de/data/natcen-social-
research/igb_html/index.php?bericht_id=1000001&index=&lang=ENG. 






religion. Woodhead (2012), in analysing the debates, suggests that post-war Britain 
is both religious and secular and emphasises the complexity and multi-layered nature 
of the current situation. Analysing the secularisation debate from an international 
perspective, Norris and Inglehart (2004: 4-5) argue that religiosity persists most 
strongly among vulnerable populations preoccupied with physical, societal and 
personal risks, especially, but not only, in poorer countries; by contrast, the 
importance and vitality of religion has eroded most clearly among prosperous social 
sectors living in affluent and secure post-industrial nations (the United States being a 
strikingly deviant case). This thesis suggest „an expanding gap between sacred and 
secular around the globe‟ as well as within nations (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 6). 
  
2.3  Cultural and religious diversity and multiculturalism  
A central concern for all liberal democracies with culturally and religiously diverse 
populations is the need to balance the interests of individuals, minority groups and 
society as a whole. This raises both theoretical and practical concerns. 
 
The early writers on „multiculturalism‟ (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1992) 
emphasised the importance of autonomy and cultural identity for groups and argued 
for recognition of key aspects of culture and religion in the public realm. Barry (2001) 
develops a theory of group rights that respects both internal diversity and universal 
rights and rules, with few permissible exceptions; the key, in his view, is the right to 
freedom of association and the ability freely to join or leave any group. Knights (2007: 
11) observes that more recent scholarship emphasises the fluidity of identity which 
means that a person may simultaneously experience more than one form of 
discrimination. According to this perspective, an approach which gives undue 
emphasis either to individual rights, or to the group, or to the state, may not be 
sufficiently responsive to this complexity. This view opens up for sociological analysis 
the discrimination that religion or belief groups exercise against others, including their 
own members or adherents. This in turn raises the difficult question of whether and in 
what circumstances the state should intervene in the internal affairs of a religious 
group; for example, in situations where adults appear to consent to harm or 
discrimination against themselves.  
 
In practice, state models of dealing with diverse cultures and identities vary, from the 
policy of assimilation in France to the more pluralistic and permissive legal and policy 
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approach taken in Britain.27 Debate in the UK about „multiculturalism‟ is unsettled. 
While it may be used as a purely descriptive term for the increasing diversity of 
culture, race and religion in liberal democracies, debate about multiculturalism has 
become preoccupied in recent years with the issues of combating violent and non-
violent Islamist „extremism‟ and creating social cohesion (Jayaweera and Choudhury, 
2008; Commission on Cohesion and Integration, 2007). David Cameron has 
advocated an „active, muscular liberalism‟, in which minorities must live according to 
certain shared social norms; he contrasted this to „state multiculturalism‟ which he 
said had failed by tolerating „segregated communities behaving in ways that run 
counter to our values‟.28  
 
However, other approaches reject this binary distinction between liberalism and 
multiculturalism. Malik (2010; 2012) proposes a form of „progressive‟ multiculturalism. 
This endorses the accommodation of difference as a requirement of the core values 
of liberal politics, whilst retaining the liberal concern with individual autonomy and 
human rights (see also Modood, 2007; Modood and Levey, 2009). It recognises not 
only the relative powerlessness of minority groups in relation to the centralised state 
and legal apparatus, but also the powerlessness of some individuals within minority 
groups. A „progressive‟ multiculturalism, then, gives predominant weight to the 
interests of vulnerable individuals where they conflict with those of the dominant 
members of a minority group.  
 
Pursuing „progressive‟ multiculturalism therefore also involves protecting the right to 
freedom of religion or belief of relatively powerless groups. For example, Tehmina 
Kazi of British Muslims for Secular Democracy commented that she had acted as a 
witness to inform a planning decision as to whether a mosque run by the global 
Islamic movement, Tablighi Jamaat, could continue to use a site in east London. Kazi 
had adduced evidence of gender segregation within the movement and a failure to 
                                               
27  A law criminalising the concealment of an individual‟s face came into force in France in 
April 2011. A similar ban was introduced in Belgium in July 2011 and was immediately 
challenged in the constitutional court as discriminatory. Legislative proposals addressing 
the wearing of face coverings in public have also been tabled in Denmark, Italy and the 
Netherlands. However, the Swedish Equality Ombudsman held that a general ban on the 
niqab was not acceptable. See Do (2011); McGoldrick (2006); Open Society Foundations 
(2011).  
  
28  David Cameron, speech at the Munich Security Conference on 5 February 2011; available 
at http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference/. 
 






provide facilities for women as a reason why the mosque did not fulfil planning 
criteria.29 
 
Minority legal orders 
The vulnerability of „minorities within minorities‟ is brought into sharp focus by the 
existence of minority legal orders - or systems of normative and legal regulation - 
rooted in religious communities.30 Malik (2012: 24) suggests that minority legal orders 
may be understood as a spectrum: all entail a set of norms as to how individuals in a 
community should or should not act and the remedies and consequences resulting 
from those actions, while some also involve a system for the identification, change 
and enforcement of norms. Christians, Muslims and Jews have systems of normative 
and legal regulation, as do many smaller minority religious communities.  
 
Malik (2012: 9) notes that minority communities‟ claims for accommodation of legal 
norms have frequently been exaggerated in public debate. This has been especially 
so in relation to Islamic legal norms or Sharia; for example, it has been suggested 
that Muslim communities seek to impose their cultural or religious norms on all British 
citizens or to opt out of the state‟s jurisdiction entirely.31 Such erroneous statements 
have fuelled the discourse of groups like the English Defence League, which object 
to what they call the „Islamisation‟ of Britain.  
 
It is important to distinguish these distorted accounts from other concerns about 
religious arbitration or mediation. Some interviewees highlighted the specific 
vulnerability of women who use religious tribunals, whether for arbitration or 
mediation. Religious arbitration involves semi-formal, but voluntary, mechanisms for 
enforcement of the norms or decisions of a minority legal order. Under the Arbitration 
Act 1996, family law matters cannot be the subject of contractually binding arbitration 
agreements; the state system maintains overall sovereignty in family law matters 
                                               
29  See „Tablighi Jamaat mosque accused of encouraging Muslim isolationism‟, The 
Guardian, 18 February 2011. 
 
30  This section does not attempt a comprehensive analysis of minority legal orders, for which 
see Bano (2007); Douglas et al. (2011); Malik (2012); Sandberg (2011a, Chapter 9); 
Shachar (2001, 2010).  
 
31  Such claims were most evident in the intense controversy following the suggestion by 
Archbishop Rowan Williams in February 2008 that some religious communities could 
„share‟ jurisdiction with state law. See also the campaign „One Law for All‟ that emerged 
after Archbishop Williams‟ speech; http://www.onelawforall.org.uk/. 
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(Douglas et al., 2011).32 Mediation is a separate procedure where parties attempt to 
negotiate a settlement of their dispute. Mediation is not binding and is not subject to 
legal principles whether of religious or state law. It must be freely entered into by both 
parties. 
 
Malik (2012: 32-33) argues that the concept of „cultural voluntarism‟, which assumes 
that individuals are free to move in or out of social groups and norms, may be part of 
the problem in situations where women are unable to negotiate social arrangements 
that are in their best interests. Women may consent to arbitration procedures (for 
example, to obtain a „religious‟ divorce) without agreeing to the substantive legal rule 
that will be applied or to be bound by the final outcome. The problem is exacerbated 
when the norms that are applied are uncertain or unclear.  
 
Professor Liz Kelly of the End Violence Against Women coalition argued that:  
 
... it is concerning when … women are being siphoned into a parallel form 
of justice which doesn‟t start from the same human rights principles as 
[state] law. [Religious arbitration or mediation] can start from the principle 
that the  most important thing is family or the community - always some 
bigger group to which women‟s rights are subordinated.  
 
Professor Kelly noted that some religious communities placed a strong expectation 
on women to use tribunals for determination of family or inheritance disputes rather 
than using state courts; this was „inherently problematic‟. Religious mediation, Kelly 
added, is particularly inappropriate in cases of domestic violence where perpetrator 
and victim are on an unequal footing and there is a risk that women may be mediated 
back into violent relationships. Pragna Patel of Southall Black Sisters (SBS)33  
argued that religious tribunals may be well suited to arbitrate business disputes 
between parties with roughly equal power, but should have no role in relation to 
family matters where disparities of power are socially engrained. Patel proposed that 
the Arbitration Act 1996 be amended so that religious arbitration in family matters is 
declared unlawful. She expressed a view that cuts to legal aid and advice services 
will increase the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution and „drive women 
                                               
32  Inheritance disputes can in principle be the subject of a binding arbitration decision 
because they do not come under the jurisdiction of family courts in the state system. 
However, under section 81 of the Arbitration Act, such a decision would only be enforced 
if it is compatible with UK law and public policy. 
 
33  Among other services, Southall Black Sisters offers advice, information, advocacy, 
counselling and self-help support services to Asian and African-Caribbean and other 
minority women experiencing violence and abuse; http://www.southallblacksisters.org.uk/. 
 






away‟ from the state legal system where their rights may be contested on a basis of 
human rights and equality.  
 
Some of the (limited) body of empirical research on the operation of religious 
tribunals in the UK reinforces these concerns. In a study of Islamic family arbitration, 
Bano (2007: 20) notes that „privatised‟ legal processes ignored state law and due 
process and provided „little protection and safety‟ for women, including those who 
were party to civil injunctions issued against their husbands on the grounds of 
violence and threatening behaviour. Women had attended „reconciliation sessions‟ 
(part of the process of seeking a religious divorce) reluctantly and felt they had no 
choice but to do so in order to obtain a divorce. Bano concludes that: 
 
Quite clearly these women were in a weak bargaining position and their 
autonomy and choice was to some extent being limited … [T]here are 
subliminal and covert forms of power and coercion … rendering the parties 
unequal and the process unfair … [I]n this process of dispute resolution 
the women were encouraged to reconcile and to conform to cultural 
dictates and acceptable patterns of behaviour if they were to be issued 
with a divorce certificate. 
 
These concerns point to the need for further empirical research to examine the 
impact of minority legal orders on those who use them or are affected by them, 
particularly vulnerable groups such as women and children. Such research might 
establish the degree to which women are able to exercise autonomy, agency and 
choice within religious arbitration or mediation.  
 
Malik (2012: 43-44) argues that the present protections offered by the Arbitration Act 
1996 are insufficient because they rely on „fire alarm‟ regulation by women 
themselves; even though tribunal decisions which breach the requirements of 
procedural justice may be unenforceable, women may be reluctant to challenge them 
and therefore may be deprived of their right to equality at law. Malik advocates a 
system of monitoring through statutory agencies which can offer active support to 
users of religious tribunals.  
  
2.4  Religion or belief and the state  
This section explores the relationship of religion or belief to the state, including 
attitudes towards secularism and the role of the Church of England. There are 
various models of church and state divide, ranging from close links (such as Greece 
and many Muslim nations), to weaker forms of establishment (such as the UK), to 
models of strict separation (such as Turkey and the United States) and models that 
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combine non-establishment with restricted legal, administrative and political pluralism 
(such as Germany). An understanding of these diverse models is critical to 
understanding the level of state interference in religious affairs and the relative 
positions of different religions or beliefs within a state (Ahdar and Leigh, 2005). In 
turn, as Knights (2007: 8) notes, a view on the importance of religion (or of a 
particular religion) and its manifestation will be implicit in the balancing exercise 
between the interests of religion, the state and individuals in particular instances 
where these appear to conflict.  
 
Attitudes to secularism 
A dominant theme of our interviews was the perceived gulf - on a range of issues 
explored in this report - between „faith‟ and some participants‟ understanding of 
„secularism‟. For example, interviewees affiliated to Christian, Muslim, Sikh and 
Buddhist groups variously described secularism as „rampant, fundamentalism under 
another hat‟; „militant‟; „like a dominant religion, monopolising the public space‟; and 
„negative and superficial‟. Yann Lovelock of the Network of Buddhist Organisations 
observed that:  
 
... many faiths are deeply distressed because we feel that a secular 
agenda is being forced on us without dialogue … there is a presumption 
that religion is the problem and is against human rights.  
 
Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal commented that public debate 
about the role of religion or belief in the public sphere had become focused on the 
Muslim community as a „strong and fervent faith-based community‟; Muslims had 
become „caught in the crossfire‟ and risked becoming scapegoats. He argued that 
the principal faultline was not between faiths, but between „the world of faith and the 
world of secularism‟:  
 
Ultimately the questions that are being asked by all [faith] communities are 
the same – what role can we play within our community and the secular 
pushback on it is, 'Yes, you can play a role in your own individual 
communities but not at a state level'.  
 
Boucher (2010: 69-70) argues that secularism is not a position of neutrality; 
secularism is itself a belief with its own „equalities identity‟ and with the „radical 
political agenda of trying to make the public square completely secular for everyone‟.  
Andrea Williams, Chief Executive Officer of Christian Concern, argued that:  
 






What we are finding is that secular liberal humanism leads to the foisting 
of certain ideas onto people who, if they speak out, can find themselves in 
trouble - even leading to the beginnings of censorship. 
 
In contrast, Pollock (2011a: 1) ventures that hostility towards „secularism‟ stems in 
part from misuse and misunderstanding of the term which is confused with (among 
other terms) atheism and „secularisation‟. While secularisation is about „the 
subordination or rejection of religious values and beliefs in a community‟,  
  
Secularism is not about a secular society but about a secular state. It is a 
political philosophy of separation of religion and politics … Secularism is 
not hostile to religion. It is respectful of all religions and beliefs. It is a 
formula for living together harmoniously with people with whom you have 
profound disagreements in matters of so-called 'ultimate beliefs' . 
(emphasis in original)  
 
Pollock‟s understanding of secularism is supported by some (but not all) religious 
people, including among our interviewees. From this perspective, a secular state, 
with no privileging of any one religion and no legitimisation of any particular religious 
identity, is the best guarantor of everyone‟s right to manifest or be free from religion; 
it also provides a neutral public space in which „competing demands - for resources, 
services and social and political influence - can be effectively negotiated‟ (brap/British 
Humanist Association, 2009: 14). Debbie Young-Somers, a Rabbi in the West 
London Synagogue, observed that while „individuals have the right to freedom of 
expression and freedom of belief, the state must be for the benefit of all‟. Tehmina 
Kazi advocated „procedural‟, as distinct from „ideological‟, secularism to ensure that 
no group is allowed to exert disproportionate influence on the state apparatus.  
 
Some interviewees, while advocating some reconfiguring of the relationship between 
church and state in Britain, were concerned not to downgrade thereby the importance 
of religious faith. Graham Sparkes of the Baptist Union of Great Britain advocated a 
„soft secularism, not a hard secularism that tries to exclude religion and belief‟. 
Charles Wookey, Assistant General Secretary of the Catholic Bishops‟ Conference of 
England and Wales, argued that:  
 
There is an idea of the state being neutral which suggests that it shouldn‟t 
pay any attention to religion which is one way of treating all religions 
equally, but this would seem to be prejudicial to the whole notion of 
religion … the state should be faith sensitive rather than faith blind and 
welcome the contribution of religion to the public square. 
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(emphasis in original) 
 
What is clear is that „secularism‟ has no settled meaning. For debate to advance, it 
may be useful for those who use the term to define what they mean by it in order that 
differences of meaning are explicit.  
 
It should also be emphasised that religious and secular perspectives are not always 
or necessarily oppositional. Gearty (2011: 5) argues that faith-based and secular 
perspectives on human rights share a common concern about social injustice and a 
commitment to a set of human rights standards and principles enshrined in law. It 
may not matter, he suggests, if „these two versions of human rights and human 
dignity get to the same truths by radically different routes‟. 
 
The role of the Church of England  
The United Kingdom is not, of course, a secular state. The Church of England is the 
established state religion of England (though not of Northern Ireland, Scotland or 
Wales) with the monarch as its head and 26 bishops holding seats as of right in the 
House of Lords (Rivers, 2010: 289-96).34 Among our interviewees, views differed as 
to the implications of having an established Church both for minority religions or 
beliefs and for equality and human rights more generally. 
 
One interviewee noted that the UK is still constitutionally a Christian country and it is 
„helpful‟ that laws have been passed historically to reflect that position. This stance 
was echoed strongly in responses to the general online survey from respondents 
who identified as Christian.35 These emphasised the UK‟s „Christian heritage‟ and the 
role of „Christian values‟ in supporting the common good. They tended to distinguish 
between what several called „man-made rules‟ (mainly identified as lesbian, gay, 
bisexual or transgender (LGBT) rights) and traditional Christian beliefs which had 
withstood the test of time. The vast majority cited the 2001 Census data to suggest 
that almost three quarters of people the UK identify as Christian (see section 2.2) and 
that, as one respondent put it: 
 
 They should not be forced to obey the dictates of a small minority 
who want to legislate against those laws and Christian practices 
which have stood the nation in good stead for over 1,000 years.  
 
                                               
34  The Church in Wales, part of the Anglican communion, is no longer an established 
church. 
 
35  Note that the majority of these responses appear to have been generated in response to 
an „Action Alert‟ by Christian Concern; see section 1.4.  






This view of an embattled church was not shared by Malcolm Brown, Director of 
Mission and Public Affairs for the Church of England, who observed that: 
 
We cherish the inheritance embodied in the established church and regard 
it as being of considerable symbolic importance ... but we don‟t expect 
laws to be made to secure our precedence within a social pecking order.  
 
He added that the Church would itself „ask more questions‟ about establishment if it 
felt that other Christian denominations or other faith groups found it a major problem, 
but „we find that other faiths and churches are quite glad it‟s there‟. Some 
interviewees affiliated with minority religions or beliefs were indeed comfortable with 
the idea of an established church. Jon Benjamin observed that the Board of Deputies 
of British Jews, which he heads: 
 
... is, as a faith community going back 350 years in this country, very 
accepting of the role of the Anglican church and the structures that exist - 
possibly more so than some Protestant groups who feel more out on a 
limb.  
 
Among our interviewees, those from newer faith communities (including all those 
affiliated with Muslim organisations) appeared to share this acceptance - or at least 
indifference. None argued for disestablishment. The formal relationship between 
church and state appeared less important to these interviewees than recognition in 
principle of the importance of religious faith to some communities and the ability of all 
religion or belief groups to have a voice and to operate freely. For example, Moulana 
Shahid Raza of the British Muslim Forum stated that: 
  
In my opinion, the relation between religion and the state should be as it is 
at the moment, where we are free to observe our religious practices and 
the state does not interfere in the religious field of faith communities.  
  
Other interviewees favoured a reduction in the influence and privileges of the Church 
of England. This view was expressed by representatives of trade unions and groups 
concerned with equality strand/s who had been frustrated by, among other instances, 
the role played by bishops in the House of Lords in preventing alterations to the 
scope of religious exemptions during the passage of the Equality Bill (Cranmer, 
2010b; see also section 6.6). It was also expressed by some interviewees affiliated to 
minority religions or beliefs, and especially minority Christian denominations. Charles 
Wookey was unconvinced of the argument for (say) removing bishops from the 
House of Lords, lest it send a message that „faith doesn‟t matter anymore‟. However, 
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he advocated adjustments to current arrangements in ways that recognise „the multi-
faith character of our country‟; for example, changes to address the disproportionate 
number of Anglican chaplaincies in public bodies (see also Beckford et al., 2005; 
Burnside, 2005; Rivers, 2010, Chapter 7).  
 
Other interviewees unequivocally favoured disestablishment. These included, 
unsurprisingly, the National Secular Society and British Humanist Association, as 
well as some interviewees affiliated to minority religions or belief groups, especially 
those from non-conformist traditions. Reverend Sharon Ferguson of the Lesbian and 
Gay Christian Movement argued that „no one religion should be able to influence to 
such an extent the laws that we put into place‟. For Jonathan Bartley of the non-
denominational Christian think-tank Ekklesia, disestablishment is necessary 
because: 
 
The Church has become conditioned to think theologically and practically 
from a top-down perspective using instruments of the state to get what it 
wants ... It has to have its arguments accepted on merit rather than 
privilege; it has to lead by example.  
 
He added that disestablishment would not mean disengagement by the Church from 
public life: rather, the Church should draw on its radical, subversive tradition, „playing 
a full part in public life but on a level playing field, recognising … religious and 
political plurality [and with] no special privileges or favours‟.  
 
2.5  The role of religion or belief in the formation of law and public policy 
Aside from the constitutional relationship between church and state, broader 
questions arise as to the role of religion or belief groups in the formation of law and 
public policy. This includes both „formal and semi-formal rights of access to major 
public contexts of debate and decision-making‟ (Rivers, 2010: 289).36  
 
Rivers (2010: 304-05) notes that there has been an „exponential rise‟ in new 
consultation processes between public and religious bodies in the past decade.37 
This has been driven by different impulses which have variously viewed religion as a 
positive social force (for example, to tackle urban deprivation or provide welfare 
                                               
36  See Rivers (2010: 305-14) and Knott and Mitchell (2012) for discussions of religious 
broadcasting, a topic not covered in this report.  
  
37  This trajectory may not be certain; for example, the Faith Communities Consultative 
Council, established in 2005 under the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, has been disbanded by the coalition government.  






services); an unavoidable social reality; or potentially socially disruptive (particularly 
after the July 2005 London bombings) (see also Allen, 2011; Dinham et al., 2009).  
 
For the majority of our interviewees, religion or belief groups have a legitimate place 
at the public table, but should not have a privileged one. From this perspective, 
religion or belief groups are, as several interviewees put it, „just like any other interest 
group‟ or self-constituted voluntary organisation. Religion or belief groups can seek to 
inform law or policy but should not constrain it and the perspective of such groups 
should not be separated out as requiring different or special treatment. According to 
this view, there is no room in debate about law or public policy for „truth claims‟ or 
claims of moral superiority based upon a particular religion or belief, however 
existential it may be for its adherents. These views suggest a broadly-held desire to 
maintain an appropriate balance between religion or belief and democratic debate. 
David Pollock of the European Humanist Federation considered that:  
 
... arguments based on religious doctrine should carry no weight in public 
decision-making, but the onus for that rests with politicians, it‟s not a ban 
on the churches … making those arguments (see also Pollock, 2011a). 
 
This „just another interest group‟ view was expressed by a range of interviewees: 
those affiliated to the Anglican and Catholic Churches, smaller Christian groups or 
denominations and a range of minority religion or belief groups, as well as by some 
groups concerned with other equality strands. There were differences of emphasis 
within this broadly articulated position. Some gave greater emphasis to what they 
saw as the positive values and perspectives on the common good that religions and 
beliefs (including humanism) bring to the public table. Reverend Aled Edwards of 
Cytûn: Churches Together in Wales and the Wales Committee of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission argued that: 
 
All good law will be promulgated on good, clear aspirations and a value 
base… Faith community, or indeed belief involvement … gives you a 
healthy  sense of personal conviction and value. So I think it forms an 
important element within the promulgation of law.  
 
For Jit Jethwa of the Hindu Forum of Britain, „faith groups need to be fully integrated 
and engaged‟ in the formation of law and policy in order that the state is able to be 
responsive to their distinct requirements. Shaista Gohir, Executive Director of the 
Muslim Women‟s Network UK, argued that the views of religion or belief groups 
should be „taken into account‟ by law- and policy-makers, but should not be too 
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closely identified with the state because of the diversity of British society and the 
general decline in religious (and especially Christian) affiliation.  
 
Some interviewees stood apart from this broadly articulated position that religion or 
belief has a legitimate, but not privileged, place at the public table. From one 
perspective, Pragna Patel of Southall Black Sisters argued that,  
 
… religion or belief is a private matter and should not form the basis of public 
engagement … It should have no role to play in shaping policy.  
 
From the opposite view, Andrea Williams of Christian Concern suggested that: 
 
What the Christian wants is good for all ... Christianity is hospitable, and 
never coercive ... The Christian discourse needs to be at the centre of 
public life.  
  
Government engagement with religion or belief groups 
Most interviewees suggested that different religion or belief groups do not engage 
with government agencies in England and Wales on a „level playing field‟.  
 
Andrew Copson of the British Humanist Association argued that the „belief‟ strand 
(including humanism) has been neglected by successive governments. This had 
been compounded by a tendency among public bodies to speak of „faith 
communities‟ as if these were inclusive of the whole „religion or belief‟ strand - a „lazy 
use of vocabulary which constitutes a serious barrier for non-religious engagement‟ 
in public policy (see also brap/British Humanist Association, 2009).38 Allen (2011) 
analyses the Labour government‟s development of, on the one hand, an equalities 
framework which protects against discrimination on the basis of „religion or belief‟ 
and, on the other, policies which focused on „faith‟ to the exclusion of belief (and 
those with no religion or belief) (see, e.g., Communities and Local Government, 
2008). Despite being routinely spoken about in the same terms, he notes 
„fundamental differences … existed between the way in which Labour approached 
and responded to religion (or belief) and faith‟, to the extent that „its faith policy 
approaches could even have gone some way in undermining the broader equalities 
ethos‟ (Allen, 2011: 272).     
 
                                               
38  It has been suggested, for example, that where public agencies want to engage with 
representatives of „religion or belief‟ groups, emphasis should be placed on seeking 
particular skills, expertise and competence rather than religious, cultural or ethnic „identity‟ 
(brap/British Humanist Association, 2009: 45). 
 






Interviewees from some smaller religion or belief groups, such as those representing 
the Bahá'í faith and different traditions within Judaism, considered that they were 
able to articulate a cohesive voice to government. This was fostered by their having 
relatively clear lines of authority and accountability and continuity of representation 
within their religious groups. Those affiliated to Muslim organisations considered that 
they lacked these advantages. According to Wahida Shaffi, Director of the Bradford 
Muslim Women‟s Council: 
 
We are still a relatively new community, structurally we are still developing, 
and we are far behind Christian communities … We have to acknowledge 
the structural inequalities between Muslims and Christians. 
(emphasis in original).  
 
Khalid Sofi, the Legal Officer of the Muslim Council of Britain, argued that this 
„structural inequality‟ created an onus on public bodies to „provide adequate 
resources and infrastructure‟ to engage with disparate and relatively less well-
established Muslim communities which, in addition, face higher levels of 
discrimination and prejudice. Shaista Gohir added that Muslim groups should be 
consulted about the „daily inequalities‟ they face and not only about issues that are 
priorities for policy-makers.  
 
Interviewees from other minority religions or beliefs, too, considered themselves at a 
disadvantage. It was observed that evangelical house churches, lacking structure, 
found it „hard to get heard‟ despite their growing numbers.39 The Pagan Federation 
had encountered „total inertia‟ from government in its efforts to gain recognition and 
respect. Its president, Chris Crowley, stated that:  
 
We‟re thought of as being fringe and marginal and we‟re not getting the 
same equality treatment that would be applied to other religious 
communities even though they might be a lot smaller than us.  
 
Jit Jethwa suggested that government agencies tended to have a greater 
understanding of Abrahamic faiths (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) than Dharmic 
faiths (principally, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism):  
  
                                               
39  Perfect (2011: 12) summarises data from successive English Church Surveys on those 
attending 'new' churches (or house churches) or denominations in England. In 2005, 6 per 
cent of all churchgoers in the survey attended such churches, compared to only 1 per cent 
in 1979. See also Brierley (2006). 
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We have had to fight to get the government to recognise the differences 
between faith groups … Hinduism is the third largest faith in Britain... yet 
we may not be consulted in the same way as other faiths.  
 
The „numbers game‟ - as some interviewees put it - plays out in complex ways. 
Malcolm Brown, who represents the Church of England, observed that „getting to the 
voice of faith communities‟ is not easy:  
 
It‟s a social fact that there are a lot of Anglicans and Catholics compared 
to others and that needs to be taken into account - but it‟s not the same as 
saying that numbers give us the authority to impose our will. We believe in 
a plurality of voices. So reflecting the fact that we‟re bigger than most 
others without making that a point of leverage or moral blackmail is quite 
subtle.  
 
A problem expressed by interviewees affiliated to both majority and minority religious 
organisations was that of „religious illiteracy‟ among public bodies and the media; that 
is, a lack of understanding of the tenets and practices of different religions or beliefs.  
 
Malcolm Brown suggested that many decision makers held in their heads a 
metaphorical wall chart, with a list of world faiths down one axis and a list of „bizarre 
behaviours‟ down the other. For Dr Don Horrocks of the Evangelical Alliance, 
religious „illiteracy‟ too often leads public bodies to engage with inter-faith 
organisations as a way of „short circuiting‟ the need to engage with a plurality of 
voices: this approach, he believed, had provoked „huge resistance and opposition‟ 
among evangelical communities which disliked its implied syncretism. Tehmina Kazi 
observed that government agencies do not always have a sophisticated 
understanding of strands of Islamic thought, with significant consequences for public 
policy; this was most effectively addressed by public discussion among Muslim 
networks and organisations which could credibly comment upon theological and 
political differences within Islam (see also Jayaweera and Choudhury, 2008). 
 
A further concern of some religion or belief groups was the tendency of public bodies 
to view them simply as a means to achieve a particular end. Reverend Alan Green, 
who chairs Tower Hamlets Inter Faith Forum, argued that: 
  
The more negative side is the tendency to see the role of faith 
communities only in terms of community cohesion - to see religion as 
dampening things down ... We have let religion in the door as a tool of 






containment and I‟m not keen on that but it‟s a step - we have been 
noticed and it‟s up to us to make it more positive.  
  
In Tower Hamlets, he added, this perception had shifted considerably:  
 
There is now a recognition that faith is a contributor, not just an instrument and 
[the local authority] has taken pains to find out what it is that faith communities 
might contribute as faith communities to help the well-being of the borough. 
 
2.6  Authority and representativeness within religion or belief groups  
Communities based upon a religion or belief tend to be highly differentiated (Beckford 
et al., 2006; Dinham, 2009; Dinham et al., 2009; Woodhead with Catto, 2009). A high 
proportion of minority religious groups also belong to minority ethnic groups, creating 
a complex - and highly context-specific - relationship between race, religion and 
culture. This complexity, and a general lack of disaggregated data, makes abstract 
generalisations about the views of religious communities perilous.  
 
Perspectives between adherents of the same religion or belief may vary according to, 
among other factors, generation, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and 
geographical location. Differences may, in turn, be linked to the geographical origins 
of particular communities or religious traditions. Nor do all religion or belief groups 
have identifiable leaders or representatives, especially those which are non-
hierarchical. Even where they do, their positions may be contested by others with the 
same stated affiliation or may not represent the views of „dissidents‟ or of relatively 
powerless groups, such as women or people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual or 
transgender (Panjwani, 2007; Stuart, 2010).  
 
Differentiation within religion or belief groups has implications for public bodies 
seeking to identify authentic or authoritative voices that represent different religion or 
belief groups (or denominations, sects or social structures within them) (Vickers, 
2011: 143-44). This concern is not unique to religion or belief groups; other interest 
groups or social movements also contain dissonant voices which public bodies must 
weigh against each other. However, it raises important issues in relation to equality 
and human rights since religion or belief groups may discriminate as well as being 
discriminated against. Who „speaks for‟ a group matters greatly where power is 
unevenly distributed within it in ways that may not always be obvious to those outside 
the group. Who government chooses to speak to also matters, because it may confer 
legitimacy or resources that may affect the balance of power within a community.  
Several interviewees argued that religious hierarchies tend to be more orthodox and 
conservative around matters of doctrine and social policy than the wider public and 
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even than the majority of their adherents (see also Bamforth and Richards, 2008).40 
According to Keith Porteous-Wood of the National Secular Society, the undue 
influence of such voices on policy-makers „leads to a mismatch in our democratic 
process‟. Several interviewees from groups concerned with equality strand/s 
suggested that policy-makers should be mindful of the differential resources and 
power of certain groups, which can make their views appear more widespread than 
they actually are. Reverend Sharon Ferguson noted that:  
 
... those who shout the loudest get heard. And they tend to be the ones 
who have attracted larger amounts of money who tend to be the more 
fundamentalist, more extreme voices, or the longer established. 
  
Interviewees familiar with community-based religion or belief networks were also 
concerned about the issue of representation. Doreen Finneron of the Faith-based 
Regeneration Network commented that „gender representation is lacking in religion 
or belief groups and audible voices are often male dominated, [even though] the 
active core of groups is often female‟. Dr Husna Ahmad, Chief Executive of the Faith 
Regen Foundation, noted that the lack of hierarchy in Islam means that people can 
„proclaim themselves as self-made leaders‟; public authorities, she added, need to 
engage with members of a community beyond its „gate-keepers‟.  
 
Issues of authority and representativeness present particular challenges for newer 
faith communities, which may feel exposed and may contain significant differences of 
view between the generations. Reverend Alan Green gave the example of the East 
London Mosque, the leadership of which became involved in the local „No Place for 
Hate‟ campaign.41 This campaign was set up to confront all forms of hate crime. 
Among other issues, it has addressed the posting of stickers in public spaces 
declaring east London a „gay free zone‟.42 Reverend Green noted that:  
 
                                               
40  For example, an opinion poll of 1,600 practising British Catholics by YouGov to coincide 
with the Pope‟s visit in 2010 found that three out of 10 believed that a woman should 
always have the right to choose whether to have an abortion, while seven out of 10 
believed that she should be allowed to do so in the case of rape, incest, severe disability 
to the child or as an indirect consequence of life-saving treatment for the mother. Nine out 




41  See http://www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/lgsl/1101-1150/1133_hate_crime/no_place_ 
for_hate_campaign.aspx. 
 
42  See „East London Mosque and mayor condemn anti-gay stickers‟, Pink News, 17 
February 2011. 
 






The East London Mosque leadership … understands the complexity … 
[but] its membership doesn't, and particularly the older generation. So the 
leaders have real difficulty. If they speak out too clearly they will lose their 
credibility within their own community and will not then be able to assist in 
moving their community forward. But in compromising their message - as 
it seems to LGBT groups - they appear to be covertly endorsing the 
conservative view. 
 
A small number of interviewees contested the very notion of „representativeness‟ in 
relation to religious groups. The strongest expression of this view came from Jasdev 
Singh Rai, General Secretary of the British Sikh Consultative Forum, who stated that:  
 
The dynamics of religious institutions are very different; they are religious 
institutions by virtue of the fact that they concern themselves with 
revelations or doctrines. [They] are not democratic set ups. The issue of 
who‟s representing religious communities is a red herring created by 
secularists; it‟s not how religions work. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the context in which discussions of equality, human rights 
and religion or belief in England and Wales take place. Evidence relating to the 
religion or belief landscape is contradictory but certain trends are apparent: a decline 
in the numbers affiliated to historic churches, a rise in those stating that they have no 
religion and (especially in England) an increase in faiths carried by post-war and 
post-colonial immigration.  
 
Multiculturalism has become a contested term. Debate about multiculturalism has 
become intertwined with, in particular, concerns about Islamic „extremism‟ and the 
perceived segregation of communities with distinct social values - one response to 
which is said to be a „muscular‟ liberal politics in which minorities are required to live 
according to the presumed shared social norms of the indigenous majority. By 
contrast, „progressive‟ notions of multiculturalism seek to address the powerlessness 
both of minority groups in relation to the centralised state and of individuals within 
those groups whose interests may conflict with those of dominant members of the 
group.  
 
Our inquiry suggests that, in matters of policy, the emphasis should be on identifying 
asymmetries of power and engaging with vulnerable individuals to prevent harm. 
Such an approach recognises and respects individuals‟ membership of a cultural or 
religious community, whilst also recognising the internal diversity of most such 
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communities and ensuring that all their putative members are able to be full citizens 
of a liberal political community.  
  
The potential vulnerability of „minorities within minorities‟ is brought into sharp focus 
by the existence of minority legal orders rooted in religious communities. We have 
identified the need for further empirical research to examine the impact of minority 
legal orders on those that use them or are affected by them, particularly groups such 
as women and children. In addition, there is a need to strengthen the protections 
presently offered by the Arbitration Act 1996 to users of religious tribunals.  
 
„Secularism‟ is also a controversial term. Among our interviewees, the faultline 
between the „religious‟ and the „secular‟ was generally perceived to be greater than 
that between religious faiths - and was certainly more vehemently expressed by 
some. Some (but not all) interviewees affiliated to religious groups perceive there to 
be a „secular agenda‟ to diminish the importance of religion in society - a perception 
which extends well beyond the established meaning of secularism as a separation of 
religion and state.  
 
In some instances, our research suggests, discussion about religion or belief in the 
public sphere involves assumptions on each side which appear mutually unintelligible 
(such as the observation that „secularists‟ concerned about the representativeness of 
religious community leaders do not understand „how religions work‟). This insight 
provides an important context for our examination of particular legal and policy issues 
relating to equality, human rights and religion or belief in Chapters 4 onwards; it may 
explain why debate has at times become so acrimonious, as specific legal cases or 
policy matters act as a „lightning rod‟ for a broader perceived gulf between the 
„religious‟ and the „secular‟.  
 
At the same time, it is important not to overstate this division. Our interviews 
suggested a fairly high degree of consensus among groups concerned with both the 
„religion‟ and „belief‟ strands (as well as groups concerned with other equality 
strands) that religion or belief groups are legitimate interest groups like any other but 
should have no privileged role in the formation of law and policy. In particular, a 
majority of interviewees held that there was no room for „truth claims‟ based on 
religious doctrine in matters of law and policy.  
 
This chapter has also established that religion and belief groups do not consider 
themselves to operate on a „level playing field‟ when it comes to law- and policy-
making. Some interviewees observed that the „belief‟ strand had been excluded due 






to a tendency among public bodies to focus on „faith communities‟. Some (but not all) 




3.  Discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter summarises research evidence about actual and perceived 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, and the difficulty of attempts to 
define and measure it.43  
 
3.2  Definition and measurement of discrimination  
Woodhead with Catto (2009: 15) note that there is an inadequate evidence base 
concerning religious discrimination - and no evidence at all about whether there is 
discrimination against secular belief. Quantitative data are particularly sparse (for 
available statistical overviews, see Purdam et al., 2007; Walby et al., 2008). 
Woodhead with Catto (2009: 15-16) add that a major problem in assessing 
discrimination in relation to minority religions is that representative sampling of the 
population requires large booster samples for these groups; the Census is likely to 
under-represent minority groups and the most disadvantaged in society (for example, 
those who do not have English language skills or a fixed address). Weller (2011: 13-
14) notes that a minority of UK-based surveys have asked questions which might 
contribute to an understanding of religious discrimination and many fewer ask about 
„religious discrimination‟ as such.  
 
Another factor which makes it difficult to establish trends in either the frequency or 
seriousness of discrimination is that social research necessarily engages with 
perceived or reported experience of religious discrimination; these may differ from 
legal definitions of discrimination which, in turn, have shifted in the past decade 
(Weller, 2011: 8-9).  
 
The existence of multiple or „intersectional‟ forms of discrimination complicates the 
picture further (Conaghan, 2007; Malik, 2008a; Modood, 2005; Weller, 2011). 
Khattab (2009: 319) argues that in the UK, „skin colour and culture (religion) are to a 
greater extent probably the main mechanisms that operate to reinforce disadvantage 
among some groups or to facilitate social mobility amongst others‟. The impact of 
skin colour, he suggests, is reinforced when attached to a group which is perceived 
as culturally and religiously „alien‟ by the dominant cultural group. Further, there 
appears to be an additional penalty for non-white Muslim women. A graphic snapshot 
of „intersectional‟ discrimination comes from one Muslim respondent to a survey on 
                                               
43  See Weller (2011) for an overview of research on religious discrimination in Britain 
between 2000 and 2010. See also the research project based at the University of Derby 
on „Religion and Belief, Discrimination and Equality in England and Wales: Theory, Policy 
and Practice (2000-2010)‟, which is due to report in 2013; 
http://www.derby.ac.uk/files/religion_and_belief_-_research_project_leaflet.pdf. 






discrimination: „If someone throws two stones through someone‟s window, that‟s 
racism. If they throw two pigs heads [as had happened to them], it‟s about religion‟ 
(Weller, 2011: 10). These factors underline the importance of subjective experience 
in any definition of religious discrimination and any attempt to measure it.44  
  
3.3  Socio-economic discrimination  
Woodhead with Catto (2009: 15) distinguish between socio-economic or „material‟ 
religious discrimination and cultural or attitudinal discrimination. The former involves 
material disadvantage, including reduced levels of educational, occupational, and/or 
economic attainment; the latter relates to religion being misunderstood, denigrated, 
ignored, trivialised, distorted or ridiculed.  
 
A significant body of evidence shows that Muslims are disproportionately vulnerable 
compared to other religious groups in terms of, among other indicators, 
unemployment, limiting long-term illness, educational attainment and housing 
(Beckford et al., 2006: Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 2010; 
Jayaweera and Choudhury, 2008; Khattab, 2009; Lindley, 2002; Modood, 2005; 
Office for National Statistics, 2004).45 Clark and Drinkwater (2002) establish a link 
between the disadvantage of Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in the UK and their 
religion, with the effect being particularly pronounced for Muslim women. 
 
While the correlation of disadvantage and certain religious affiliations may be clear, 
Khattab (2009: 306-07) argues that the causal link is still largely open; skin colour, 
social class and „social capital‟46 also combine to reinforce disadvantage. The policy 
imperatives that arise from this evidence are also a matter of debate. It has been 
argued that addressing socio-economic disadvantage on the basis of religion or 
belief (rather than, say, race or gender) is likely to increase resentment between 
communities and damage community relations (Lester and Uccellari, 2008: 572; see 
also Vickers, 2011). This is a pressing matter for public authorities which, since April 
2011, have assumed a duty to have due regard to the need to eliminate 
discrimination, harassment and victimisation on grounds of religion and belief; and 
                                               
44  For example, Weller (2011: 11-13) proposes a working definition of religious 
discrimination which includes „unfair treatment‟ manifested through the reported 
experience of: religious prejudice; religious hatred; religious disadvantage; direct religious 
discrimination; indirect religious discrimination; and „institutional religionism‟ (a term 
coined by analogy to the term „institutional racism‟).  
 
45 See Winckler (2009: 61) for data showing that Muslim people in Wales are much less likely 
to be economically active than the population as a whole.  
 
46  There is no single definition of „social capital‟ but most definitions emphasise the value of 




advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people of different 
religions (and none). The public sector equality duty in relation to religion or belief is 
discussed in section 9.4. 
 
3.4  Perceived and reported discrimination  
Data relating to perceived levels of discrimination and prejudice have fluctuated over 
time. Citizenship Survey data indicated that in 2008-09, 52 per cent of people thought 
that there was more religious prejudice than five years previously, a decrease from 
62 per cent in 2007-08 (Ferguson and Hussey, 2010: 7). This fluctuation has been 
attributed to heightened perceptions of prejudice after the July 2005 London 
bombings (Ferguson et al., 2009).  
 
A Eurobarometer poll found sharply decreasing perceptions between 2006 and 2009 
that discrimination on grounds of religion or belief was widespread, both in the UK 
and selected other European countries (TNS Opinion & Social, 2007: 68; 2008: 66; 
2009: 100). In the UK, the figure had fallen from 57 per cent in 2006 to 45 per cent in 
2009. In 2009, discrimination on grounds of religion or belief was considered in the 
UK (and in the other European countries as whole) to be less widespread overall 
than discrimination on grounds of age, disability and ethnic origin (TNS Opinion & 
Social, 2009: 99). 
 
Despite the evidence about the perceived extent of discrimination, only 2 per cent of 
UK respondents to the Eurobarometer poll in 2009 stated that they had themselves 
experienced discrimination or harassment on the grounds of religion or belief in the 
previous year, although a higher percentage (6 per cent) had witnessed it (TNS 
Opinion & Social 2009: Annex of data tables). Similarly, among respondents to the 
2009-10 Citizenship Survey in England, less than 0.5 per cent of adults felt that they 
had personally been refused a job or turned down for a promotion because of their 
religion or belief, though for Muslims the figures were 4-5 per cent (Weller, 2011: 31). 
These figures remind us that perceived religious discrimination and direct experience 
of it may vary widely; however, as Weller (2011: 28) points out, even low percentage 
figures may still represent a sizeable number of individuals.  
 
Weller (2011: viii) notes that research evidence consistently shows that in Britain, 
Muslims experience discrimination of a greater frequency and seriousness than other 
religious groups (see also Brown, 2000; Lindley, 2002; Muir et al., 2004). This has 
been especially pronounced since 11 September 2001, with identifiable „spikes‟ in 
the manifestation of some forms of religious discrimination in relation to Muslims (or 
those thought to be Muslim) (Weller, 2011: vii). In a survey of adults in England in 
2009-10, 17 per cent of Muslims considered that racial or religious harassment was a 






big problem in their local area, compared to 6 per cent of Christians and an average 
of 7 per cent for other religions (Communities and Local Government (CLG), 2010: 
51). A Home Office-commissioned study published in 2001 found that a consistently 
higher level of „unfair treatment‟ was reported by Muslim organisations than by most 
other religious groups (Weller et al., 2001: vii).47 The majority of Muslim organisations 
surveyed said that their members experienced unfair treatment in every aspect of 
education, employment, housing, law and order, and in all the local government 
services covered in the survey.  
 
As regards evidence of discrimination experienced by other religious groups, Hindu, 
and especially Sikh, organisations also reported relatively high levels of unfair 
treatment in the 2001 Home Office survey (Weller et al., 2001: viii). So, too, did 
black-led Christian organisations and those representing groups such as Mormons 
and Jehovah‟s Witnesses. Pagans and „new religious movements‟ reported 
experiencing „open hostility‟ - a reminder of the (largely undocumented) existence of 
discrimination against socially marginal religious groups where ethnicity is not a 
factor (Weller, 2011: 56). Weller (2011: 34-35) also cites evidence that the recorded 
number of incidents of anti-Semitism has increased since 2000.  
 
According to Woodhead with Catto (2009: 16), the nature and extent of discrimination 
against Christianity has not yet been studied (save for studies of sectarian prejudice 
against particular forms of Christianity). They add that it is likely to vary with class, 
skin colour and type of Christianity, as well as by geography and between rural and 
urban locations. Weller (2011: 23) notes the growth of „at least concerns and claims 
about discrimination in relation to Christians‟ and, in particular, claims that 
„mainstream‟ Christianity is becoming marginalised (see also Boucher, 2010; 
Christian Institute, 2009). Weller (2011: 54-55) identifies an associated concern 
about whether potential „religious discrimination‟ against (particularly) white 
Christians is taken as seriously as discrimination in its own right compared with such 
discrimination when it is associated with those who are also members of minority 
ethnic groups. However, as noted in section 3.2, visible difference (of skin colour and 
culture or religion) is a salient factor in religious discrimination. Weller notes that an 
important question remains as to „the extent to which sufficient research evidence on 
this issue exists and/or if it does exist, the extent to which such evidence supports or 
does not support such concerns and claims‟; none is presented in his review of 
research evidence.  
  
 
                                               





3.5  Discrimination in the workplace  
The 2001 Home Office study found that employment was a key area where unfair 
treatment was reported to be experienced by religious individuals. Discrimination was 
reported on grounds of religious status, such as a reluctance to employ people 
because of their religion or belief, and on grounds of religious practice, such as a 
refusal to accept a religious dress code (Weller et al., 2001: 41-42). Three quarters or 
more of Sikh, Muslim and Hindu organisations surveyed (compared with 40 per cent 
of Christians) said their members experienced unfair treatment from private sector 
managers or colleagues, with Muslims being more likely to say such treatment was 
frequent; figures for the public sector were only marginally lower (Weller et al., 2001: 
37-38).  
 
The concerns raised in the Home Office study are reflected in Employment Tribunal 
discrimination cases. The number of tribunal cases in Britain on grounds of religion or 
belief remains relatively low, although it is increasing; in 2010-11, 880 claims relating 
to discrimination on grounds of religion or belief were accepted by Employment 
Tribunals, compared with 1,000 in 2009-10 (Ministry of Justice 2011: 7). To put these 
figures in context, 382,400 claims were accepted in total in 2010-11; a higher number 
of cases related to sex discrimination (18,300), disability discrimination (7,200), race 
discrimination (5,000) and age discrimination (6,800), but more cases related to 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief than to discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation (640). In 2010-11, the success rate for tribunal cases concerning 
religion or belief was 3 per cent. This was broadly in line with the low success rate for 
discrimination claims on other grounds, since the majority of cases are withdrawn or 
result in Acas conciliated settlements (Perfect, 2011: 18). 
 
Of the 461 cases brought to an Employment Tribunal between January 2004 and 
August 2006 where religion or belief discrimination was the main jurisdiction, around 
half the claimants were Muslim (Savage, 2007: 44).48 Similarly, a survey of calls to 
the national Acas helpline found that around half of the calls which referred to a 
specific religion or belief were to do with Islam (Savage, 2007: 44). Across all tribunal 
cases, bullying and harassment were common complaints; behaviour from managers 
included verbal abuse, setting impossible deadlines, subjecting claimants to 
increased scrutiny, refusing holiday requests and disputes over dress codes 
(Savage, 2007: 50-52). For both tribunal cases and the Acas helpline, problems 
around working hours and time off or leave to meet religious obligations were far 
more frequent than those relating to dress codes (Savage, 2007: 59-60). Another 
                                               
48  The remaining half were split between Christians, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs and those who 
described themselves as „non-Catholics‟ bringing cases against a Catholic school. 






cause of dispute has been the practice of religious employers recruiting or promoting 
only those who share the organisation‟s religion or belief (see section 6.6).  
 
It should be noted that Employment Tribunal statistics are an unreliable proxy for 
actual discrimination on any ground. Denvir et al. (2007: 23) note that financial and 
personal factors prevent employees, especially those from vulnerable groups, from 
taking claims or grievances. Silence or resignation are more likely routes for such 
individuals and so the extent of discrimination may be under-represented in 
grievances or tribunal claims. 
 
3.6  Conclusion  
In summary, discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief is difficult to define or 
measure. There is scant evidence about whether there is discrimination against 
„belief‟. Measurements of „religious discrimination‟ are complicated by the fact that 
social research necessarily engages with perceived or reported experience of 
religious discrimination, which may differ from legal definitions. The fact that 
individuals may experience different forms of discrimination simultaneously 
complicates the picture further.  
 
One clear trend is the greater prevalence of discrimination (by any measure) against 
Muslims compared to other groups defined by their religion. This has been attributed 
to the impact of skin colour, combined with a perception that certain groups are 
culturally and religiously „alien‟ in relation to the dominant culture. Anti-Muslim 
discrimination also appears to have increased since the attacks of 11 September 
2001. However, the policy imperatives arising from this trend are a matter of debate.  
 
Reviews of research evidence about discrimination note an increase in concerns and 
claims relating to discrimination against Christians, though not (yet) any evidence to 
substantiate those claims at a societal level. The nature of these concerns and 
claims among Christians is discussed further in section 7.3. 
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4.  The law on equality, human rights and religion or belief 
  
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of legal provisions on equality, human rights and 
religion or belief. It examines the importance of contextualising legal cases in order to 
determine their social, as well as legal, significance. It introduces a selection of cases 
that have been particularly significant and/or contentious.  
 
4.2  The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion  
The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 came into force across the UK in October 2000.49 
Prior to the HRA, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion was not 
expressly protected under domestic law. The HRA introduced this right into domestic 
law through Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as well 
as safeguarding equality through Article 14 ECHR which requires non-discrimination 
in the enjoyment of all other Convention rights. Section 13 of the HRA requires courts 
to „have particular regard to the importance‟ of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; however, commentators generally agree that it has made 
little practical difference (Knights, 2007: 34, 67).  
 
Under Article 9(1), the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (including 
the right to change one‟s religion or belief) is absolute; it may never be interfered 
with. The right to manifest one‟s religion or belief, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private „through worship, teaching, practice and observance‟ is 
qualified; it may be interfered with in certain circumstances which are set out in 
Article 9(2) (and explained below). Most decisions at the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg concern the right to manifest one‟s religion or belief.  
 
In practice, the ECtHR grants states discretion (also known as the „margin of 
appreciation‟) to determine the precise relationship between church and state and the 
place of religion or belief in the public sphere. The ECtHR thereby recognises the 
                                               
49  The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were bound by the 
Act from their inception in 1999. The aim of the HRA is to „give further effect‟ in UK law to 
the fundamental rights and freedoms in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The Act makes available in UK courts a remedy for breach of a Convention right, 
without the need to go to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg. 
Under section 2 of the HRA, domestic courts must „take into account‟ decisions of the 
ECtHR, whether they relate to cases against the UK or cases against other Council of 
Europe states. Domestic courts are not bound to follow Strasbourg decisions; in practice, 
they do apply their own interpretation and have sometimes made decisions that expressly 
divert from Strasbourg judgements in comparable cases. 
 






cultural, historic and philosophical differences between nations and the need for 
sensitive matters of religion or belief to be closely scrutinised at the domestic level. 
Determining whether there has been an interference with Article 9(1) 
Sandberg (2011a: 83-86) identifies three „filtering devices‟ that have been used by 
the ECtHR in Strasbourg to exclude claims by establishing that Article 9(1) has not 
been interfered with (also known as the „interference stage‟). These are:  
 
 The definition filter, which asks whether the religion or belief warrants 
protection. The ECtHR has seldom applied this filter.50 The Court has clarified 
that the state cannot attempt to prescribe what constitutes a religion or belief 
and that these notions also protect „atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned‟.51 It has established that religion or belief is essentially personal 
and subjective and need not necessarily relate to a faith arranged around 
institutions, but must pass certain tests: for example, it must attain a certain 
level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance and be worthy of 
respect in a democratic society.52 Newer religions and beliefs such as 
scientology53 have been included within the definition, as have pacifism,54 
druidism,55 atheism,56 secularism,57 communism58 and veganism.59 See section 
5.2 for an examination of definitional matters in domestic jurisprudence.  
  
 The „manifestation/motivation‟ filter, which requires that the claimant‟s actions 
manifest their religion or belief as opposed to being merely motivated by it; this 
includes a requirement that the claimant‟s actions are prescribed by the 
                                               
50  A rare example is Pretty v UK No. 2346/02, 29.4.2002, concerning a belief in the notion of 
assisted suicide. 
 
51  Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia No. 18147/02, 5.4.2007, at para. 71. 
 
 52  Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes, para. 52. 
 
53  X and Church of Scientology v Sweden No. 7805/77, 5.5.1979. 
 
54  Arrowsmith v UK No.7050/75, 12.10.1978.  
 
55  A.R.M. Chappell v UK No. 12587/86, 14.7.1987.  
 
56  Angeleni v Sweden No. 10491/83, 3.12.1986. 
 
 57  Lautsi v Italy No. 30814/06, 18.3.2011. 
 
58  Hazar, Hazar and Acik v Turkey Nos. 16311/90, 16312/90 and 16313/90, 11.10.1991. 
 
59  X v UK No. 18187/91, 10.2.1993. 
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particular religion or belief.60 However, the ECtHR has in recent years chosen 
not to apply this distinction or to interpret it broadly to include any causal link 
between the claimant‟s action and their religion or belief and to include non-
prescribed practices.61  
 
 The „specific situation‟ rule, which applies where someone has voluntarily 
submitted themselves to a system of norms; for example, by entering into a 
contract,62 enrolling at a university63 or submitting to military service.64 It 
establishes that there is no interference with Article 9 where an individual has 
put themselves in a situation which limits their ability to manifest their religion, 
and where they can choose to leave that restrictive context, even if doing so 
requires some personal sacrifice. More recent decisions of the Court indicate 
that it no longer endorses such an approach; interference has been found 
despite the claimants‟ apparent acceptance of a restriction.65  
  
As the filters are applied only rarely by the ECtHR, the question of whether there has 
been an interference (also described as whether Article 9 is „engaged‟) is commonly 
a formality; the Court then considers the merits of each case in detail using the 
criteria for justification under Article 9(2).  
 
Determining whether interference with Article 9(1) is justified under Article 9(2) 
Under Article 9(2), freedom to manifest one‟s religion or belief is subject only to such 
limitations as are: 
 
 „prescribed by law‟; that is, they must be clear, publicly accessible, non-
retrospective, and people must be able to understand the circumstances in 
                                               
60  Arrowsmith v UK No.7050/75, 12.10.1978.  
61  For example, Bayatyan v Armenia No. 23459/03, 7.7.2011, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR found that where opposition to military service is motivated by a genuinely held 
religious belief, Article 9 will be engaged. See also Jakóbski v Poland No. 18429/06, 
7.12.2010, in which the Court found that the refusal of a Buddhist prisoner‟s request for 
vegetarian food fell within the protection of Article 9 even though vegetarianism was not a 
mandatory requirement of Buddhism. 
62  Stedman v UK No. 29107/95, 9.4.1997.  
63  Karaduman v Turkey No. 16278/90, 3.5.1993. 
64  Kalac v Turkey No. 20704, 1.7.1997.  
 
65  For example, in cases concerning the prohibition on wearing the headscarf in universities 
and schools: Şahin v Turkey No. 44774/98, 10.11.2005; Dahlab v Sweden No. 42393/98, 
15.2.2001; Dogru v France No. 27058/05, 4.12.2008. 
 






which it might be imposed and foresee the consequences of their actions with a 
degree of accuracy; and, 
 „necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others‟. 
The principle of proportionality  
The principle of proportionality provides a structured way to determine how to 
balance competing interests on any particular set of facts and in any particular 
context. To be „necessary‟, interference with Article 9(1) must have a legitimate aim,
i.e. it must reflect a pressing concern in a democratic society and have a specific 
purpose. It must also „be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued‟.66 This includes 
a requirement that the restriction is not arbitrary, irrational or ineffective. The principle 
of proportionality is also commonly expressed as pursuing the least restrictive 
alternative or „not using a sledgehammer to crack a nut‟. 
 
In recent years, domestic courts have - controversially - shown a greater propensity 
to use the filters to find that interference has not taken place, short-circuiting any 
need for a discussion of justification. Much commentary focuses on this 
inconsistency and the uncertainty that now exists as to whether judges will find 
favour with Article 9 claims at either the interference or justification stage (see 
sections 5.3 and 5.4). The Equality Act 2010 (and its predecessors) has come to be 
viewed by legal practitioners as a firmer basis for pursuing claims relating to religion 
or belief.67  
 
4.3  Discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief  
Laws prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief are also of recent 
origin. The legal landscape shifted with the 2000 EU Framework Employment 
Directive, implemented in the UK by Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003, which introduced obligations on employers and providers of 
vocational training not to discriminate, victimise or tolerate harassment on grounds of 
religion or belief (Knights, 2007, Chapter 5; Vickers, 2008, Chapter 5). This was 
                                               
66  Serif v Greece No. 38178/97, 14.12.1999 at para. 49. 
67  For example, in R (Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Body of Abedare Girls’ High School, 
[2008] EWHC (Admin) 1865, the claimant‟s legal team relied on race and religious 
discrimination laws rather than Article 9 to protect her freedom to wear a Sikh kara bangle
at school.  
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followed by the Equality Act 2006 and the Equality Act 2010, which replaced the 
2003 regulations and a raft of other anti-discrimination laws (Hepple, 2011).  
 
The Equality Act 2010 prohibits direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, 
harassment and victimisation in relation to certain areas such as goods and services, 




Direct discrimination occurs when A treats B less favourably than A treats or would 
treat others.69 The law provides protection against less favourable treatment 
„because of a protected characteristic‟; this includes association with someone who 
has a protected characteristic. For example, it is direct discrimination if A refuses to 
offer a job to B because B is a Muslim or because B‟s husband is a Muslim. It also 
includes less favourable treatment of someone because they are perceived to have 
a religion or belief, even if this is not in fact correct. In direct discrimination cases, the 
claimant must first prove facts from which the tribunal can conclude that unlawful 
discrimination has occurred. The burden of proof then passes to the respondent. 
Direct discrimination cannot be justified; there is no defence of reasonableness. The 
only defence open to the respondent is to prove that no discrimination occurred. 
Courts and tribunals have generally taken a restrictive approach to direct 
discrimination and successful claims are rare.70 
 
Indirect discrimination 
Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice puts persons with a particular protected characteristic at a disadvantage 
compared with others who do not share that characteristic and applying the 
provision, criterion or practice cannot be objectively justified. For example, if an 
employer introduces a new rota that requires all employees to be available for work 
on Sundays, this puts practising Christians at a particular disadvantage and may be 
indirectly discriminatory unless it can be justified; for example, because of a 
compelling business need.71  
                                               
68  Harassment on grounds of religion or belief is only prohibited in relation to employment.  
 
69  Equality Act 2010, s.13. 
 
70  See Bodi v Teletext [2005] ET Case No. 3300497/2005, 13-14 October 2005, in which the 
claimant successfully argued that he had not been shortlisted for a job on grounds of his 
Asian race and/or Muslim religion. 
 
71  See Williams-Drabble v Pathway Care Solutions [2004] ET Case No. 2601718/2004, 2 
December 2004. 






The operation of indirect discrimination is comparable to that used in Article 9 cases 
in the sense that the court or tribunal determines whether there has been an 
interference (or „disadvantage‟), and if so, whether it can be justified. A key distinction 
is that the law on indirect discrimination does not protect solitary disadvantage; it 
must be shown that the provision, criterion or practice puts „persons‟ of the claimant‟s 
religion or belief at a particular disadvantage as well as actually disadvantaging the 
claimant. This requirement to show group disadvantage has been criticised for 
leaving individual believers unprotected from indirect discrimination (Vickers, 2009a) 
(see section 5.4).  
 
There have been a number of successful indirect discrimination claims, for example, 
relating to working hours72 and religious dress.73 Other claims have, for various 
reasons, failed either on grounds of either interference (disadvantage)74 or 
justification.75 This has given rise to concern that some of the same factors which 
have inhibited the success of Article 9 claims may also prevent successful indirect 
discrimination claims in a manner which is unduly restrictive of claims based on 
religion or belief (see section 5.4).  
 
Exceptions relating to religion or belief 
The Equality Act 2010 contains exceptions permitting discrimination in certain limited 
and specified circumstances. Some relate to religion or belief. A distinction can be 
made between religion or belief exceptions that relate to employment76 and those 
that relate to the provision of goods and services.77 Both have proved contentious; 
we examine this controversy in sections 6.6 and 6.7.  
 
                                               
72  For example, Fugler v MacMillan - London Hairstudios Ltd ET Case No. 2205090/2004, 
21-23 June 2005, concerning a Jewish claimant who was disadvantaged by a requirement 
to work every Saturday when no attempt had been made by her employer to rearrange 
her duties.  
 
73  For example, Noah v Sarah Desrosiers (trading as Wedge), ET Case No. 2201867/2007, 
29 May 2008, concerning a Muslim applicant for a job in a hair salon whose interview was 
terminated because she was wearing a headscarf and the salon required stylists to 
display modern hair styles; the tribunal found that the respondent had accorded 
disproportionate weight to this business requirement.  
  
74  Most controversially, Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
 
75  For example, Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council UKEAT/0009/07/MAA, 30 
March 2007. 
 
76  Equality Act 2010, Schedule 9, paras. 2-3. 
 
77  Equality Act 2010, Schedule 23, paras. 2 and 29. 
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Public sector equality duty 
The 2010 Act extends and strengthens the public sector equality duties. Previously, 
these applied only to race, sex and disability; the new single general public sector 
equality duty applies to all protected characteristics, including religion or belief. The 
duty has three elements:  
 
 eliminating discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that 
is prohibited by the Act;  
 
 advancing equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant 
characteristic and persons who do not share it; and 
 
 fostering good relations between persons who share a relevant characteristic 
and persons who do not share it.78 
 
The duty is placed on most central and local government authorities, health 
authorities, schools, and the police. It came into force in April 2011. See section 9.4 
for a discussion of issues involved in implementing the duty in relation to religion or 
belief.  
4.4  Contextualising legal cases  
This section discusses the importance of contextualising legal judgments in order to 
determine their social as well as legal significance.  
 
Legal judgments may raise important matters of principle. However, being highly fact 
specific, they are not necessarily representative of common experience or a reliable 
indicator of the place of religion or belief (or particular religions or beliefs) in society. 
There are invariably contingent reasons why certain cases come to court and others 
do not. Potential claimants may not wish bring cases or have the resources to do so. 
 
The outcome of cases is often unpredictable and may appear contradictory. This is 
partly due to the heavy reliance on the principle of proportionality in assessing 
whether interference or disadvantage is justified in a given case (Vickers, 2010: 298-
99) (see section 4.2). This makes it hard to „read across‟ from one case to another 
because every case is fact-sensitive. For example, it may appear difficult to reconcile 
why one tribunal held that a Muslim security guard did not suffer indirect 
discrimination when his employer refused him permission to leave work early on a 
                                               
78  Equality Act 2010, Part 11, Section 149. 
 






Friday to attend a mosque;79 while another held that a Christian care worker did 
suffer indirect discrimination when her employer introduced a rota requiring her to 
work on Sundays and miss going to church.80 In the former, the disadvantage was 
held to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim‟; in the latter, it was 
not.81 Similarly, Employment Tribunal decisions may appear to show that it is 
proportionate to restrict the wearing of a cross at work,82 but not the wearing of the 
headscarf,83 the proportionality decision having been weighed differently in each 
case.  
 
In other instances, legal judgments may actually be contradictory; for example, the 
„specific situation‟ rule has been applied inconsistently over time by the ECtHR, while 
recent domestic judgments which apply the rule restrictively are at odds with recent 
ECtHR judgments which have chosen to disregard it (see sections 5.3 and 5.4). 
It is particularly difficuIt to generalise from Strasbourg case law given the wide 
discretion granted to states by the ECtHR to determine the precise relationship 
between church and state and the place of religion or belief in the public sphere (see 
section 4.2). 
 
Public responses to high-profile cases may make conflicts between religion or belief 
and other interests appear more intractable or prevalent than they actually are (Malik, 
2008a: 6-7). This may be especially so where understanding is solely reliant upon 
media reports or the views of lobby groups and is not also informed by the detailed 
circumstances of each case and the reasoning in legal judgments. In particular, the 
prominence of cases concerning religion or belief and sexual orientation can be 
explained in part by the vigorous backing for such cases by organisations such as 
the Christian Legal Centre and Christian Concern (Afridi and Warmington, 2010: 10) 
and by consistently high-profile coverage in newspapers such as the Daily Mail and 
Daily Telegraph.  
 
For all these reasons, caution is required when seeking to generalise from specific 
cases or assess their social, as well as legal, significance.  
                                               
79  Cherfi v G4S Security Services Limited EAT Case No. 0379/10/DM, 24 May 2011. 
 
80  Williams-Drabble v Pathway Care Solutions [2004] ET Case No. 2601718/2004, 2 
December 2004. 
 
81  See also Howard (2011a, b) for a discussion of the application of proportionality in cases 
concerning the wearing of religious symbols in British schools.  
 
82  Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust ET Case No. 1702886/2009, 6 
April 2010. 
 
83  Noah v Desrosiers (trading as Wedge) ET Case No. 2201867/2007, 29 May 2008. 
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4.5 Selection of significant or high-profile cases 
This section introduces a selection of domestic legal cases relating to religion or 
belief that have established important precedents and/or been particularly 
contentious. See Appendix 8 for summaries of the cases referred to and also for the 
case references.  
Cases relating to collective religious practice and the activities of religious 
organisations  
These include cases concerning: 
 
 exceptions in the Equality Act 2010 (and its predecessors) relating to 
employment: 
 
o R (Amicus - MSF Section) v Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry  
o Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance  
 exceptions in the Equality Act 2010 (and its predecessors) relating to goods and 
services:  
 
o Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England 
and Wales)  
 the entry criteria of state-maintained schools with a religious character:  
 
o R (E) v JFS Governing Body  
Cases relating to individuals’ manifestation of their religion or belief  
These include cases: 
 
 in an employment context in relation to dress codes:
o Eweida v British Airways  
o Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust  
o Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Council 
o Noah v Sarah Desrosiers (trading as Wedge) 
 in an employment context in relation to working hours:  
 
o Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd  






 in an educational context in relation to dress codes:
o R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School  
o R (Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Body of Abedare Girls’ High 
School  
o R (Playfoot) (A Child) v Millais School Governing Body  
 in an educational context in relation to corporal punishment:  
o R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others, ex 
parte Williamson 
 
Cases concerning individuals where discrimination on grounds of religion or 
belief and on grounds of sexual orientation have both been at issue  
These include cases: 
 
 where religious individuals have refused on grounds of conscience to provide 
goods or services to others on the grounds of their sexual orientation: 
o Ladele v London Borough of Islington  
o McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd
o McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs  
o Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull 
 where, in other circumstances, individuals claim to have been discriminated 
against because of their conscientiously-held beliefs that same sex relationship 
are morally wrong: 
o R (Johns) v Derby City Council  
Cases concerning the definition of religion or belief 
o Grainger Plc v Nicholson 
4.6 Conclusion 
The right to freedom of religion or belief and the law prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief have provoked a considerable amount of litigation, some 
of which has been highly contentious. However, these cases do not necessarily 
denote prevalent or entrenched problems in society; nor can we assume that they 
are a reliable indicator of the place of religion or belief (or particular religions or 
beliefs) in society.  
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As Sandberg (2011a: 130) notes, the law on equality, human rights and religion or 
belief reflects: 
 
... a complicated and conflicted move towards a multi-faith society where 
the State seeks to facilitate (and regulate) a religious free market by 
increasing the quantity and reach of regulation.  
 
For some, these new standards are welcome and might in turn be used to examine a 
number of long-standing legal provisions concerning religion or belief.84 For others, 
the „increasing encroachment of legal restrictions on what was hitherto a field of 
unregulated liberty is distinctly illiberal‟, undermining the autonomy of religious 
associations and at times constraining the very significance of religion (Rivers, 2007: 
51). In Chapters 5-7 we explore these two broad perspectives in relation to particular 
themes and cases.  
                                               
84  For example, laws relating to religious offences; religion in schools, and the internal 
spiritual laws and practices of religious groups. See generally Sandberg (2011a), 
Chapters 7-9. See section 2.4 for a discussion of equality and human rights in relation to 
minority legal orders. 






5.  Case law on equality, human rights and religion or belief  
 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines domestic case law concerning Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief and debates it has given rise to. It discusses the uncertainty that 
exists around the definition of „belief‟. It also examines the tendency for Article 9 
rights to be construed narrowly in domestic courts, and the consequent debate about 
the institutional competence of courts and tribunals to rule on matters of religion or 
belief and to comprehend the significance of religions or beliefs to their adherents. 
The chapter also discusses the idea of a duty of „reasonable accommodation‟ for 
religion or belief in the workplace. This chapter should be read in conjunction with 
Chapter 6 which focuses on the issue of competing interests relating to religion or 
belief and the way in which these have played out in law and public debate.  
  
5.2  Matters of definition in relation to religion or belief  
The lack of clarity as to what constitutes a religion or belief - and the instability this 
creates at the heart of the protection provided - arises frequently in legal and 
academic commentary (Ahdar and Leigh, 2005: 110-24; Griffith, 2007; Knights, 
2007: 40-43; Sandberg, 2011a, Chapter 3; Vickers, 2008, Chapter 2).85  
  
Under the Equality Act 2010, religion means „any religion‟ and belief means „any 
religious or philosophical belief‟; the lack of religion or belief is also covered. The 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also covers „religion or belief‟. As 
noted in section 4.2, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has given a wide 
interpretation to the meaning of religion or belief. Effectively, the defining boundary is 
not between religion and belief, but between protected beliefs and those that are too 
ill-defined to warrant protection.  
 
The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Equality Act 2010 follow Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in explaining that a „philosophical belief‟ must, among other things, 
„attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance‟ and be 
„worthy of respect in a democratic society‟.86 The „respectability‟ requirement appears 
out of step with the protection for freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR, 
which includes speech that offends, shocks or disturbs and not only inoffensive 
                                               
85  We consider here only human rights law and discrimination law; the definition of religion 
or belief is also significant in charity and registration law and, for example, in asylum 
cases. See Sandberg (2011a), Chapter 3.  
 




speech.87 Vickers (2010: 284-85) recommends removing the respectability hurdle, 
though respectability might still be a factor in deciding whether discrimination for 
manifesting a belief is justified.  
 
This is not the only matter of uncertainty. The Explanatory Notes also state that 
beliefs should relate to „a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour‟ in order to warrant protection. As Hepple (2011: 41) notes, this may leave 
scope for belief in a political philosophy (such as communism or free-market 
capitalism) to claim protection, though not a belief in a political party or action. This 
was a matter of concern for several of our interviewees who noted that, for example, 
extreme right-wing organisations might seek protection under discrimination law. 
 
Other working definitions exclude this possibility. The British Humanist Association 
(BHA) (2007a: 8) has proposed the following minimum working definition of „religion 
or belief‟:  
 
 A collective belief that attains a sufficient level of cogency, seriousness, 
 cohesion and importance and that relates the nature of life and the world to 
 morality, values and/or the way its believers should live.88 
 
Similarly, Vickers (2010: 285) would limit protection to beliefs which are „more 
philosophical or religious in nature, in that they relate in some way to the meaning 
attached to the world or to fundamental aspects of human existence‟. These 
definitions allow scope for newer and minority religions or beliefs to be protected, 
along with subjective understandings of religion or belief, though not beliefs held only 
by individuals or small groups (Bamforth et al., 2008: 890-99).  
                                               
87  In a case concerning whether corporal punishment was a manifestation of parents‟ and 
teachers‟ religious belief, the House of Lords was clear that to limit protection only to 
beliefs which are respectable or of which the court approves is inappropriate: „in matters 
of human rights the court should not show liberal tolerance only to tolerant liberals‟. See 
R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others, ex parte Williamson 
[2005] UKHL 15 at para 60. 
 
88  This definition was proposed in relation to charity law as part of the BHA‟s campaign to 
have the advancement of non-religious beliefs for the public benefit accepted as a 
charitable object. The Charities Act 2006 specifically recognises that the promotion of 
religion is a charitable purpose. During the passing of the Act, humanist groups argued 
unsuccessfully that the promotion of non-religious beliefs should be given the same 
treatment as religious beliefs under law. After several years of negotiation, in October 
2011, the BHA announced that the Charity Commission had allowed it to amend its 










Domestic case law concerning the definition of belief 
Case law in domestic tribunals has established that a belief in a political party is not 
covered (e.g. those of the British National Party);89 however, controversially, belief in 
man-made climate change is,90 as are anti-hunting sentiments,91 a belief in 
spiritualism and life after death,92 and a belief that public service broadcasting has 
the higher purpose of promoting cultural interchange and social cohesion.93 These 
cases have excited much negative commentary. Vickers (2010: 283) notes that „it 
becomes difficult to see where boundaries are between the types of belief that 
should be covered and those that should not‟; for example, if a belief in man-made 
climate change warrants protection, then so might belief in any other scientifically-
grounded theory. Further, the climate change case may have damaging (if 
unintended) consequences if applied in other contexts. It could, for example, mean 
that attempts to combat climate change could be viewed as the promotion of a 
„belief‟, and therefore inappropriate for the state or public sector organisations 
(Vickers, 2010: 283-84). Pitt (2011: 403) notes that the inclusion of all religions and 
all beliefs within the rubric of a protected characteristic „leads to a real danger of 
trivialising the equality principle‟. 
 
Concerns about emerging case law on matters of definition were expressed by 
interviewees affiliated to groups situated in both the „religion‟ and „belief‟ strands. 
Some Christian interviewees objected to placing „idiosyncratic‟ views or attitudes 
contingent on contemporary events on a par with beliefs held for millennia. David 
Pollock argued from a humanist perspective that recent judgments risked „watering 
down‟ the concept of religion or belief such as to bring it into disrepute; this might, in 
turn, provoke a backlash resulting in a diminution of protection for all non-religious 
beliefs, including humanism.  
 
                                               
89  Baggs v Fudge ET Case No. 1400114/2005, 23 March 2005. See also Kelly and others v 
Unison ET Case No. 2203854-57/08, 28 January 2010, in which the Employment Tribunal 
found that „philosophical belief‟ did not include „political belief‟, on the basis that the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 do not protect all political 
beliefs and opinions (in this case, beliefs based on Marxism/Trotskyism and the Socialist 
Party).  
 
90  Grainger Plc v Nicholson EAT Case No. 0219/09/ZT, 3 November 2009. 
 
91  Hashman v Milton Park, Dorset Ltd (t/a Orchard Park) ET Case No. 3105555, 4 March 
2011. 
 
92  Greater Manchester Police Authority v Power EAT Case No. 0434/09/DA, 12 November 
2009.  
 




Interviewees concerned with employment also expressed disquiet about the lack of 
definitional clarity created by case law. Steve Williams, Head of Equality at Acas, 
described it as a „problematic‟ area for employers. Simon Langley, National Grid‟s 
UK Lead Manager for Inclusion and Diversity, argued that the assessment of 
whether a belief enjoyed legal protection „shouldn‟t be left as a judgment call for 
employers because judgment calls by definition expose both parties to risk‟. Another 
equality specialist working for a large private sector employer, who wished to remain 
anonymous, noted that it was „exceptionally difficult‟ to interpret the definition of 
„belief‟: „It‟s a big issue for us; line managers just can‟t get their heads around it‟. 
Alan Beazley, an Advice and Policy Specialist with the of the Employers‟ Forum on 
Belief (now part of the Employers‟ Network for Equality and Inclusion) commented 
that the „acid tests‟ established through case law for the definition of belief were 
useful to employers, yet particular judgments had been „surprising‟.  
 
These comments suggest that the criteria set out in the Explanatory Notes to the 
Equality Act for determining what is a „philosophical belief‟ are either insufficiently 
known about and/or insufficiently clear. Indeed, the only examples offered in the 
notes as beliefs that would be excluded are „any cult involved in illegal activities‟ and 
„adherence to a particular football team‟.94 Other guidance documents deal with the 
question of definition only briefly (for example, Acas, 2011: 7). Taken as a whole, 
these concerns suggest the need for more detailed and accessible guidance for 
decision-makers which might assist them to achieve clarity and consistency in 
matters of definition of „belief‟.  
 
5.3  Article 9 in domestic case law 
This section analyses selected cases in domestic courts where Article 9 has been at 
issue. Some commentators suggest that domestic courts have taken such a cautious 
approach to Article 9 that it has come to protect „only a very restrictive and 
conservative form of religious life‟ (Sandberg, 2011a: 98).  
 
Successive Article 9 claims have failed for reasons which have changed over time. 
In earlier cases, it was found that, although there had been an interference with the 
claimant‟s Article 9(1) right, the interference had been justified under Article 9(2). 
That approach was evident in the case of R v Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment and others, ex parte Williamson, in which teachers and parents at four 
independent Christian schools claimed that mild corporal punishment was part of the 
duty of education in a Christian context.95 The House of Lords held that there had 
                                               
94  Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes, paras. 52-53. 
 
95  [2005] UKHL 15.  






been an interference with the claimants‟ Article 9(1) rights, but that the interference 
was justified under Article 9(2) because, among other reasons, it had the legitimate 
aim of protecting children as a vulnerable group.96  
 
In recent cases, courts have been more ready to reject claims at the interference 
stage, using the „filtering‟ devices described in section 4.2. In particular, as Sandberg 
(2011a: 89-99) notes, courts have used the „manifestation/motivation‟ requirement 
and the „specific situation‟ rule. A leading case is R (Begum) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School. The majority in the House of Lords held that 
there was no interference with Article 9 in a situation where a girl voluntarily 
accepted a place at a school, since she had knowledge of its uniform policy, which 
did not permit the wearing of a jilbab (full length gown), and in a situation where she 
could have chosen to attend a school where the jilbab was permitted (Malik, 
2008a).97 The House of Lords, quoting selectively from ECtHR judgments, 
emphasised the specific situation rule to find that (in the words of Lord Bingham), 
interference with Article 9 „is not easily established‟.98 The judgment also stated that 
Article 9 „does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief‟.99  
 
The Begum decision was found to be an insuperable barrier to establishing 
interference in several subsequent cases. In one, a twelve-year-old school girl lost 
her claim for judicial review of a decision that she could not wear a niqab veil in the 
presence of male teachers; the judge ruled that because the claimant could have 
gone to another school which would allow her to wear the niqab, there was no 
interference with her rights.100 Another application for judicial review on behalf of a 
schoolgirl who wished to wear a „purity‟ ring as a symbol of her religiously-motivated 
commitment to celibacy before marriage was refused because the wearing of the 
ring was not considered to be a manifestation of that belief.101  
                                               
96  See Sandberg (2011a: 89) for a discussion of the impact of Williamson on subsequent 
lower court decisions. 
 
97  R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. 
However, two Law Lords (Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale at paras. 41 and 92-99 
respectively) differed from the other three in finding that Article 9 had been engaged, but 
that the interference was justified.  
 
98  Para. 24. 
 
99 Para. 22. 
 
100 R (X) v Y School [2006] EWHC (Admin) 298 at paras. 26-40. 
 





Another recent case, however, illustrates the unpredictability of Article 9 case law. In 
R (Imran Bashir) v The Independent Adjudicator, HMP Ryehill and the Secretary of 
State for Justice,102 the High Court held that disciplining a Muslim prisoner for failing 
to give a urine sample in a drugs test when he was in the midst of a voluntary fast 
breached his right to manifest his beliefs and was not proportionate. The ruling is 
relatively limited in its practical effect; however, it is notable for the way it sidesteps 
the specific situation rule.103  
 
5.4  The ‘filters’ used by domestic courts in religion or belief cases  
The „specific situation‟ rule and the requirement that claimants must show that they 
are „manifesting‟ their religion or belief raise wider legal and conceptual questions. 
These relate to the institutional competence of courts and tribunals to rule on matters 
of religion or belief and to comprehend the significance of religions or beliefs to their 
adherents. This section examines the use of these filters and critiques of them. It 
refers to both free-standing claims under Article 9 and claims concerning 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, since tribunal decisions concerning 
discrimination now routinely refer to Article 9 case law. They have generally 
concluded that, as Sedley LJ did in Eweida, the jurisprudence on Article 9 „does 
nothing to advance the claimant‟s case‟ because of the restrictive interpretation of 
Article 9 in domestic courts.104  
 
The specific situation rule  
The notion that voluntary submission to a system of norms creates a „specific 
situation‟ which limits the claimant‟s right to manifest their religion or belief is 
contested on both legal and ethical grounds. In Copsey v WBB Devon Clays Ltd, the 
Court of Appeal applied the rule (rejecting the appeal of a Christian claimant who 
                                               
102 [2011] EWHC 1108. 
 
103  The Secretary of State argued that requiring a urine sample was not an interference with 
Article 9. He based this on case-law including Begum which provides that where a person 
has voluntarily accepted a situation where his religious beliefs are not accommodated, 
there is no interference. Mr Bashir, it was argued, had by committing a serious crime 
voluntarily accepted the restrictions of being in prison. HHJ Pelling QC rejected this 
analysis, being unconvinced that a choice of employment could be compared to being a 
prisoner. Judge Pelling notes (at para. 22) that none of the authorities that are considered 
by Lord Bingham in Begum concern the position of prisoners.  
 
104 Para. 22. 
 






was dismissed after refusing to accept regular Sunday working), but strongly 
criticised it.105  
 
Commentators question whether such situations are always truly voluntary and 
whether the notion of surrendering one‟s rights by (say) signing a contract is 
consistent with the absolute right to change one‟s religion. Leader (2007: 725) 
argues that when two basic rights are at stake for an individual - such as the right to 
freedom of religion or belief and the right to work - the individual should be allowed to 
„find a personal optimum‟ subject only to an institution‟s demonstration that it cannot 
go any further to accommodate that optimum; this is preferable to a „unilateral power‟ 
for institutions to dictate the alternatives, with the consequence that individuals with 
strong beliefs „withdraw into angry or cynical indifference towards [their] society‟. In 
the context of the workplace, Vickers (2008: 52-53) similarly argues that the „right to 
resign‟ should remain the residual protection, rather than the starting (and swift 
ending) point for the provision of protection.  
 
The specific situation rule in the context of employment 
The majority of our interviewees acknowledged that individuals whose religion or 
belief is important to them have a responsibility to make sensible career choices: as 
one put it, an Orthodox Jew should no more become a professional footballer 
required to play on Saturdays than a vegan should take a job in an abattoir. 
Participants of all types agreed that employers should not always have to 
accommodate an individual‟s religion or belief; observing one‟s religion or belief was 
not seen as „cost free‟, especially where conflict with the law or job requirements is 
foreseeable. Put another way, it was widely agreed that everyone has a right to work 
but no-one has a right to do a particular job (or to make a living by providing 
particular goods or services). For example, the case of Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan 
Council, in which a tribunal found that it was proportionate for a primary school to 
suspend a teaching assistant who wished to wear the full face-veil when providing 
teaching support to children, was generally felt to have been correctly decided. An 
exacerbating factor was that the claimant had not worn a veil when she attended the 
job interview or signalled that her religious beliefs placed any limitation on her 
working.106  
                                               
105  [2005] EWCA Civ 932. Rix LJ argued (at paras. 65-66) that Strasbourg jurisprudence „did 
not represent a body of consistent decisions‟ in cases where the employer, rather than 
the employee, sought to vary the employee‟s working hours.  
 
106 Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council UKEAT/0009/07/MAA, 30 March 2007, at 





Participants also generally accepted that if an employee experiences a significant 
religious transformation that means they can no longer do an integral part of their job 
(for example, serving alcohol in a bar or supermarket), they may have to pay a 
personal sacrifice and exercise their „right to resign‟. Others noted, however, that 
there are circumstances in which it may be reasonable (and may make good 
business sense) for an employer to accommodate an employee‟s strongly-held 
belief, even if it is the employee who has „moved the goalposts‟; for example, if only 
a peripheral aspect of the job is affected. Such circumstances would form part of the 
proportionality decision in a given case.  
 
One exception to this view came from Jasdev Singh Rai, commenting from a Sikh 
perspective, who could not envisage any circumstance where it would be reasonable 
to restrict a Sikh‟s professional options because of his obligation to wear a turban. 
For example, he noted that the technology existed to make bullet proof turbans 
which would allow Sikh police officers to join firearms teams, but police services had 
been unwilling to invest in it.107  
 
Many interviewees concerned with the „religion‟ strand were troubled by what they 
saw as too wide an application of the specific situation rule in domestic 
jurisprudence. The most acute tensions were seen to arise in situations where the 
ethical basis of a job changes because of a change in the law. Malcolm Brown 
suggested that „contracting out‟ of protection of the right to manifest religion or belief 
in such circumstances risks reducing employees to „mere functionaries‟. The case of 
Ladele v London Borough of Islington aroused particularly polarised views among 
our participants. The issue of „conscientious objection‟ raised by this case is explored 
in detail in section 6.5.  
 
The specific situation rule in the context of education 
Some commentators view the notion of voluntarily contracting out of Article 9 as 
particularly problematic in the context of education. Knights (2007: 48) notes that the 
Begum decision was striking in that it elides the ECtHR decisions relating to 
education to those concerned with employment; however, it is questionable whether 
the provision of state-funded education can be so readily aligned with that of private 
employment. The majority of Law Lords in Begum based their decision on the fact 
that Shabina Begum had a free choice to attend another school. The minority held 
that, in reality, parents impose their choice of school on their children; that 
adolescents cannot foresee all the consequences of their decisions; and that moving 
                                               
107 See „Sikh turbans banned from armed police operations‟, BBC News website, 23 April 
2010. 
 






schools can be both difficult and disruptive (see also section 6.8 for discussion of the 
implications of this case).108  
 
The manifestation requirement  
Hambler (2008) distinguishes between „negative‟ manifestation (such as a request 
for time off to fulfil religious obligations or to abstain from certain duties for reasons 
of religious conviction); „passive‟ manifestation (such as wearing certain dress or 
symbols); and „active‟ manifestation (such as distributing literature promoting a 
religion or belief). Hambler identifies in case law an emergent acceptance of the 
need for employers to accommodate requests for employees to take time off for 
religious observance.109 However, passive and active110 manifestation of religion or 
belief, as well as negative manifestation that involves withdrawing from certain 
workplace tasks, appear to have enjoyed little additional protection since the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 were introduced. This 
indicates that „privatised faith is much more acceptable in contemporary discourse 
than a faith which is holistic in the way it encompasses both the private and the 
public sphere‟ (Hambler, 2008: 133).  
 
Judgments relating to the right to manifest one‟s religion or belief frequently involve 
consideration of whether a particular belief or practice is „core‟ or „peripheral‟ and 
whether or not it is prescribed by the religion or belief.111 This in turn raises the 
profound questions of how far the law can comprehend religions and beliefs as 
normative systems on their own terms and how far it can accommodate the degree 
of subjectivity involved (McCrudden, 2011; Stychin, 2009).  
 
                                               
108 Para. 92. 
 
109 Especially, as noted above, where the employer, rather than the employee, seeks to 
change working patterns; for example, Williams-Drabble v Pathway Care Solutions Ltd 
[2004] ET Case No. 2601718/2004. 
 
110 See Greater Manchester Police Authority v Power EAT Case No. 0434/09/DA, 12 
November 2009 concerning a police trainer dismissed for bringing material relating to 
spiritualism to the workplace.  
 
111 A further consideration might be the sincerity of the professed belief; see Hambler (2011) 





Courts have traditionally been careful not to make determinations on matters of 
belief or practice.112 However, some commentators suggest that in both Article 9 and 
religious discrimination cases, the courts‟ previous reticence has been replaced by a 
„much more self-confident willingness to adjudicate contested issues touching on the 
religious sphere‟ (McCrudden, 2011: 30). It is also suggested that judges are more 
ready to determine what is core or peripheral with regard to Christianity than other 
faiths, even though this strays beyond the boundaries of their usual competence, 
possibly because they consider that they are more familiar with it.113 There is 
disquiet among some Christian commentators that the more significant the effect of 
non-compliance with a religious rule is for the adherent, the more likely it is that 
employers will have to accommodate the belief; this might give greater protection to 
more rule-bound (or even punitive) religions than to Christianity (Vickers, 2010: 299-
300).  
 
Such perceptions even prompted a call by the former Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Lord Carey, for a separate court structure for religious cases involving judges who 
have a „proven sensibility to religious issues‟;114 this proposition was not advocated 
by any participants in our research or in any literature we have reviewed. However, 
interviewees situated in the „religion‟ strand expressed concern about what they saw 
as an overly-restrictive approach to manifestation in domestic courts. For some, it 
suggested that religion or belief should be „boxed away‟ or treated as a „private 
eccentricity‟. Barney Leith OBE of the Bahá‟í community of the UK argued that 
domestic courts: 
  
... have made more of a separation between belief and practice than I and 
many people of faith feel comfortable with; this is very challenging 
                                               
112 For example, in R (Johns) v Derby City Council [2011] EWHC Admin 375 (at para. 41), 
Munby J stated that: „The court recognises no religious distinctions and generally 
speaking passes no judgment on religious beliefs or on the tenets, doctrines or rules of 
any particular section of society. All are entitled to equal respect. And the civil courts are 
not concerned to adjudicate on purely religious issues, whether religious controversies 
within a religious community or between different religious communities‟. 
 
113 For example, in Playfoot, the court applied an objective test to hold that the claimant was 
under no obligation by reason of religious doctrine to manifest her religion in the way she 
claimed. It is not only Christian claimants who have been affected by judicial 
determinations on matters of faith and doctrine. A similar test was applied in R (Ghai) v 
Newcastle City Council [2009] EWHC (Admin) 978, in which open air cremation was held 
(at para. 101) to be „sufficiently close to the core of one strand of orthodox Hinduism‟ to 
warrant protection but to be only a matter of tradition and belief for Sikhs.  
  
114 Lord Carey supported the applicant in McFarlane v Relate Avon [2010] EWCA Civ 880; 
see paras. 16-18. 
 






because you may believe something in all conscience and … yet there is 
a rhetoric that you can believe what you like but you are not necessarily 
free to act on your belief. 
 
From a different perspective, the difficulty for secular courts of adjudicating doctrinal 
disputes as to what a religion requires is presented as an argument for limiting the 
protection afforded to religion (McColgan, 2009: 11). For example, in the case of 
Williamson, the House of Lords accepted the parents‟ and teachers‟ views as to the 
necessity of corporal punishment as „religious‟; this potential „trump card‟ might have 
fatally undermined the prohibition of corporal punishment in schools had not the 
interference with those views been found to be justified under Article 9(2).  
 
Interviewees from religion or belief groups emphasised the difficulties that judges 
(and other decision-makers) may face in determining matters of faith and doctrine. It 
was noted that the „cross-fertilisation‟ of faiths complicates matters; for example, one 
Christian interviewee referred to the surprising number of Christians who believe in 
reincarnation. Jewish and Muslim interviewees gave instances of unresolved (or 
unresolvable) uncertainties in the interpretations of their faiths; for example, between 
Orthodox and Reform Judaism or between the four sources of Islamic law. It was 
noted that the lack of hierarchy between different traditions frequently precludes any 
definitive interpretation of „core‟ or „obligatory‟ practices. A Muslim participant added 
that „religious and cultural baggage may become blurred‟ in such interpretations.  
 
The issue of group disadvantage under discrimination law  
The issue of what are „core‟ or „peripheral‟ beliefs has also arisen in discrimination 
cases, most controversially in Eweida v British Airways115 and Chaplin v Royal 
Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust.116 In Eweida, a member of check-in staff 
wore a cross on a neck chain in breach of British Airways‟ uniform policy which 
prohibited visible religious symbols unless their wearing was mandatory. The Court 
of Appeal held that the uniform policy did not put Christians as a group at a 
particular disadvantage; there was no evidence that practising Christians considered 
the visible display of the cross to be a requirement of their faith.117 In Chaplin, which 
concerned a nurse who wished to wear a crucifix around her neck, the tribunal again 
found no evidence of group disadvantage; in this instance, another Christian nurse 
who worked with Chaplin and whose religious objection was weaker had removed 
                                               
115 [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
 
116 ET Case No. 1702886/2009, 6 April 2010. 
 





her cross and chain and therefore was judged not to have been put at a particular 
disadvantage.  
 
These judgments have been criticised for failing to protect beliefs held by individuals 
(or by a minority of believers within a larger religion or belief groups) (Pitt, 2011: 396-
99; Sandberg, 2011a: 113-14; Vickers, 2009a). Pitt (2011: 397-98) notes that it is 
unclear from case law how many people need to be adversely affected in order for 
indirect discrimination to be established. She adds that the investigation of whether 
there is group disadvantage should be extended beyond the existing workforce to 
those who could potentially be employed by the same employer and that in the case 
of a large and diverse company, such as British Airways, this would probably be 
society at large.  
 
It is not argued that the decisions in the two cases were necessarily incorrect, but 
rather that they should have been reached on the basis of an assessment of 
proportionality rather than at the interference stage. Such a change would bring 
discrimination law into harmony with Article 9 jurisprudence which expressly protects 
the manifestation of individual beliefs. The submission by the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) to the ECtHR in the case of Eweida and Chaplin follows 
this line of argument. It argues that group disadvantage may be difficult to identify in 
the context of diverse religious beliefs that, unlike other protected characteristics, are 
„legitimately subject to autonomous interpretation by individual adherents‟.118 It 
concludes that domestic case law „currently fails adequately to protect individuals 
from religious discrimination in the workplace‟.119  
  
Overall, the concerns explored in this section suggest that courts and tribunals 
should ground their assessment of justification for interference in sociological rather 
than doctrinal or theological arguments; that is, they should assess whether 
interference was justified in relation to the particular social context in which it 
occurred, rather than whether the particular belief or practice was or was not „core‟ or 
„obligatory‟. This does not preclude any scrutiny of belief or practice, particularly 
where (as the EHRC states), manifestations are „less closely connected to 
requirements of a religion or belief‟.120 However, it suggests that such scrutiny should 
                                               
118 Submission of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the European Court of 
Human Rights, Eweida and Chaplin v United Kingdom, September 2011, para. 26.  
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occur at both the interference and justification stages in order that the merits of the 
case can be fully considered. 
  
5.5  The concept of reasonable accommodation 
Concerns about an overly-restrictive approach to religion or belief claims in domestic 
courts have prompted some commentators to call for the introduction of a specific 
duty on employers to make reasonable accommodation for the observance or 
practice of religion or belief.121 Such a duty exists on employers in the United States 
and some Canadian provinces (Vickers, 2008, Chapter 6). By extending the public 
sector equality duty to religion or belief, something akin to a duty of reasonable 
accommodation has now been imposed on public authorities (Hepple 2011: 43). The 
main difference between a reasonable accommodation duty and non-discrimination 
is that the former places a greater onus on the employer to accommodate 
employees‟ observance or practice of religion or belief (Vickers, 2008: 220). Such a 
duty may, therefore, create stronger protection for religion or belief claims depending 
on the threshold established for justifying any failure to accommodate (Vickers, 
2008: 222-25).122  
 
A duty of reasonable accommodation has been advocated as a pragmatic response 
to the fact that „religious belief is an important organising feature of many people's 
lives and that present arrangements are not even-handed in the extent to which they 
enable people to manage the competing demands upon them‟ (McColgan, 2009: 
25). Examples of reasonable accommodation might include the provision of halal 
and kosher food in institutions where Muslim or Jewish employees were present in 
significant numbers; flexibility as regards appearance rules; and early finish times for 
observant Jewish workers on Friday evenings to permit compliance with Sabbath 
restrictions (McColgan, 2009: 26). Such a duty might also prevent litigation and 
divisive debate by avoiding „hair-splitting‟ distinctions between direct and indirect 
discrimination arising from religion or belief (McColgan, 2009: 29; Hepple, 2011: 43). 
Another possible benefit would be to encourage consistency of practice across 
                                               
121 The Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
proposed that employers, schools and other institutions should be under a duty to make 
reasonable adjustment to accommodate a person‟s religious observance or practice, 
provided that this can be done without undue hardship for the employer‟s business or the 
conduct of the school or other institution (Hepple et al., 2000: 49). 
 
122 In the United States, the threshold is very low; factors such as economic cost, 
inconvenience and complaints from other workers can be used to show that 
accommodation would cause „undue hardship‟ to the employer (Vickers, 2008: 180-95). 
In Canada, the duty to accommodate is stronger, in terms of the expense or 
inconvenience that employers are expected to bear; however there is an onus on both 





employers: for example, Jit Jethwa observed from a Hindu perspective that Hindu 
employees experienced different treatment depending on whether they lived in 
London or elsewhere.  
 
The EHRC conducted an informal public consultation in 2011 on whether a concept 
„akin to reasonable accommodation for individuals wishing to manifest their religions 
or beliefs in the workplace should be incorporated into the approach to human rights 
in the UK‟ (EHRC, 2011).123 Most religious respondents to that consultation either 
wanted the concept to be introduced immediately or to be further investigated.124 
Business representatives opposed the concept; it was perceived to be unclear and 
potentially unduly burdensome. Trade unions and lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) respondents were concerned that it could „act as a vehicle for 
religious people to discriminate and thereby threaten the rights of LGB and T 
people‟.125 Some religion or belief stakeholders, lawyers and academics were also 
opposed, suggesting there was no basis for treating religion or belief differently from 
any other protected characteristic. Some suggested that the effect of a duty of 
reasonable accommodation would be very similar in practice to that of non-
discrimination and would not necessarily guarantee greater protection or 
consistency.  
 
This research project did not ask participants expressly whether they favoured the 
introduction of a duty of reasonable accommodation. However, participants were 
asked about the criteria for deciding whether exceptions to general rules or practices 
should or should not be made on the basis of a person‟s religion or belief; for 
example if an employee wishes to wear certain clothing or symbols; distribute 
literature relating to their religion or belief; or have particular facilities provided. Such 
criteria would inform proportionality decisions regardless of the precise legal model 
used.  
 
The extent and limits of reasonable accommodation 
Among our participants, there was a high degree of consensus as to the type of 
factors which might in some circumstances reasonably restrict the manifestation of 
                                               
123 This was part of the Commission‟s informal public consultation inviting opinion on its 
submissions to the ECtHR in the cases of Ladele, McFarlane, Eweida and Chaplin); see 
section 1.3.  
 
124 EHRC (2011: 4-5).  
 
125 McColgan (2009: 28) suggests that this would not, in fact, be the case since „reasonable 
accommodation could not require an employer to override a prohibition on direct sex 
discrimination‟ (emphasis in original). 
 






religion or belief in the workplace and the wider public sphere (i.e. that might 
constitute „undue hardship‟ in relation to a duty of reasonable accommodation).126 
Agreement extended across interviewees and general survey respondents of all 
religious affiliations and none. The factors that were raised most consistently were: 
 
 genuine health or safety concerns; 
 cost and efficiency (taking into account the size of the employer); 
 detrimental impact on colleagues (excluding pure offence);127  
 requirements for brand and uniformity; 
 the capacity to communicate;128 and 
 the relative institutional power of the claimant.129  
 
We encountered a strong presumption across all types of interviewee towards the 
accommodation of religion or belief where these criteria do not apply or are not 
compelling. This was sometimes expressed as a presumption in favour of the 
principle of personal autonomy in the public realm. As David Pollock observed in 
relation to dress codes:  
 
What people wear is a matter of personal freedom and autonomy. As with 
everything people say and do, it‟s the effect on others that matters and it 
is only when others are affected that the law should have any purchase.  
 
                                               
126 A large number of general survey respondents with Christian affiliation stated that to be 
reasonable, restrictions should be stated upfront by employers and should apply equally 
to all religions or beliefs lest Christians find themselves less accommodated than those of 
other faiths. 
 
127 Interviewees from a variety of stakeholder groups, as well as several survey respondents, 
stated that pure offence should rarely be a determining factor in what beliefs or practices 
it is reasonable to accommodate; provisions in the Equality Act 2010 covering 
victimisation and harassment established the threshold for conduct in the workplace and 
beyond that there was, as one interviewee put it, „no right not to be offended‟.  
  
128 This criterion was suggested by some interviewees and survey respondents concerned 
with both the „religion‟ and „belief‟ strands and other equality strands, including a Muslim 
participant. Those who suggested it proposed that it would often be reasonable to restrict 
the wearing of a full face veil in public-facing roles. This was also the argument which 
Jack Straw MP gave for asking constituents to remove the veil when meeting him. „I felt 
uneasy talking to someone I couldn't see‟, Jack Straw MP, 6 October 2006; 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/oct/06/politics.uk. 
 
129 For example, it might be reasonable not to accommodate a Christian prison warden who 
wishes to wear a visible cross in a context where prisoners of other faiths or none might 




This was also underpinned for some interviewees by a broader principle of the 
inherent value of diversity in a workplace or public service. For example, Jon 
Benjamin of the Board of Deputies of British Jews argued that it would be „a terribly 
sad position to be in if non-Jewish schools were devoid of observant Jews‟ because 
they did not accommodate flexible working around Jewish high holidays. 
 
Many general survey respondents distinguished between the accommodation of 
religion or belief in relation to dress codes and what they saw as the more onerous 
duty of providing facilities (such as prayer rooms) or meeting dietary requirements 
(see also section 5.4). Many of those who identified as Christian noted that it was 
„going too far‟ to expect employers actively to provide facilities; these should be 
regarded as „entirely discretionary‟ and a „perk‟. Moreover, employees might 
sometimes need to share the cost or take responsibility for their own requirements, 
for example by bringing their own food to work. Survey respondents of all affiliations 
were generally disinclined to accommodate the distribution of literature relating to 
religion or belief at work; many suggested that rules should be the same as for 
political literature, which might be placed on designated noticeboards but not be (as 
many put it) „forced on people‟. Several Christian respondents argued that (as one 
put it) religious material should not be regarded as being „necessarily inappropriate 
… or offensive simply because it contains material on areas of controversy‟.  
  
Interviewees generally acknowledged that decisions about what it is reasonable to 
accommodate are always fact-specific and may involve nuanced judgments as to the 
social context involved. Such decisions inevitably involve a degree of subjectivity. 
This was apparent in responses from interviewees and general survey respondents 
as to when it was reasonable to expect employers to accommodate employees‟ 
religions or beliefs; for example, in a situation such as that faced by British Airways 
in Eweida or the hospital authorities in Chaplin.130 „Common sense‟ was frequently 
invoked - but what constitutes common sense was interpreted differently by different 
participants, including by those of the same religion or belief.  
 
 
                                               
130 Note that this section focuses on matters of justification rather than 
interference/disadvantage. The Court of Appeal in Eweida considered matters of 
justification (at paras. 30-39). It concluded that BA‟s actions were a proportionate means 
of achieving a legitimate aim; therefore, even if indirect discrimination had been found, it 
would have been justified. It noted that the Employment Tribunal had concluded 
differently on the matter of justification; the tribunal found that prohibition of visible 
symbols was not proportionate because the eventual review which resulted in a relaxation 
of the code to permit the visible wearing of religious symbols could have taken place 
sooner had the (assumed) discriminatory impact of the code been analysed before 
November 2006.  






The cases of Eweida and Chaplin 
Malcolm Brown, representing the Church of England, sympathised with Nancy 
Eweida on the basis that her request to wear a visible cross harmed no-one and that 
„doing things in public is how we live - our identity is played out in public‟. However, 
Reverend Aled Edwards noted a personal view that some may, in the context of 
such debates, have been „trying to make a point, rather than have a legitimate 
human right respected‟. Charles Wookey of the Catholic Bishops‟ Conference of 
England and Wales added that:  
 
What‟s important is that when people are recruited to roles, clear 
stipulations are made in advance about what the employer requires as 
regards dress. If that is done, the employee has no business kicking up 
later on ... I would veer on the side of the employer in these situations - 
they have a perfect right and sometimes a very clear need to have 
consistency of practice. 
 
Muslim participants also gave different responses to the case. One suggested that 
Eweida should have been satisfied to wear the cross discreetly „but not flaunt it‟; 
others felt BA had been „heavy handed‟ and that the judgment was „unfair‟. Concern 
was also expressed that the judgment could, in turn, stigmatise Muslims by creating 
the erroneous impression that Muslims who were permitted to wear headscarves 
were privileged over Christians. This concern may be well founded: some religious 
respondents to the EHRC‟s informal consultation on Eweida pointed to the perceived 
unfairness of granting accommodation to Muslims and Sikhs but not to Christians. 
Most (but not all) religious respondents to that consultation were also alarmed that 
limits on wearing a cross or crucifix were being set under what they saw as a 
„secular agenda‟.  
 
Trade union participants in our research generally had little sympathy for Eweida. 
They noted in particular that she pursued legal action after compromises were 
offered and after BA had relaxed its uniform policy so as to permit the visible wearing 
of religious and charity symbols.131 Trade union respondents to the EHRC‟s 
consultation also felt the correct conclusions were reached in Eweida and Chaplin 
(EHRC, 2011: 2). Business respondents also felt the cases had been correctly 
                                               
131 Media reports quote Eweida as having refused the compromise of wearing a cross as a 
lapel badge; „BA cross women [sic] vows no compromise as 92-per cent of public back 
her‟, Mail Online, 26 November 2006; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-418819/BA-
cross-women-vows-compromise-92-cent-public-her.html#ixzz1aCYNW1Kj. Eweida had 
also refused an accommodating offer by BA to move her (without loss of pay) to work 





decided and were concerned that the Commission‟s intervention could lead to 
greater regulatory burdens.  
 
Among our interviewees, there was greater consensus across stakeholder groups 
around the outcome in the Chaplin case compared to that in Eweida.132 Malcolm 
Brown stated that: 
 
We know the reasons why nurses can‟t wear anything dangling round 
their necks. It doesn‟t matter whether it‟s religious or not. It‟s a perfectly 
good pragmatic argument … Where there is harm or genuine 
disadvantage, I think Christians should back off from the need to display 
their faith in public.  
 
Several Christian interviewees noted that Chaplin could have worn the crucifix under 
her uniform. Aled Edwards gave weight not only to the health and safety argument, 
but also to the social context of the hospital ward: it appeared that a nurse „was 
neither commissioned nor allowed‟ to wear the crucifix as a means of sharing his or 
her faith with patients. Chaplains were there to offer spiritual care. 
 
Perceptions of reasonableness  
The Eweida case has been particularly high profile. Politicians from each of the 
major UK parties criticised British Airways publicly in November 2006 and some 
(including two ministers) stated their intention to boycott BA.133 The fact that the 
Court of Appeal subsequently found that the airline‟s actions had been a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim illustrates the gulf that can exist 
between different perceptions of what is reasonable or proportionate in a given set of 
circumstances. Public controversy has persisted since the Court of Appeal judgment 
and appears likely to reverberate further as the case heads to Strasbourg. 
  
In summary, the response of our participants suggests a high degree of consensus 
around the general criteria for allowing or restricting accommodation of religion or 
belief, but differences of view as to how those criteria should be applied in particular 
cases. These differences were not purely between religious and non-religious 
participants: they were evident between, for example, Anglican participants. The 
introduction of a duty of reasonable accommodation would not necessarily produce 
                                               
132 However, the vast majority of general survey respondents who identified as Christian and 
referred to the Chaplin case supported what they saw as her right to wear the crucifix. 
 
133 „Second minister to boycott BA in growing row over Christian worker‟, Mail Online, 21 
November 21; http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-417796/Second-minister-boycott-
BA-growing-row-Christian-worker.html. 






greater certainty than the present indirect discrimination model, since the 
proportionality (or „undue hardship‟) calculation has to be made in each case 
whatever the legal model adopted. In addition, it may be hard to achieve informed 
public discussion about the possible introduction of a duty of reasonable 
accommodation and its practical implications given the divisive nature of much public 
debate about religion or belief.  
 
The European perspective 
The presumption towards accommodation of religion or belief in the absence of 
compelling reasons for restriction contrasts strongly with approaches elsewhere in 
Europe. A review of discrimination cases in European Union states between 2004 
and 2010 reported controversy around the implementation of non-discrimination 
provisions relating to dress codes and religious symbols (Do, 2011: 15). For 
example, the principle of neutrality in education in Belgium has been held to justify 
the prohibition imposed on teachers not to wear any visible religious, political or 
philosophical symbol on school premises. As noted in section 2.3, there have been 
fierce public debates in Europe about the wearing of the hijab, niqab or burqa in 
public with a ban on the concealment of the face in France and legislative proposals 
tabled in several other states.  
 
Howard (2009: 9-12) identifies several reasons given in different European states for 
such bans. These include the need to deal with the threat of terrorism, both literally 
in the sense that a person in a burqa could hide a bomb under it and symbolically in 
the sense that the hijab, niqab or burqa are seen as representing „extremist Muslim 
politics‟. Other reasons given are that these forms of clothing are a barrier both to 
social integration and, in the case of face coverings, effective communication. Bans 
have also been justified on the grounds that the hijab, niqab or burqa are symbolic of 
the oppression of women and that if some women wear them, even of their own free 
will, others who do not, may come under pressure from their community to do so.134 
Interviewees for this research did not mention any of these factors save for that 
relating to effective communication.    
 
5.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have examined the growing, and frequently controversial, body of 
case law concerning equality, human rights and religion or belief. We noted the lack 
                                               
134 The issue of whether women or girls choose freely to wear a form of religious dress arose 
in the Begum case. Three Law Lords emphasised the possibility that Shabina Begum had 
been influenced or pressurised by her older brother to wear the jilbab. Lord Scott noted 
(at para. 80) that the „confrontational‟ way the issue had been raised with the school was 





of clarity surrounding the definition of „belief‟ and the consequent uncertainty as to 
which beliefs warrant legal protection and which do not. This is an issue of pressing 
concern to employers (whose practical responses are discussed in Chapter 8). 
 
We have seen that, overall, the law on equality, human rights and religion or belief 
has been interpreted cautiously in domestic courts. While some claims concerning 
dress codes and working hours have succeeded, most have failed. However, case 
law remains unpredictable with a recent, successful Article 9 claim (Imran Bashir) 
appearing to sidestep the hurdles erected in earlier cases such as Begum. Concern 
exists about the number of decisions by courts and tribunals that have excluded 
religion or belief claims at the interference stage, rather than considering the merits 
of the case by examining the justification for interference. In particular, the 
requirement to show group (rather than solitary) disadvantage is viewed by the 
EHRC, among others, as failing to provide sufficient protection for individual 
believers. Religion or belief groups and others also argue that courts and tribunals 
should ground their assessment of justification for interference in sociological rather 
than doctrinal or theological arguments. 
 
It was acknowledged by nearly all participants in this research that individuals whose 
religion or belief is important to them have a responsibility to make sensible 
professional choices and may have to make personal sacrifices. Our research found 
consensus around the type of criteria (such as health and safety and the impact on 
others) which might reasonably restrict the manifestation of religion or belief in the 
workplace and the wider public realm.  
 
We found an equally strong presumption towards the accommodation of religion or 
belief where these criteria do not apply or are not compelling. Views differed 
(including between co-religionists) as to how the criteria should be applied in 
particular instances. Nevertheless, these findings indicate a high degree of 
acceptance of what might be termed „routine‟ accommodation of religion or belief, in 
marked contrast to approaches elsewhere in Europe. More controversial is 
accommodation of claims based on religion or belief where they compete (or appear 
to compete) directly with the interests of others, which is the subject of Chapter 6.  






6.  Competing interests in relation to religion or belief  
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the legal and conceptual debates about competing interests 
in relation to equality, human rights and religion or belief. It does not 
comprehensively examine case law concerning competing interests, but focuses on 
those cases and debates that have been most contentious in the domestic context. 
The chapter explores the balancing of competing rights and equality grounds; 
debates about the nature of religion or belief as a protected characteristic; the 
perceived existence of a hierarchy between religion or belief and other equality 
grounds; and the issue of conscientious objection. It also examines the legal 
exceptions to the Equality Act 2010 which exist to deal with potential tensions but are 
themselves clouded in legal uncertainty. It concludes by examining the issue of legal 
„overstretch‟ caused by the inclusion of religion or belief alongside other equality 
grounds. 
 
6.2  Balancing competing rights  
The need to strike a balance between competing interests is a perennial feature of 
human rights law (Knights, 2007, Chapter 3; Malik, 2008a). The test of proportionality 
generally requires some form of assessment as to how to weigh competing interests 
in a given case (see section 4.2). A balance may need to be struck between the 
rights of the individual and the obligation and interests of the state. Cases may also 
need to balance the competing interests of the individual and others; the individual 
and the religious group; the child and the parent; or a minority religion or belief group 
and the majority. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not 
contain specific guidance on how to deal with competing interests; it is primarily the 
role of the domestic courts to strike a balance in each case. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) affords a wide margin of appreciation to domestic courts to 
ensure that a fair balance is struck and that any interference is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim sought (Knights, 2007: 72).  
  
There are several areas where competition may arise between substantive rights. 
For example, it may sometimes be necessary to balance the right to freedom of 
religion or belief (Article 9) with the right to freedom of expression (Article 10) (see 
Evans, 2009a, 2010).135 In some instances, the balancing act is between two aspects 
of the right to freedom of religion or belief, namely the right to preach and express 
                                               
135 For example, in Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria, No. 13470/87, 20.9.1994, the ECtHR 
considered an application by a non-profit association which had been prevented from 
showing a satirical film set in heaven due to concerns about offending Christians. The 
Court rejected the Article 10 claim, recognising that the state had exercised a positive duty 




views as against the right to be free from religion and not be subjected to improper 
proselytisation (Knights, 2007: 66-67).  
 
The question arises as to whether a hierarchical analysis is required in order to 
resolve what might otherwise be intractable conflicts. Most commentators, viewing 
rights as indivisible and interdependent, reject this approach in favour of an analysis 
that seeks to balance and give importance to each right (Brems, 2008; Bribosia and 
Rorive, 2010; Zucca, 2007).136 Discussing the intersection of the right to freedom of 
religion or belief and the right to freedom of expression, Evans (2009a: 233) argues 
that:  
 
... it is both artificial and unhelpful to juxtapose them in an oppositional 
fashion or seek to determine a hierarchy of significance between them. 
Rather, it is necessary to identify the important contribution of both rights 
to the functioning of a tolerant, plural and democratic society and seek to 
ensure there is a maximising of both rights in situations of tension, rather 
than a relativising of the one in the interests of the other.  
 
The key, Evans suggests, is to identify the core principles which inform the 
assessment of the legitimacy of any restriction to the freedom of religion or belief in 
particular instances.  
 
Legal principles to resolve situations where rights conflict  
International human rights law provides a frame of reference for the practical 
resolution of situations where rights appear to conflict.137 Principles established in 




                                               
136 For example, in Şahin v Turkey, concerning a headscarf ban, Judge Tulkens in her 
dissenting judgment stated (at para. 4) that: „In a democratic society, I believe it is 
necessary to seek to harmonise the principles of secularism, equality and liberty, not to 
weigh one against the other. She added (at para. 41) that: „It is precisely this constant 
search for a balance between the fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes 
the foundation of a “democratic society”‟. The case of Trinity Western University v British 
Columbia College Teachers [2001] 1 SCR 772 in the Canadian Supreme Court raised the 
issue of a conflict between freedom of religion and the constitutional right to equality; see 
Malik (2008a: 28-29) for discussion of this case. 
 
137 For a comprehensive analysis of principles established in international human rights law 
concerning religion or belief, see Evans (2009b) and Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (2004). 
 







Any restriction should not be discriminatory in the sense that it bears more directly or 




The state is required to act in a neutral fashion as between religions and as between 
religious and non-religious forms of belief. This means that any protection or 
restriction should be generic and not focused on a particular religion or belief.138 
 
Fostering pluralism and tolerance 
This is a seen as a goal in its own right as a means of preserving democracy; it 
requires religious adherents to accept a fairly high degree of challenge to their belief 
systems in the pursuit of this goal.139  
 
Respect for the right of others to believe  
This principle is a key factor when assessing the necessity of any interference with 
the manifestation of a religion or belief; it establishes the duty of the state to create a 
„level playing field‟ between different parties, with one side being free to present their 
point of view, and the other to reject it. This is also expressed as respecting the 
„believer‟ rather than the „belief‟ (Evans, 2009b: 30). This has come into play in cases 
concerning the restriction of proselytising activities which run the risk of subjecting 
individuals to pressure which they might be powerless to resist.140  
 
Proportionality  
As explained in section 4.2, this principle provides a structured way to determine how 
to balance competing considerations in any particular context. Interference with the 
right to manifest one‟s religion or belief must have a legitimate aim and be necessary 
in a democratic society for the purpose of achieving that aim. The means employed 
                                               
138 For example, in Manoussakis and Others v. Greece No. 18748/1991, 26.9.1996, 
concerning the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to set up a temple without authorisation, the 
ECtHR (at para. 47) stated that: „The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the 
Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious 
beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate‟.  
 
139 The Court recognised the tension caused by pluralism in Serif v Greece No. 38178/97, 
14.12.1999, involving the prosecution of a man claiming to be the Mufti of a Muslim 
community and the potential for unrest arising out of rival claims to this role. The Court 
stated (at para. 53) that: „The role of authorities in such circumstances is not to remove 
the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups 
tolerate each other‟.  
 




must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; that is, the least restrictive 
alternative must be pursued.  
 
Legality 
Restrictions on the right to manifest one‟s religion or belief must not be arbitrary or 
irrational. They must be clear, publicly accessible, non-retrospective, and people 
must be able to understand the circumstances in which it might be imposed and 
foresee the consequences of their actions with a degree of accuracy. 
 
Human rights as a ‘non-negotiable floor’ in competing equality claims 
Malik (2008a: 10) recommends that competing interests that arise in equality law 
should be resolved by treating human rights standards as a „non-negotiable floor‟ 
which binds all the relevant parties; for example, where there is a conflict between a 
religious or cultural practice and gender equality. Human rights values and principles, 
Malik suggests, also provide decision-makers with a substantive set of positive 
values with which to design policy and practice. An example is the principle of 
personal autonomy, which was endorsed by our interviewees as an approach to the 
accommodation of religion or belief (subject to reasonable limitations; see section 
5.5). The practical utility of human rights as an overarching framework within which to 
approach equality duties was underlined by health and social care practitioners who 
participated in our Cardiff roundtable; their experience is discussed in detail in 
section 9.2.  
 
‘Substantive’ and ‘peripheral’ aspects of competing rights 
The literature contains other criteria to guide legal reasoning in cases where rights 
appear to conflict. Brems (2008: 5) distinguishes between the „substantive‟ and 
„peripheral‟ aspects of conflicting rights as a guide to deciding which to prioritise in 
any given case. This criterion necessarily entails an evaluation of the seriousness of 
the interference caused by the respective exercising of one right at the expense of 
another. However, several interviewees were doubtful about the practical value of 
this criterion as a guide to decision-making. They argued that assessments about 
substantive and peripheral aspects of rights cannot be made in the abstract but must 
be grounded in the social context in which the case occurs, including the relative 
power of the protagonists. Malcolm Brown observed that: 
 
This relates to … power because [I might be able to] concede what might 
look to me to be a peripheral issue but someone else might not be in a 
position to concede anything. If you‟re vulnerable, conceding anything 
feels like defeat.  
 






The procedural approach  
Bribosia and Rorive (2010: 25) propose another criterion for adjudicating competing 
rights cases. They emphasise the need to verify the quality of the decision-making 
procedure implemented by the „authority‟ involved in a given case. This might also 
involve a consideration of which authority should decide the boundaries of religious 
accommodation in each case; for example, the legislature, the courts, or non-legal 
institutions and authorities, such as employers or schools.  
 
In Begum, the Court of Appeal held that the school had not followed a proper 
decision-making procedure when determining whether there had been an 
infringement of an Article 9 right; it had not expressly applied the proportionality test 
(Malik, 2008a: 377-78). However, this was overturned by the House of Lords. It held 
that the question was whether or not the school had, in the end, acted in a way that 
was permissible under the ECHR rather than whether or not the school had asked 
itself the right questions.141 Moreover, the Lords held that the school had taken 
immense pains to devise a uniform policy which conformed to the requirements of 
mainstream Muslim opinion; it would be irresponsible of any court to overrule the 
decision of the school authorities in such circumstances.142 The judgment underlines 
the extent to which groups such as school governing bodies are on the „front line‟ of 
decision-making about the „complex social and political challenges posed by 
multiculturalism … and identity politics‟ - decisions which may need to withstand 
considerable scrutiny as claims make their way into legal process (Malik, 2008b: 
384). 
  
Dignity as a basis for resolving competing interests 
Human dignity is a core human rights value and is central both to religious and non-
religious perspectives on rights (McCrudden, 2008, 2011). Some commentators 
propose that dignity could be used instrumentally to help resolve competing rights or 
equality claims (Moon and Allen, 2006). This suggestion arises partly from the use of 
dignity as a value underpinning applied human rights practice in public services.  
 
McCrudden (2011: 35) observes that there is a consensus across human rights texts 
around a minimum core concept of dignity. This encompasses the intrinsic worth of 
the individual human being; the need for this intrinsic worth to be recognised and 
respected by others; and the requirement that the state should be seen to exist for 
the sake of the individual human being, and not vice versa. However, the way in 
which these elements are understood is context-specific, varying over time and 
                                               
141 Paras. 32-33. 
 




between different jurisdictions and religious and non-religious traditions. Moreover, 
dignity may be invoked by both sides of a dispute to support their particular claims.  
 
Interviewees in this research differed as to how far dignity might be useful to resolve 
competing rights or equality claims. Some viewed it as having practical value: it 
underpinned and provided a common metric for efforts to promote fair and equitable 
treatment in the workplace or wider community. This view was expressed in 
particular by practitioners who used the concept of dignity in, for example, the 
delivery of healthcare (see also Afridi and Warmington, 2010: 31). However, others 
noted that dignity is a „slippery‟ concept. Malcolm Brown observed that Christians are 
followers of someone who „abandoned all dignity‟ in the Easter story: 
 
Having that foundational narrative, we understand dignity in a different 
way to other traditions that don‟t have that self-abnegating, self-sacrificing 
element at the heart of their belief ... You can‟t alight on a word like dignity 
as if it had the same cultural meaning across the board … Our concern is 
what happens to vulnerable people but we reserve the right to make 
ourselves vulnerable in pursuance of our religion. 
 
McCrudden (2011: 38) suggests that there is a „golden opportunity‟ for engagement 
between religious organisations and human rights law as regards the meaning of 
human dignity, given its centrality to both. However, the absence of consensus 
suggests that dignity does not presently provide a secure foundation for principled 
decision-making when interests compete either inside or outside the courtroom.  
 
6.3  Competing interests in equality law  
The Equality Act 2010 is underpinned by the assumption that religion or belief can be 
protected in the same way and broadly to the same extent as other protected 
characteristics. However, tension arises when there is an incompatibility between 
giving effect to the principle of non-discrimination to protect one group (e.g. women 
or lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) people) at the same time as 
protecting another (e.g. those with a religion or belief) (Dinham and Shaw, 2009). 
This section explores some of the legal and conceptual difficulties that have arisen as 
a result of the inclusion of different characteristics in the same Act (see also section 
6.8). 
 
In recent years, cases concerning tension between the „religion‟ strand and sexual 
orientation have been exceptionally high profile. Stychin (2009: 733) notes that „the 
construction of rights in conflict and in need of balancing pervades the relationship of 
sexuality and religion‟. As discussed in section 4.4, contentious judgments 






concerning competing interests do not mean that friction is prevalent or entrenched in 
society. Nor is it the case that the resolution contained in a specific judgment is 
necessarily that which will or must be followed in every setting; for example, different 
circumstances may affect the proportionality decision in relation to the justification for 
indirect discrimination. 
 
Contentious cases have prompted debate about how to create a coherent equalities 
framework given the proliferation of protected equality grounds and the inevitability of 
tension between them. This debate involves consideration of whether or not religion 
or belief is essentially different from other protected characteristics.  
 
The nature of religion or belief as a characteristic  
We found little consensus in the literature or among our interviewees about the 
nature of religion or belief as a protected characteristic compared to others.  
  
One argument advanced for seeing religion or belief as essentially different from 
other characteristics is that it is chosen by the individual and is therefore more akin to 
a political belief than an „essential, immutable element of the individual‟s birthright or 
identity‟ (Lester and Uccellari, 2008: 569).143 A counter-argument is that a high 
percentage of religious adherents stay in the religion or belief group into which they 
were born or brought up (Vickers, 2011: 138; Perfect, 2011: 9-10). It is also argued 
that to see religion as a personal choice is to take too individualistic a stance and to 
ignore more communal and cultural understandings of religious identity (McCrudden, 
2011).  
 
Among our interviewees, the understanding of either religion or belief as a choice 
appeared to be personal rather than institutional. There was no clear divide between 
groups situated in the „religion‟ and „belief‟ strands. Interviewees, including those 
affiliated to the same religion or belief, expressed subtly different understandings. 
Many recognised that individual experience of religion or belief is variable and 
subjective; it might be the result of one‟s upbringing, a moment of conversion or an 
act of will. It was observed that Paganism is always expressly chosen, while for other 
religions or beliefs, tradition, culture and nationality are significant contributory 
elements of „religious‟ or „belief‟ identity. Distinction was also made between religious 
observance or conversion and indelible markers of identity; for example, there is no 
liturgical capacity in Catholicism to „un-baptise‟ someone, while Orthodox Judaism 
adheres to the law of matrilineal descent.  
                                               
143 In Eweida v British Airways (at para. 40), Sedley LJ noted that all protected characteristics 
apart from religion or belief are „objective characteristics of individuals: religion and belief 




Debate about religion or belief as a matter of choice is sometimes connected to that 
of whether sexual orientation is a chosen characteristic. One interviewee considered 
that if the manifestation of religion or belief were to enjoy lesser protection from 
discrimination on that basis, so should the manifestation of sexual orientation. By this 
account, both religion and sexual orientation are distinct from other protected 
characteristics because they involve a degree of personal appropriation about one‟s 
belief and identity and how one chooses to live as a result (Stychin, 2009). For 
interviewees concerned with the LGBT (and sometimes also the religion) strand, this 
bracketing together of the religion and sexual orientation strands is unfounded and 
has damaging consequences. Reverend Sharon Ferguson of the Lesbian and Gay 
Christian Movement argued that:  
 
The fundamental faiths believe that [sexual orientation] is a lifestyle 
choice; they … say we can be „cured‟ of our homosexuality. If we can get 
over the idea that either faith or sexuality are chosen it would be easier to 
address discrimination. You can‟t choose whether you believe in God; you 
can choose what you believe about God. The law does not protect a 
person‟s right to impose their theology - their understanding of God - on 
other people.  
 
A firmer basis on which to distinguish religion or belief from other characteristics was 
suggested by some interviewees situated in both the „religion‟ and „belief‟ strands. 
They suggested that religion or belief is sui generis because it has intellectual 
content; it both proscribes and prescribes certain behaviour that impinges on 
adherents to the religion or belief and, indirectly, on others. Further, unlike other 
protected groups, some religion or belief groups may seek to recruit new followers.  
 
Some interviewees concerned with the „belief‟ strand and other equality strands felt 
that the inherent differences they perceived to exist between religion or belief and 
other characteristics created an argument for religion or belief to enjoy more limited 
protection. For some, the inclusion of religion or belief in the public sector equality 
duty is particularly problematic; for a detailed discussion, see section 9.4.  
 
By contrast, interviewees situated in the „religion‟ strand generally argued that, even 
if religion or belief is inherently different, this does not warrant giving it lesser 
protection. For some, this was grounded in the centrality of religions or beliefs to their 
adherents. Charles Wookey stated that humans are „meaning-seeking creatures‟ and 
therefore a propensity to form and live by particular religions or beliefs is as important 
to the human experience as any other characteristic. Further, interviewees noted that 
some fundamental human rights protect chosen actions rather than immutable 






characteristics, most obviously the right to freedom of expression; the fact that 
religion or belief may be chosen does not create a firm basis for relegating its 
importance.  
 
For some participants concerned with both religion or belief and other equality 
strands, all protected characteristics are distinct and subject to conceptual 
uncertainty. One Christian interviewee argued that:  
 
The aggressive assertion of rights should be resisted. Let‟s live with a 
degree of bemusement; let‟s not pretend that we know clearly things that 
we don‟t know clearly. Let‟s move carefully and courteously. 
 
Participants from trade unions and other equality specialists argued for a focus on 
the social reality of acts of discrimination rather than the nature of characteristics. 
Amanda Ariss of the Equality and Diversity Forum (EDF - a national network of 
equality and human rights organisations) argued that: 
 
How people perceive you, rather than what you actually are, is often the 
basis on which discrimination occurs; you‟re discriminated against 
because you‟re called Mohammad regardless of what you believe or do.  
 
Sam Dick, Head of Policy at Stonewall, observed that abstract discussions about the 
nature of different characteristics were often a distraction:  
 
What employers should discuss is what does dignity and respect look like 
in this or that place. And that cuts across all the equality strands.  
 
In summary, there are contested understandings about the nature of religion or belief 
as a characteristic enjoying legal protection. The lack of consensus is particularly 
evident in relation to whether religion or belief is chosen or immutable. Less 
contestable is the observation that religion or belief is distinct in having intellectual 
content. What is clear is that the inclusion of religion or belief alongside other 
protected characteristics has stretched concepts of equality and non-discrimination in 
often uncomfortable ways (section 6.8). 
 
6.4  Debate about a hierarchy between protected characteristics  
A further question arises from discussion about whether protected characteristics are 
inherently different: is there - or should there be - a hierarchy of protection between 
different characteristics, with discrimination on grounds of religion or belief being 




this idea by observing that religion or belief had become the „Cinderella‟ of protected 
characteristics. 
 
For some commentators, the concept of a hierarchy between equality grounds is 
anathema; rather, the imperative is to seek to harmonise them using human rights as 
a non-negotiable base (Malik, 2008a: 10) (see section 6.3). It is argued that the 
creation of a hierarchy could lead to the „disappearance‟ or lack of acknowledgment 
of individuals or groups that experience discrimination on more than one ground, 
such as young, Muslim homosexual men (Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2007: 
19). Bribosia and Rorive (2010: 72) argue that the establishment of a hierarchy of 
grounds is „fraught with risk‟; they argue for greater coherence within European non-
discrimination law to ensure that judges are not first in line in negotiating the 
„minefield of internal conflicts that can occur within the principle of equality‟.  
 
We encountered strong objection in principle to the notion of a hierarchy from some 
religion or belief groups and others concerned with other (or all) equality strands. 
Amanda Ariss felt that: 
 
It would be wrong for there to be a hierarchy of grounds … Equivalence of 
protection is very important. That might take slightly different forms in 
terms of the form of law … but the purpose is to achieve an equivalent 
quality of protection. 
 
Similarly, Sam Dick argued that hierarchy was an unhelpful concept: all protected 
groups had a „shared right to be treated with dignity and respect and to have a level 
playing field‟.  
 
However, it is arguable that a hierarchy already exists within discrimination law; for 
example, direct discrimination on the grounds of age is capable of being justified 
unlike direct discrimination on any other ground. Analysing religion or belief cases 
relating to the workplace, Vickers (2010: 293-94) argues that courts have generally 
applied only a moderate level of review of employer decision-making, compared to 
the much stricter review in cases relating to race and gender. Vickers (2010: 301-02) 
argues that the emergence of a de facto hierarchy „may be inevitable given the lack 
of consensus over so many issues regarding religion‟ and „would be the lesser of two 
evils given that the alternative is a levelling down in the protection on grounds such 
as race and gender‟. For example, if business needs can be used to justify indirect 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, then the same justification might in 
theory be introduced to justify sex or race discrimination. Similarly, McCrudden 
(2005) suggests that there is a danger in seeking to create a „false consistency‟ 






between grounds since to do so may mask differences such as the levels of social 
exclusion experienced by the different groups and the socio-political context in which 
discrimination occurs. McColgan (2009: 1) proposes an attenuated form of protection 
against discrimination on grounds of religion or belief due to the inevitability of conflict 
between these and other grounds (see also Okin, 1998). By this account, the 
acknowledgement of a hierarchy is necessary in order to protect the integrity and 
coherence of the equalities framework.  
 
Vickers (2008: 228) argues that hierarchies are also likely to occur given the variety 
which exists in the understanding of what is meant by equality; for example, the 
symmetrical model of protection focused on individual justice as against models 
focused on group justice or tackling social exclusion. Different grounds of 
discrimination, she suggests, may fit better with different understandings of equality 
(see also section 9.4). Vickers (2008: 229) argues that the concept of proportionality 
is the best route to achieving a consistent approach and ensuring proper 
consideration of the interests at stake in each case. Proportionality is also sufficiently 
flexible to take into account the different contexts in which religion or belief 
discrimination may occur, both within national jurisdictions and across Europe. Thus 
courts „can consistently require employers to act proportionately, without dictating the 
factual outcome of cases‟ (Vickers, 2008: 229).  
 
Debate about the ‘trumping’ of religious claims  
A number of high-profile cases - principally, Ladele and McFarlane - have given rise 
to concerns in some quarters that religious discrimination claims are too readily 
„trumped‟ by the aim of preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
Sandberg (2011a: 116) argues that the restrictive interpretation of Article 9 in 
domestic case law was underscored by the decisions in Ladele and McFarlane, in 
which „the laudable aim of preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
was used to annihilate the equally laudable aim of preventing religious 
discrimination‟.  
 
Some Christian interviewees also highlighted the case of R (Johns) v Derby City 
Council, concerning a Pentacostalist Christian couple who wished to become short-
term foster carers, but whose application was deferred because their negative views 
about same-sex relationships were not in line with the National Standards for 
Fostering Services. A few interviewees suggested that the Johns case showed that 
sexual orientation would always „trump‟ claims based on religious discrimination. In 
fact, the judgment makes no such assertion, but a more limited statement giving 
priority in the particular circumstances of the case to national standards and statutory 




way in which judgments are sometimes taken out of context or given a more 
expansive meaning or significance in public discourse than the facts of the case 
warrant.144  
 
One Christian interviewee argued that: 
 
The law has drifted into a position where it is asserting a hierarchy of 
rights with some rights trumping others. The right to freedom of religion … 
has been relegated by comparison with the right to equal treatment in 
respect of other issues, most obviously sexuality … If this hierarchy of 
rights becomes ideological and entrenched, it will lead to great difficulty in 
the future. 
 
This view is not universally held. In the consultation conducted by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC), responses received from a wide number of 
business representatives, trade unions and LGBT stakeholders, and some religion or 
belief groups, supported the reasoning of, and conclusion reached by, the appeal 
courts in Ladele and McFarlane (Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) 
2011: 3).Trade union and LGBT stakeholders were concerned that any other 
conclusion „might provide legal legitimacy for homophobic views‟. Some highlighted 
what they perceived as a growing campaign by Christians „to seek the right to 
discriminate against LGB and T communities under the guise of seeking religious 
equality and human rights‟. Such claims are commonly couched in terms of the right 
to conscientious objection, the subject of the next section. 
  
6.5  The issue of conscientious objection  
Protection of the right to conscientious objection is not new. The principle originated 
with war and was extended when laws to legalise abortion in defined circumstances 
were introduced in 1967. Medical staff also have legal rights to opt out of carrying out 
abortions, embryo research, fertility treatment and withdrawing life-prolonging 
treatment. In recent years, there have been claims that the principle should be 
extended to new and diverse situations. For example, some Christian, Muslim and 
Jewish pharmacists claim the right to refuse to dispense the „morning after‟ 
                                               
144 Munby LJ stated (at para. 93) that, while there is no hierarchy between protected rights 
concerning religion and sexual orientation, there may be a tension between equality 
provisions concerning religious discrimination and those concerning sexual orientation. He 
added that where this is so, Standard 7 of the National Minimum Standards for Fostering 
(on „Valuing Diversity‟) and the Statutory Guidance on Promoting the Health and Well 
Being of Looked After Children „must be taken into account and in this limited sense the 
equality provisions concerning sexual orientation should take precedence‟ (emphasis 
added).  
 






contraceptive pill, including the right not to refer patients on to other providers.145 It is 
such claims for the extension of the right to conscientious objection that this section 
examines. 
 
There is a disjuncture between, on the one hand, public and philosophical discussion 
of cases that concern matters of conscience and, on the other, legal judgments that 
consider these issues. Public and philosophical debate is frequently couched in 
terms of protection (or not) for conscientious objection (e.g. British Humanist 
Association, 2011c; Wolfe, 2009). Legal judgments restrict the term to its 
conventional meaning of abstention from military service (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2011). Thus, in Ladele and McFarlane, the Court of Appeal did not refer to 
the claimants as conscientious objectors, but focused its reasoning on the 
proportionality of the restriction of their right to freedom of religion or belief and the 
nature of a reasonable accommodation in each situation. These judgments suggest 
that conscientious objection should be viewed as, at most, a residual form of 
protection, to be invoked only if situations have not been resolved through 
consideration of proportionality or accommodation. To view conscientious objection 
as the „entry point‟ for discussion in situations such as that in Ladele is at odds with 
the legal approach both at the domestic and European levels.  
 
An illustration of the disjuncture between legal and wider public debate is the 
response to the EHRC‟s consultation on the cases of Ladele and McFarlane. Most 
religious respondents to the consultation viewed these cases as concerning the 
principle of conscientious objection to same-sex relationships that should have 
resulted in exemptions being granted to both employees (EHRC, 2011: 3). Many 
thought the situation of Ladele and McFarlane analogous with the right that medical 
staff have to be exempted from duties concerning abortion. Effectively, this is an 
argument for individuals to enjoy a similar type of exception to that granted to 
religious groups and religious employers whose beliefs clash with the obligations 
placed upon them (see sections 6.7 and 6.8). Other religion or belief groups, as well 
as respondents concerned with other equality strands, were troubled by this view.  
 
                                               
145 See „Christian chemists “will be forced out” under morning-after pill rules', The Telegraph, 
9 August 2011. In September 2010, the General Pharmaceutical Council issued Guidance 
on the provision of pharmacy services affected by religious and moral beliefs. These state 
that if pharmacy professionals‟ beliefs prevent them from providing routine or emergency 
hormonal contraception, they must refer patients to an alternative appropriate source of 
supply within the timeframe required for treatment to be effective. This might include 
telephoning ahead to check that there is a pharmacist available who can provide the 





These arguments were mirrored among participants in this research. The cases, and 
the principles they raise, were the most contentious of those we reviewed - certainly 
more so than cases concerning dress codes and other forms of accommodation for 
religion or belief. This does not necessarily mean that such disputes are prevalent; 
for example, participants at the Cardiff roundtable noted that when the Welsh Local 
Government Association had been prompted by Ladele to review whether similar 
issues had occurred in Wales, no local authority said that they had.  
 
The case of Ladele146 
This section focuses on the leading case of Ladele, described as „iconic‟ by Dr Don 
Horrocks of the Evangelical Alliance. The case concerned a registrar employed by 
the London Borough of Islington who refused on grounds of religious conscience to 
perform civil partnership ceremonies. Islington insisted that she should undertake at 
least some of these duties,147 disciplined her and threatened her with dismissal. She 
alleged that she had suffered discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief. At 
the appeal, Islington argued that they could not lawfully have acted in any other way 
in the light of the provisions of the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007 
and that Ladele was in breach of Islington‟s published „Dignity for All‟ equality and 
diversity policy.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that Islington‟s policy decision to designate all registrars as 
civil partnership registrars had a legitimate aim: „fighting discrimination, both 
externally, for the benefit of the residents of the borough, and internally in the sense 
of relations with and between their employees‟.148 The Dignity for All policy was held 
to be of „overarching‟ policy significance, while implementing the policy did not impact 
on Ladele‟s religious beliefs: „she remained free to hold those beliefs and free to 
worship as she wished‟.149 Moreover, Ladele was employed in a public role by a 
public authority; she was being required to perform a „purely secular task‟ as part of 
her job and her refusal to perform that task „involved discriminating against gay 
people in the course of that job‟.150 The fact that other local authorities had decided 
                                               
146 See Stychin (2009) for a comparative analysis of Ladele and other domestic cases and 
North American case law, where the question of balancing religious freedom and LGBT 
rights has been considered in the context of competing constitutional rights. 
 
147 Islington offered a temporary a „temporary measure‟ of only having to officiate at civil 
partnerships which involved no ceremonies but Ladele refused this compromise (Ladele v 
LB Islington at para. 10). 
 
148 Para. 46. 
 
149 Para. 51. 
 
150 Para. 52. 






not to designate registrars who shared Ladele‟s beliefs as civil partnership registrars, 
and that such decisions „may well be lawful‟, did not undermine the court‟s finding 
that Ladele was neither directly nor indirectly discriminated against, nor harassed.151 
 
Principled arguments for extending protection for conscientious objection  
This section considers the argument that conscience is, as one academic interviewee 
argued, „a tender plant that should be nurtured‟: that it should, as a matter of 
principle, enjoy special legal protection beyond the usual considerations of 
proportionality and accommodation. The principle of protecting conscience based on 
religion or belief was advanced by some, mainly Christian participants. One deplored 
the „aggressive pursuit of people who in conscience can‟t do something‟. Dr Don 
Horrocks argued that: 
  
Coercion should not be used against people who have a religious 
conscience. [They] cannot be morally complicit in amoral situations. There 
should be no coercion, or sackings, unless you want a public sector with 
no Christians in it, because that is discriminatory.  
  
Andrea Williams of Christian Concern emphasised the price paid by public servants 
who wished to abstain from certain tasks on conscientious grounds:  
 
The issue is whether in the public sphere you are going to compel people 
to act against their conscience … It‟s wrecking. We‟re taking away 
people‟s livelihoods and losing experienced people from the system – it‟s 
so disproportionate. 
 
General survey respondents who identified as Christian also tended to support 
broader protection for conscientious objection; one noted that conscience should be 
„esteemed‟. Many added that the belief underlying the objection should be 
demonstrably genuine. Others acknowledged that, in some circumstances, 
employers may find it hard to relieve people of certain duties; for example if the task 
was central to the role (like serving alcohol in a bar or restaurant). The majority of 
Christian respondents strongly opposed the judgment in Ladele.  
 
Some Muslim interviewees also objected in principle to the judgment in Ladele. 
Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal noted that „in a liberal state I 
shouldn't be forced to act against my conscience‟.  
 
                                               




It was also argued that being a public servant should not necessarily be a bar to 
exercising the right to conscientious objection. The requirement was to provide the 
service in a non-discriminatory way, which did not necessarily require each public 
servant to deliver every part of that service. In a similar way, Julian Rivers argued 
that: 
 
Suddenly we‟ve got a state-sponsored sexual orthodoxy and [Ladele] was 
on the wrong side of the line. It‟s a dangerous logic that every individual 
must be prepared to share the ethic of the state as a whole (see also 
Rivers, 2007). 
 
These arguments were generally advanced by interviewees in favour of special 
protection for beliefs rooted in religious conscience. They could also be used to 
support the protection of conscience inspired by non-religious beliefs. Simon Barrow 
of the non-denominational Christian think-tank Ekklesia noted that rooting 
conscientious objection in religious credentials does not automatically confer greater 
legitimacy, as was recognised in the judgment in McFarlane.152 
 
Arguments in favour of a pragmatic approach  
Some interviewees situated in the „religion‟ strand, including majority and minority 
religion or belief groups, advanced pragmatic arguments for the extension of the right 
to conscientious objection. For some, these were additional to principled arguments; 
for others, they were simply a „common sense‟ approach to a difficult situation such 
as that in Ladele.  
 
This approach was commonly expressed in utilitarian terms. It was argued that 
Islington could have exercised discretion (as other councils had reportedly done) not 
to designate Ladele as a civil partnership registrar; the key question was, what was 
the harm in doing so? A participant involved in inter-faith issues stated that 
„conscience can‟t be made cost-free for the individual - but neither should it be too 
expensive‟. It had been open to Islington to decide not to designate all registrars as 
civil partnership registrars:  
 
It‟s not wicked to do so and it might in fact be preferable to do so … Equality 
provides a framework in determining what is just … but that doesn‟t mean we 
                                               
152 Laws LJ (at para. 24) stated that, „The precepts of any one religion – any belief system – 
cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the 
precepts of any other … The law of a theocracy is dictated without option to the people, 
not made by their judges and governments. The individual conscience is free to accept 
such dictated law; but the State, if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of 
thinking for itself‟. 






shouldn‟t try to reach informal accommodation in ways which don‟t put people 
in a difficult position. 
(emphasis in original) 
 
This utilitarian view was also expressed by some Muslim, Sikh and other 
interviewees from minority religion or belief groups.  
 
The assessment of harm was acknowledged to be context-specific. If, hypothetically, 
Ladele had been the only registrar on Orkney, her refusal to officiate at civil 
partnerships would have materially affected the right of others to receive that service 
in a non-discriminatory way. However, in Islington, it was assumed to have been 
possible for duties to be allocated so as to maintain the service unaffected and 
protect Ladele‟s conscience. Malcolm Brown, representing the Church of England, 
argued that: 
 
What appeared to be missing from the judgment was the idea of who was 
actually harmed … and that comes down to the way the law is being 
interpreted very much on the basis of the hypothetical damage to a 
hypothetical claimant. 
 
The judgment in Ladele refers to the fact that her refusal to officiate at civil 
partnerships caused offence to at least two of her gay colleagues, who felt 
„victimised‟ by her conduct; however, the case did not turn on this point.153  
 
A different „lens‟ was applied to the problem by practitioners from the health, social 
care and voluntary sectors in the roundtable held in Cardiff. The majority view was 
that „if it can be managed, it should be managed‟ without resort to disciplinary action 
or litigation. This was also described as keeping the conflict „under the radar‟ if it is 
practicable to do so. It was argued that a same-sex couple should not receive a 
service from someone who doesn't fundamentally accept same-sex relationships. As 
one participant noted:  
 
In a functioning team … you don‟t say that staff members must take the 
next client that comes through the door because it‟s their turn. You have a 
discussion about people‟s expertise and experience and ability to build a 
rapport with a service user. This person does not have LGBT sensitivity, 
so they are not the best person to deliver the service. It‟s about 'horses for 
courses'. 
 
                                               




The „quality of service‟ lens appears a strong basis for arguing that - in the interests 
of service users - Ladele should not have been compelled to officiate at civil 
partnerships. However, the precise form of accommodation is still open for debate. 
Sam Dick observed that it is open to councils in Islington‟s position to facilitate the 
individual‟s continued employment within the organisation, but in a role that doesn‟t 
bring the conscientious objection into play: 
 
We encourage employers to be flexible, not in terms of saying „you need 
only deliver half of your job‟ but in terms of finding a different role. None of 
that should undermine the principle that whatever job you do, you don‟t 
discriminate or create an intimidating, humiliating or discriminatory 
atmosphere for colleagues.  
 
This suggests the need for mutual compromise and the desirability of avoiding 
disciplinary action and litigation. It also establishes a principled objection to extending 
protection for conscientious objection where it allows an individual, on the basis of 
their religion or belief, to discriminate against others on another equality ground. 
Simon Barrow argued that the outcomes of pragmatic accommodation had to be 
examined in each case:  
 
Accommodation is good if it‟s about making the service work and if it‟s 
about adaption towards inclusion. But if it‟s adaption towards prejudice, 
whether based on religious or other grounds … then [it] becomes a 
problem.  
 
Principled objections to extending protection for conscientious objection  
Some interviewees situated in both the religion and belief strands, and in other 
equality strands, argued against extending the right to conscientious objection for a 
variety of reasons. Trade union interviewees and those concerned with employment 
also did so. Their arguments did not rule out pragmatic responses in some 
circumstances, but emphasised the risks inherent in a „free-for-all unregulated 
endorsement of conscientious objection‟ (Pollock, 2011b: 42).  
 
A key concern is that public services could become „undeliverable‟ or at least 
unreliable for certain users; for example, those wishing to access hormonal 
contraception in a situation where a pharmacist does not wish either to dispense it or 
take active steps to ensure they receive the service elsewhere. Concerns have been 
accentuated by developments at the Council of Europe level, where efforts to 
address „the increasing and largely unregulated occurrence‟ of conscientious 
objection in health services were obstructed after concerted lobbying by religious 






organisations.154 David Pollock expressed concern that in some places, the Catholic 
Church encourages followers to seek to make the law on abortion and contraception 
a „dead letter‟ by use of conscientious objection.155  
  
It was also argued that if public office holders, representing the state, the law or the 
community, are permitted to opt out of delivering services on conscientious grounds, 
this could damage the ethos and reputation of the service. This was especially so in 
the case of public officials (like Ladele) whose role has a symbolic and not merely a 
bureaucratic function. Khalid Sofi of the Muslim Council of Britain said he had 
advised Muslim registrars that: 
 
Delivering a service as a registrar is a broad national duty, which means 
you have to deliver it to everybody. If you want to make exceptions 
because of religion or belief, it‟s going to create a tension which I would 
not support. If you‟re in a public position, then you have to say that you 
don‟t want to do the whole job, not that you don‟t want to do part of the 
job.  
(emphasis in original) 
 
                                               
154 In July 2010, the Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe introduced a resolution to develop „comprehensive and 
clear regulations‟ covering conscientious objection, especially in the field of reproductive 
health; see Women’s access to lawful medical care: the problem of unregulated use of 
conscientious objection, Doc. 12347 20 July 2010. Following intervention by religious 
opponents, the resolution was amended and prefixed with the following statement: „No 
person, hospital or institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any 
manner because of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist or submit to an abortion, the 
performance of a human miscarriage, or euthanasia or any act which could cause the death 
of a human foetus or embryo, for any reason‟; see The right to conscientious objection in 
lawful medical care, Resolution 1763 (2010), adopted 7 October 2010. The European 
Humanist Federation argued that the statement removes individuals and institutions from 
liability for their conduct, contradicting basic concepts of the rule of law that require that 
persons who have been harmed have a right to have access to review procedures before 
an independent body. See http://www.humanistfederation.eu/download/129-
CoE%20re%20rejn%20of%20consc%20obj%20resolution.pdf. The amended resolution 
also appears to be contradictory in stating that the practice of conscientious objection is 
„adequately regulated‟ in „the vast majority of Council of Europe states‟ (para. 3), yet also 
inviting member states to develop „comprehensive and clear regulations that define and 
regulate conscientious objection with regard to health and medical services‟ (para. 4). 
 
155 In 2007, Pope Benedict invited pharmacists to „address the issue of conscientious 
objection, which is a right your profession must recognize, permitting you not to 
collaborate either directly or indirectly by supplying products for the purpose of decisions 
that are clearly immoral such as, for example, abortion or euthanasia‟. See Address of His 
Holiness Benedict XVI to members of the International Congress of Catholic Pharmacists, 




The „specific situation‟ rule (see section 5.4) was invoked by some interviewees to 
suggest that those with strongly-held beliefs should make responsible choices that 
avoid foreseeable conflict with the law or professional standards, or else to bear a 
degree of personal sacrifice. Richard Rowson, a moral philosopher, argued that: 
 
Services are delivered in context of multicultural society, so there is an 
obligation not to make professional judgments from a particular private or 
culturally-specific perspective. It should be made clear to new joiners that 
one cannot tolerate requests for exemptions if they can‟t be tolerated 
within the overall objective of the profession or organisation (see also 
Rowson, 2006). 
 
This view was expressed by some Christian, Muslim and Jewish interviewees, as 
well as others from minority religion or belief groups. Most of these interviewees also 
felt that the requirement for public servants not to „pick and choose‟ who they served 
extended to existing employees (like Ladele) who encountered problems of 
conscience because of changes to law or policy. Most also felt that it was right that 
providers of private goods and services should not be able to pick and choose who 
they serve on conscientious grounds. The case of Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull, 
concerning Christian hoteliers who said they only let double rooms to mixed-sex 
married couples, was viewed by these interviewees as a useful precedent in this 
regard.156  
 
Some interviewees - again, both religious and non-religious - were concerned that 
proliferating requests for conscientious objection might damage the integrity of the 
equalities framework. Several noted that it would be unthinkable to refuse guests at a 
hotel on the basis of, for example, their race or their religion or belief; it was no more 
acceptable to do so on grounds of sexual orientation. One Christian interviewee 
argued that: 
 
To classify people and then refuse them services is inappropriate. It 
seems so obvious when looking back to America in the 1960s; it was 
abhorrent to do that to black people. I think it is wrong to offer a service 
                                               
156 This case was intensely controversial among our general survey respondents: Christian-
affiliated respondents voiced strong support for the Bulls‟ conscience to be protected. 
Note that this case went to the Court of Appeal after interviews for this project were 
completed; the Court of Appeal dismissed the hoteliers‟ appeal. See Bull and Bull v Hall 
and Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83. 
 
  






and then be selective as to who should or shouldn‟t be able to take that 
service up based on your own preferences. 
 
Similarly, an LGBT participant argued that LGBT people should not have to 
„renegotiate‟ hard-won legal rights to accommodate the conscientious objection of 
religious believers (see also Stychin, 2009: 748).  
 
In its submission to the ECtHR on Ladele and McFarlane, the EHRC supported the 
decisions of the domestic courts. It noted that:  
 
An employer‟s refusal to accommodate the manifestation of a 
discriminatory religious belief in cases where discrimination in the 
provision of public services results will generally be justified by reference 
to the legitimate aim of eliminating discrimination and advancing 
equality…157  
 
It adds that state services must be provided on an impartial basis and employees 
cannot expect their public functions to be shaped to accommodate their personal 
beliefs.158 
 
Deciding the extent and limits of conscientious objection 
No participant in our research argued either for an untrammelled right to 
conscientious objection or enforced uniformity in every instance. All agreed on the 
desirability of avoiding disciplinary action or litigation wherever possible.  
In public discussion, arguments coalesce around the criteria by which to decide 
which exercises of conscientious objection are acceptable and should be 
accommodated in laws and procedures, and which not. Pollock (2011b: 38-42) 
proposes a range of possible conditions which might be placed on the exercise of 
conscientious objection. These include conditions not examined elsewhere in this 
section; for example, that the conscientious objection should be to a proximate action 
(such as carrying out in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment) rather than a remote one 
(such as conducting an administrative role in an IVF department); and that children 
must be protected from damage to their education or health by placing limits to their 
parents‟ power over them Pollock (2011b: 42).  
 
                                               
157 Submission of the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the European Court of 
Human Rights, Ladele and McFarlane v United Kingdom, para. 57. 
 




Also critical is the process by which decisions are made and resolutions achieved. 
Stychin (2009: 755) argues for a model of rights based on „democratic dialogue and 
compromise‟, in which:  
 
… pragmatic solutions will be preferred to ideological stalemates. This is 
pluralism at the coalface, in which purity is foregone, solutions may not be 
pleasing to participants, and agreements are contingent and partial. 
 
For Stychin (2009: 752-53), nuanced analysis of the context in each case is 
preferable to abstract determinations on how to balance competing rights or the 
pursuit of victory in a zero-sum game:  
 
Engaging with context, and accommodating what otherwise would appear 
to be irreconcilable world views, will not necessarily satisfy anyone, and it 
may appear to be the triumph of pragmatism over principle … But it seems 
well suited to the social reality of pluralism around religion and sexuality 
today. 
 
Contextual analysis might focus upon the sincerity of subjective belief; a 
consideration of whether the right at issue is core to the system of beliefs (secular or 
religious); the degree of difficulty involved in accommodation by the employer; 
whether accommodation would significantly impair the exercise of the competing 
right; and the material consequences of any impairment (Stychin, 2009: 752). In 
order that this discussion can take place, it may be necessary to agree certain 
„ethical rules of engagement‟ as a condition of entry into the public sphere, such as 
openness to „the other‟, good faith and mutual respect (Stychin, 2009: 754); these 
„ground rules‟ for public debate are discussed in detail in section 7.8. 
 
The search for compromise may reveal common ground that might not otherwise be 
made apparent. Stychin (2009: 754) observes that LGBT people and people with 
religious faith who object to same-sex relationships may find common ground based 
on their shared rejection of the „public-private‟ or „belief-conduct‟ dichotomy; such 
distinctions serve to „marginalize, silence and closet, hollowing out rights by 
separating belief from manifestation‟. Put another way, neither group wishes to be 
forced (or forced back) „into the closet‟.  
 
Several participants in our research acknowledged that deciding the extent and limits 
of conscientious objection is an area of unresolved difficulty requiring broad public 
discussion. While some suggested that this is essentially a „religious‟ versus „secular‟ 
debate, our research suggests that the lines are not so clearly drawn. Members of 






religion or belief groups argued both for and against extending protection for 
conscientious objection. Moreover, some Christian participants commented that the 
rights of LGBT Christians (and other LGBT believers) wishing to receive civil 
partnerships or other services are centrally at stake in this debate - a consideration 
that is overlooked in debates framed as religious versus secular.  
 
6.6  Legal exceptions for religion or belief relating to employment 
As noted in section 4.3, discrimination law recognises the potential for conflicts and 
makes exceptions to deal with these situations. These exceptions apply to religious 
groups, including religious employers, rather than to individuals. The exceptions have 
proved controversial and are surrounded by considerable legal uncertainty, giving 
rise to concerns that they may be misunderstood and misapplied. In this section, we 
examine the exception relating to employment.  
 
The Equality Act 2010 contains an exception from laws prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of sex, marriage and sexual orientation.159 This applies where certain criteria 
are met. The criterion that has attracted most controversy is that the employment 
must be „for the purposes of an organised religion‟. 
 
The employment exception originally contained in the Equality Bill would have made 
two significant changes to this wording. One related to the definition of employment 
„for the purposes of an organised religion‟ and the other related to the requirement for 
it to be applied in a proportionate manner. Both changes were defeated at Committee 
stage in the House of Lords after sustained opposition by the Anglican and Catholic 
Churches, which objected that the changes would make them and other faiths more 
vulnerable to legal challenge.160 As a result, the exceptions contained in the 2010 Act 
are similar to those in its predecessor. However, significant legal uncertainty remains. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that the Explanatory Notes to the Act contain wording 
which goes beyond the text of the actual exception, as explained below.  
 
The definition of ‘employment for the purposes of an organised religion’  
The Equality Bill originally sought to define for the first time the type of employment 
covered by the exception. The draft bill would have defined it as employment that 
„wholly or mainly involves leading or assisting in the observation of liturgical or 
                                               
159 Equality Act 2010, Schedule 9, para. 2 
 
160 See, for example, the statement issued on behalf of the Rt Revd Michael Scott-Joynt, 
Bishop of Winchester; the Rt Revd Michael Langrish, Bishop of Exeter and Chair of the 
Churches Legislation Advisory Service; and the Rt Revd Peter Forster, Bishop of Chester: 






ritualistic practices of the religion, or promoting or expanding the doctrine of the 
religion‟. This change would have meant that, for example, diocesan youth officers 
were not covered by the exception as they had previously been.161 Religious 
opponents of the change argued that the definition failed to understand the nature of 
religious life and was unworkable in that it might even exclude some clergy.162  
 
However, the absence of any definition creates a lack of clarity (Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (JCHR), 2010: 6) and „a real risk that the exception may be used more 
widely than is warranted by the definition‟ (Pitt, 2011: 402). The Explanatory Notes to 
the Act state that the exception is „intended to cover a very narrow range of 
employment: ministers of religion and a small number of lay posts, including those 
that exist to promote and represent religion‟.163 This accords with the judgment in R 
(Amicus - MSF section) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry which 
emphasised the narrowness of the exception.164 However, Sandberg (2011a: 120) 
notes that the text of the exception does not expressly convey this restricted meaning 
and therefore the precise scope of the phrase remains unclear.  
 
The proportionality requirement 
The employment exception originally contained in the Equality Bill required explicitly 
that its application be proportionate. Since this change was rejected in the House of 
Lords, the exception in the Equality Act 2010 does not, on its face, require 
proportionality. 
 
                                               
161 See Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance [2007] ET Case No. 1602844/2006, 
17 July 2007. 
 
162 See, for example, Catholic Bishops‟ Conference of England and Wales, Equality Bill: 
Submission to the Scrutiny Committee, 27 May 2009.  
  
163 Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes, para. 790. 
 
164 [2004] EWHC 860 (Admin). The Amicus judgment held that the exceptions strike the 
appropriate balance between individual rights to freedom of religion and belief; freedom of 
religion as an associational right; and the right to non-discrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation. However, it emphasised the narrow scope of the exceptions. Richards 
J stated that the exception was „on its proper construction, very narrow. It has to be 
construed strictly since it is a derogation from the principle of equal treatment; and it has 
to be construed purposively so as to ensure, so far as possible, compatibility with the [EU] 
Directive‟.  
 






This appears to make it vulnerable to challenge under European Union (EU) law.165 
In November 2009, the European Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the UK 
stating that exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation for religious employers are broader than that permitted by the relevant EU 
Directive; this is in part because they do not specify that the objective must be 
legitimate and the requirement proportionate.166 To date, this opinion has not been 
followed by infringement proceedings against the UK (as has been urged by the 
Trades Union Congress, among others).167  
 
The parliamentary JCHR (2010: 6) notes that the removal of the express requirement 
of proportionality „runs the risk of generating legal uncertainty and misleading 
organisations who wish to make use of this exemption as to the true nature of the 
test to be applied in law‟. The JCHR added that the absence of an express 
proportionality requirement does not remove the requirement to read the legislation in 
conformity with EU law; that is, subject to a requirement of proportionality.168 Further 
uncertainty is created by the fact that the Explanatory Notes to the Act appear to 
impose additional requirements that are not found in the text of the exception, 
including one relating to proportionality (Sandberg 2011a: 121-22).169  
 
Employers with an ethos based on religion or belief 
The 2010 Act also provides an exception allowing employers with an „ethos based on 
religion or belief‟ to discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief.170 This applies 
                                               
165 The Explanatory Notes to the EU Directive on implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation states that a „double test of a justified aim and proportionate way of reaching it 
(i.e. in the least discriminatory way possible) is required‟; COM(2008) 426 2008/0140,  
  p. 8. 
 
166 See EU press statement IP/09/1778, „Employment equality rules: reasoned opinion to the 
UK; cases closed for Slovakia and Malta‟, 20 November 2009. For a copy of the reasoned 
opinion, see http://www.secularism.org.uk/uploads/ec-reasoned-opinion.pdf. 
 
167 Trades Union Congress, Infringement proceedings on religious exemptions in Equality Act 
2010, 2010/01155, 2 August 2010. 
 
168 This requirement was also recognised in the judgment in R (Amicus MSF Section) v 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.  
  
169 They state that the exception is „intended to cover a very narrow range of employment: 
ministers of religion and a small number of lay posts, including those that exist to promote 
and represent religion‟; further, the organised religion may only discriminate when it is 
„crucial to the post‟ to do so and where it is a „proportionate way of meeting the criteria‟. 
See Equality Act 2010 Explanatory Notes, para. 790.  
 





where being of a particular religion or belief is an „occupational requirement‟. This 
requirement must be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
 
Tribunals have established that each post must be evaluated separately; the 
exception does not permit an organisation to fill all vacant posts with persons of a 
particular religion or belief.171  
 
Implementation and impact of the employment exceptions  
Most interviewees representing religion or belief groups were broadly happy with the 
exceptions model, even if they regretted the lack of clarity surrounding the text of the 
exceptions. Malcolm Brown, Director of Mission and Public Affairs for the Church of 
England, noted that the exceptions allow the Church valuable space to resolve 
internal arguments, such as that about women‟s ordination. However, he 
acknowledged that the exceptions were difficult in terms of public presentation: 
 
Either something is a universal provision or it isn‟t ... that‟s why religion or 
belief is a problematic test case because [it‟s not] susceptible to that kind 
of universalism. You have to make exceptions and then it looks as if we‟re 
resiling from the principle. Actually what we‟re saying is that we want to be 
able to form positions from our own tradition and view of the world. I think 
this is a proper model of society as a 'community of communities'.  
 
A small number of religious participants were uncomfortable with the model. One 
Christian participant argued that the exceptions should be „tested virtually to 
destruction‟ because „the presumption should always be in favour of equality‟. Robust 
recruitment procedures, he suggested, would be a better way of ensuring that 
religious organisations filled vacancies with the most suitable candidates. Some 
academic participants were also uncomfortable with the exceptions model. Russell 
Sandberg of the Centre for Law and Religion at Cardiff University noted that it tended 
to „put religion on the back foot‟; it was too easily forgotten that its purpose was to 
facilitate religious freedom. Further, Sandberg argued that judicial emphasis on the 
narrowness of the exceptions (as in Amicus), reinforced by concerns raised by the 
European Commission, could mean that „they will simply cease to exist‟. 
  
Our research suggests a disjuncture between, on the one hand, this perception that 
the exceptions are being interpreted too narrowly by courts and tribunals and, on the 
other, a concern that they are being applied too widely in practice (British Humanist 
Association, 2007b: 31-32). This concern was raised by interviewees concerned with 
                                               
171 Hender (Louise ) v Prospects ET Case No. 2902090/2006, 13 May 2008; Sheridan (Mark) 
v Prospects ET Case No. 2901366/2006, 13 May 2008. 






equality strand/s and/or employment. Amanda Ariss noted that some (but not all) 
EDF members:  
 
... have concerns that [the exceptions are] interpreted on the ground as 
being wider than in fact they are - and they think that‟s a practical problem 
because people can‟t challenge every instance, either because they don‟t 
know the law or they don‟t have the resources to.  
 
Stonewall (2007: 5) states that the employment exception has been „flagrantly 
abused by some organisations that have used it to unfairly discriminate against gay 
employees in a way which was certainly not envisaged when it was introduced‟. It is 
not possible to substantiate this observation as evidence relating to implementation 
of the exceptions has not been systematically collected. Malik (2008a: 36) proposes 
that the JCHR should gather and report on evidence from civil society organisations 
about their experience of the exceptions.  
 
A further concern was raised in relation to the exception allowing employers with an 
„ethos based on religion or belief‟ to discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief. 
Joy Madeiros, Public Policy Director of Faithworks (which supports Christian groups 
delivering community-based services)172 argued that there is insufficient guidance to 
help religion or belief groups articulate their ethos and apply the exception properly: 
 
 [Many] religion or belief charities don't have a great deal of experience in 
 recruitment and thus how to make fair decisions. What I mean by this is that 
 while they might be very clear about their religious doctrines, they must also 
 think through the relation of their belief systems to everyday behaviour in order 
 to define their ethos, so that when they decide to recruit a Christian rather than 
 a non-Christian, they can justify why they have done it. I know of well-known 
 Christian organisations that apply a blanket exception and this is not 
 acceptable. It leads to a closed environment and an environment in which the 
 relationship of the religious ethos to the work is not thought through. 
 
This concern may be partially addressed by initiatives which establish principles and 
standards for (among other things) employment practices among religion or belief 
                                               
172 Joy Madeiros is also Managing Director of Oasis UK, a charity that delivers services 






groups.173 Some interviewees situated in the religion strand acknowledged that 
consensus does not always exist as to when being of a particular religion or belief is 
an „occupational requirement‟; for example, whether and in what circumstances the 
exception covers ancillary or support staff. One Christian interviewee noted that there 
is a tendency for religion or belief organisations to seek to create „religiously 
homogenous workplaces‟ which might not, in fact, be a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim.  
 
Sandberg (2011a: 129) argues that the complexity of the employment exceptions and 
the uncertainty of their ambit and scope „will inevitably lead to further litigation‟. This 
research points to a similar conclusion. It also suggests the need for more evidence 
as to the impact of the exceptions „on the ground‟ and greater guidance for religious 
organisations to which they apply. 
6.7  Legal exceptions for religion or belief relating to goods and services 
Under the Equality Act 2010, „organisations relating to a religion or belief‟ can, in 
certain circumstances, discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief or sexual 
orientation in the way they operate, provided their sole or main purpose is not 
commercial.174 In some situations, such organisations and people acting on their 
authority can restrict or refuse:  
 
 membership of the organisation;  
 participation in its activities;  
 use of any goods, facilities or services that it provides; and  
 use of its premises.175  
 
                                               
173 The „Faithworks Charter‟ establishes principles for churches and Christian agencies 
„committed to excellence in community work and service provision‟; see 
http://www.faithworks.info/Standard.asp?id=7432. The „VISIBLE Communities‟ initiative 
provides an accredited scheme for community organisations (including religion or belief 
groups) to achieve nationally recognised standards in areas including equality; see 
http://visiblecommunities.org.uk/index.php?page=1. 
 
174 Equality Act 2010, Schedule 23, para. 2. For a full definition of an „organisation relating to 
religion or belief‟, see para. 2(1).  
 
175 Schedule 3, para. 29 of the Equality Act 2010 provides an additional exception for 
ministers allowing them to provide a service only to persons of one sex or separate 
services for persons of each sex. This must be for the purposes of an „organised religion‟ 
and must be necessary to comply with the doctrines of the religion or be for the purpose of 
avoiding conflict with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the 
religion‟s followers.  
 






In relation to a service user‟s (or would-be service user‟s) religion or belief, the 
exception only applies where a restriction is necessary: 
 
 to comply with the purpose of the religion or belief organisation; or 
 to avoid causing offence to members of the religion or belief that the 
organisation represents.176 
 
In relation to sexual orientation, the exception only applies only where it is necessary: 
 
 to comply with the doctrine of the organisation; or 
 to avoid conflict with the strongly held convictions of a significant number of the 
members of the religion or belief that the organisation represents.177 
 
Sandberg (2011a: 124-25) notes that there is no legal articulation of the difference, if 
any, between an „organisation relating to religion or belief‟ and the term used in the 
employment exception, an „organised religion‟. The only evident difference is that the 
latter relates to „religion‟ rather than „religion or belief‟. An „organised religion‟ might 
also be expected to be a narrower category than an „organisation relating to religion 
or belief‟, but this is not specified in the Act.  
 
The exception in relation to services delivered on behalf of a public authority  
The sexual orientation exception does not apply when organisations relating to a 
religion or belief contract with a public authority to provide a service. This means that 
the exception does not cover Roman Catholic adoption agencies. This attracted 
intense controversy prior to the enactment of the Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2007.178 Cardinal Cormac Murphy O‟Connor, then leader of 
the Catholic Church in England and Wales, requested an opt out for Catholic 
adoption agencies. His call was supported by the Church of England hierarchy, 
underscoring the extent to which the issue was seen as having relevance for other 
Christian-based welfare services (Stychin, 2008: 10). Adoption agencies were given 
                                               
176 Equality Act 2010, Schedule 23, para. 2(6). 
 
177 Equality Act 2010, Schedule 23, para. 2(7); in relation to sexual orientation discrimination, 
the definition of an „organisation relating to religion or belief‟ is slightly more restricted; see 
para 2(11). 
 





a period of time to adapt to the provision after which discrimination by such agencies 
on grounds of sexual orientation became unlawful.179  
 
The case of Catholic Care  
The Leeds-based agency Catholic Care sought - unsuccessfully - to circumvent the 
requirement by amending its charitable objects so as to bring itself within an 
exception for charities in the Equality Act 2010.180 The charity argued that restricting 
its service to mixed-sex couples (and thereby continuing to raise donations from its 
members and prevent its closure) was a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 14 ECHR, which bans discrimination.181 
The agency described the legitimate aim as „the prospect of increasing the number of 
children (particularly “hard to place” children) placed with adoptive families‟. It argued 
that the proposed discrimination was proportionate to achieving this aim because the 
service denied to same-sex couples would be available via other voluntary adoption 
agencies and local authorities.  
 
The Charity Tribunal rejected these arguments. It held that the agency‟s aim was 
legitimate, but would not be achieved by its proposed method.182 Moreover, the 
proposed discrimination was not a proportionate means of achieving its legitimate 
aim: the services available to same-sex couples from others could not be relied upon 
to justify the charity‟s own less favourable treatment.183 The tribunal held that the 
charity had not proved that permanent closure of its adoption service was the 
inevitable consequence of its inability to discriminate.184 Moreover, the possible 
                                               
179 Prime Minister Tony Blair reportedly sought a compromise which would have allowed 
Catholic agencies to refer same-sex couples to other agencies but not offer the service 
themselves, but this was not supported by the Cabinet; „Blair retreats over opt-out for gay 
adoption‟, The Telegraph, 25 January 2007.  
 
180 Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales) 
CA/2010/0007, 26 April 2011. 
 
181 Paras. 35-41.  
 
182 Paras. 49-52. This was because, among other reasons, Catholic Care‟s proposed means 
of operation would be likely to reduce the pool of potential adopters by (a) excluding same 
sex couples from assessment by the Charity itself and also by (b) risking the loss of 
suitable same sex couples to the adoption system as a whole by subjecting them to the 
„particularly demeaning‟ experience of discrimination on the grounds of their sexual 
orientation.  
 
183 Para. 53. 
 
184 Paras. 54-58. 
 






closure of the service did not outweigh the detriment to same sex couples and the 
detriment to society generally of permitting the discrimination.185  
 
The case was highly controversial among our participants. Some participants from 
religion or belief groups deplored the decision of the Charity Tribunal. These included 
not only Catholics and other Christians, but also, for example, Sikhs, Jews and 
Buddhists. Their arguments were similar to those made about the individual claim in 
the Ladele case; that it was, in the circumstances, both possible and desirable to 
accommodate legitimate conscientious belief.186  
 
These participants contested the basis of the tribunal‟s proportionality decision; they 
argued that it would have been possible for same-sex couples to use other adoption 
services and that the interests of children were best served by keeping the Catholic 
agency open by allowing it to discriminate. As one Christian survey respondent put it: 
 
It is not at all clear why the rights of a same sex couple to access adoption 
services anywhere are more important than the right of a Catholic couple 
to access adoption in a context that is sensitive to the needs of their 
protected characteristic identity somewhere.  
(emphasis in original)  
 
Roddy Minogue, Chief Executive of Catholic Care, commented that the issue did not 
affect his agency alone:  
 
If you don‟t allow religious groups … to undertake or continue their 
practice then there is nothing left at all … More exceptions should be the 
order of the day.  
 
Charles Wookey argued that „simply from the point of view as to what would serve or 
not serve the common good, [the agency had] a strong argument‟.  
                                               
185 Para. 59.  
 
186 The right of individuals conscientiously to object to placing children with same-sex couples 
arose in McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs EAT Case No. 0223/07/CEA, 
31 October 2007. The refusal of a magistrate to place children with same-sex couples was 
found not to have triggered the Religion or Belief Regulations. This was because his 
objection was found not to be based on a religious or philosophical belief, but on his belief 
that children were being used as guinea-pigs in a social experiment. The Appeal Tribunal 
held (at para. 62) that even if it had been found that McClintock had suffered 
discrimination on grounds of his religion or belief, „the Department was fully justified in 
insisting that magistrates must apply the law of the land as their oath requires, and cannot 
opt out of cases on the grounds that they may have to apply or give effect to laws to which 




However, the empirical basis of this utilitarian argument was disputed by others who 
supported the tribunal‟s decision. Reverend Sharon Ferguson argued that sexuality is 
not a determinant of parenting skills; allowing LGBT people to adopt or foster was in 
the best interests of children and the overriding imperative was to secure the widest 
pool of prospective parents.  
 
The significance of public funding  
A wider principle at stake in the Catholic Care case is that the agency could not be 
exempted from anti-discrimination law because it was receiving a public subsidy to 
provide a public service. One Christian interviewee argued that in this case:  
 
The dangerous principle was enunciated that the reason you could not 
reach a pragmatic judgment … that respected conscience as well as 
equality was that [the agency] was in receipt of public money. It was not a 
problem for the NHS doctors who [are] exempted from practising abortion. 
That‟s why I think this is going backwards. 
  
An academic interviewee, Julian Rivers, argued that the notion that „ethics flow with 
money‟ was „irrational, wrong and illiberal‟ (see also Rivers, 2007).  
 
Other interviewees expressed the opposing view that organisations receiving public 
money should abide by equality law. This included several Christian participants, 
others from minority religion or belief groups, and participants concerned with other 
equality strand/s. One equality specialist argued that the delivery of public services 
was not a „pick and mix‟ matter:  
 
There is a problem when plurality is taken to mean reserving the right to 
discriminate. And wouldn‟t people feel very aggrieved indeed if we said 
that there were agencies that said we‟re not going to accept Catholics as 
foster parents? It‟s disingenuous to interpret that as plurality. I can‟t 
believe people would accept the discrimination in reverse. 
 
Reverend Alan Green from Tower Hamlets Inter Faith Forum defended the existence 
of agencies with different principles; however, he saw the issue of public funding as 
critical: 
 
You can‟t expect to be out of step with government thinking and luxuriate 
in that. There is no reason why the agency shouldn‟t be respected for its 
stand, but that‟s no reason to give taxpayers‟ money to groups that take 
that sort of stand. That‟s what a Christian organisation ought to expect. 






Graham Sparkes of the Baptist Union of Great Britain similarly argued that where 
public money is involved, the „secular duty of the state to be sensitive to everyone 
would generally override the sensibilities of one particular group‟.  
 
The adaptability of religious organisations 
A related area of disagreement was the capacity that religious institutions have to 
„change their spots‟ when the law shifts. Catholic participants noted that the law on 
same-sex adoption (the Adoption and Children Act 2002) had caused a 180 degree 
shift in how the law perceives the work of Catholic adoption agencies. This marked a 
rupture rather than an approach of allowing social divisions to work themselves out 
over time. Richard Kornicki, a spokesman for the Catholic Bishops‟ Conference of 
England and Wales, argued that:  
 
 We believe in objective, definable moral truth ... The state believes that moral 
 truth is what the mood of the day says it is. Those two things are bound to 
 differ - and we don‟t mind them differing, but we do mind that difference 
 suddenly turning what was normal and lawful for the past 2,000 years into 
 something unlawful. 
 
Catholic participants commented that the speed of the change meant that religious 
organisations faced difficulty in adapting their ethos, along with their constitutional 
and funding arrangements (see also Rivers, 2007: 34).  
 
However, Simon Barrow noted that some religious groups had been able to „adapt 
and accommodate themselves within the public sphere even where there are strong 
internal disagreements‟.187 Other participants concerned with the LGBT strand 
commented that same-sex adoption rights had been long fought for; the perception 
that the law was ahead of social norms was disputed and, in any event, was not 
viewed as a valid reason for being allowed to opt out of it. 
  
The symbolic importance of legal cases  
Stychin (2008: 7) notes that the Catholic adoption issue assumed a „symbolic 
importance‟ far beyond its practical relevance; it unleashed controversy about human 
rights, sexuality, religion, secularism and the limits of tolerance of minorities. The 
hierarchies of the Catholic and Anglican Churches, and their sympathisers, viewed 
                                               
187 For example, Faithworks, which supports Christian organisations to deliver community-
based services, argued when the sexual orientation regulations were enacted in 2007 that 
they „do not pose a threat to Christians … This is not an argument about Christian 
morality. It is rather a discussion about discrimination and prejudice, and ensuring that our 





the principle at stake as concerning „the extent to which the discourse of equality and 
gay rights trumped the sincerely held faith-based views of a minority‟, views which 
were being expressed through the provision of adoption services (Stychin, 2008: 8). 
For Rivers (2007: 35), such cases show that „religions are now seen not primarily as 
beneficiaries of rights of protection from the state, as subjects enjoying religious 
freedom, but as potential sources of human rights breaches‟. The consequence, he 
argues, is that a „new moral establishment is developing, which is being imposed by 
law on dissenters‟. Andrea Williams of Christian Concern argued that cases which 
concerned the rights of LGBT people are:  
 
… not just about their emancipation but about the redefinition of culture 
and of family and marriage. It‟s a wholesale redefinition of what society is - 
the bedrock of our law and society has been totally overthrown. It‟s not just 
about rights, but about turning society on its head.  
 
Such perceptions have created palpable anxiety among some, mainly Christian, 
participants in this research. However, our research indicates that this anxiety is not 
universally shared, either by Christians or other religion or belief groups. 
 
6.8  The problem of legal ‘overstretch’ 
The cases and issues examined in this chapter and in Chapter 5 highlight the 
problem of „overstretch‟ in domestic equality and human rights law concerning 
religion or belief (McColgan, 2009: 15; Pitt, 2011). This section examines how this 
„stretching‟ of legal provisions has taken place and its implications for domestic legal 
debate concerning religion or belief. Legal practitioners and scholars at our London 
roundtable identified two interrelated areas in which the law is under strain.  
 
The interplay of Article 9 and equality provisions  
The first relates to the relationship between, on the one hand, protection for the 
manifestation of religion or belief under Article 9 and, on the other, protection against 
direct and indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. Roundtable 
participants commented that there is a lack of clarity about this relationship that is not 
always recognised; the two concepts do not map neatly onto one another and this 
has sometimes led to confused debate about religion or belief claims in the domestic 
context.  
 
The lack of clarity arises partly from a disjuncture between the understanding of 
freedom of religion or belief in the domestic and international contexts. In the 
international arena, the preoccupation is with the persecution of religious individuals 






or groups and the protection against persecution afforded by Article 9 ECHR.188 In 
the domestic context, the preoccupation is with discrimination that emerges 
primarily in the context of social exclusion or inclusion. Several roundtable 
participants commented that the (international) Article 9 „persecution‟ analysis and 
the (domestic) discrimination law „social exclusion‟ analysis are essentially different 
yet these differences are often elided in the domestic context. Consequently, there is 
a need to differentiate more clearly those situations that are most appropriately 
addressed on the basis of freedom of religion or belief and those that are best 
addressed on the basis of non-discrimination.  
 
The Begum case was given as an example. Several participants endorsed the 
minority view of the Lords in Begum regarding the undesirability of requiring the 
claimant voluntarily to „contract out‟ of her Article 9 rights (see sections 5.3 and 5.4). 
As one noted: 
 
The classic religious freedom analysis doesn‟t work in Begum. When the 
majority [in the House of Lords] start using the classic „contracting out‟ 
doctrine to say “there is no interference [with her Article 9 rights]”, you 
have to ask, “what is she contracting out of?” This is basic education; 
she‟s a marginalised young woman and the sort of person you want to be 
accommodated in mainstream education. It‟s not a persecution issue at 
all.  
(emphasis in original) 
  
In a similar way, several authors argue that ECtHR judgments upholding 
headscarf bans in part because headscarves are „hard to reconcile with the 
principle of gender equality‟ are, in fact, inimical to gender equality (Malik, 
2008a: 21-23; Marshall, 2006).189 In these cases, it is argued, restrictions on the 
manifestation of religious belief are felt disproportionately by minority women 
who may be forced to choose between adherence to religious obligation and the 
pursuit of education or employment. 
 
„Conflict‟ cases such as Ladele also throw into sharp relief the lack of clarity about 
how protection of the manifestation of religion or belief under Article 9 maps onto 
direct and indirect discrimination under the Equality Act. Roundtable participants 
acknowledged the perception in some quarters that sexual orientation claims 
                                               
188 And analogous provisions such as Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
 




routinely „trump‟ those based on religion or belief (see section 6.4). As one participant 
noted in relation to Ladele:  
 
What you‟re dealing with is the religious person‟s claim to have a right to 
discriminate directly balanced against the [issue of whether they have 
suffered] indirect religious discrimination. But it gets muddied when you‟re 
trying to map that onto whether - if it‟s a manifestation of her religion or 
belief - that means that a person like Ladele should have had more than 
an ordinary protection from indirect discrimination. 
(emphasis in original) 
 
As discussed in section 6.5, this „more than ordinary‟ protection is commonly argued 
in public debate in terms of the right to conscientious objection. With Ladele and the 
related case of McFarlane pending at the ECtHR, participants noted that domestic 
legal debate on this issue is likely to take some time to be resolved.   
 
Strains within the equality framework  
The second area in which legal provisions are subject to strain is related to the 
inclusion of religion or belief alongside other characteristics in the Equality Act 2010. 
Some commentators detect a long-term conceptual difficulty in the inclusion in the 
same Act of equality grounds which are qualitatively different from each other and 
which sometimes conflict (see also sections 6.3 and 6.4). 
 
As we have seen, one effect of this is to generate tension - especially between the 
religion and sexual orientation strands - which might not otherwise become so visible 
or so tense. However, the strain upon established legal concepts is not confined to 
cases involving direct tension between competing grounds. Other cases, too, 
illustrate how concepts that have developed comfortably in relation to other equality 
grounds - such as the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination - have 
caused an uncomfortable stretch in relation to religion or belief. Azmi is one such 
case (McColgan, 2009: 11). Azmi's claim was that the school's action (in refusing her 
request to wear a full-face covering while acting as a classroom assistant) amounted 
to direct discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, for which there exists no 
defence of justification. However, this claim failed: the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
held that the discrimination at issue was indirect and that it was justifiable because of 
the impact on her job function. Some commentators argue that tribunals‟ general 
reluctance to find direct discrimination in religion or belief claims is problematic 
(Fitzpatrick, 2007: 10). The suggestion is that cases are forced down the indirect 






discrimination route for the purposes of justification.190 In Azmi, it is not hard to see 
why the appeal tribunal chose to do so. However, the consequence may be to shrink 
the concept of direct discrimination across all equality grounds and so „infect the 
whole statutory discrimination regime‟ (McColgan, 2009: 14; see also Pitt, 2011).  
 
Legal practitioners and academics at our roundtable acknowledged that not all 
religion or belief cases face these difficulties. As one noted, the anti-discrimination 
framework „works very neatly in ... straightforward cases where you‟re dealing with a 
disinclination to embrace [religious difference] and especially where religion maps 
onto ethnicity‟ as in the case of Watkins-Singh. However, public attention is likely to 
continue to focus on those cases where the law is under strain, and especially where 
claims based on religion or belief clash with the equally-protected claims of others. 
 
6.9  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined competing interests that arise in relation to religion or 
belief and how they have played out in legal cases and public debate. Some of the 
main conclusions to emerge are:  
 
  There are contested understandings about the nature of religion or belief as a 
protected characteristic. The lack of consensus is particularly evident in relation 
to whether religion or belief is chosen or immutable. Less contestable is the 
observation that religion or belief is distinct from other characteristics in having 
intellectual content and both proscribing and prescribing certain behaviour 
which impacts on adherents to the religion or belief and, indirectly, on others. As 
a result, some commentators propose an attenuated form of protection for 
religion or belief.  
 
 The inclusion of religion or belief alongside other protected characteristics in the 
Equality Act 2010 has stretched legal concepts in often uncomfortable ways. 
One effect has been to generate conflicts - especially between the „religion‟ 
strand and sexual orientation - which might not otherwise have become so 
visible or so tense. Cases concerning religion and sexual orientation were the 
most contentious of those we reviewed. However, legal judgments concerning 
competing interests do not necessarily mean that such friction is prevalent or 
entrenched in society.  
 
                                               
190 In Azmi, the appeal tribunal accepted a teaching assistant wearing a balaclava helmet as 
a comparator to a Muslim teaching assistant wearing a veil in order to establish that the 
discrimination was indirect and not direct. Fitzpatrick (2007: 47) argues that this was an 





 Tensions concerning the religion and sexual orientation strand have prompted 
calls, mainly from some Christians, for an extension of the right to conscientious 
objection to new and diverse situations, such as a pharmacists‟ right to refuse 
dispense hormonal contraception or a registrar‟s right not to officiate at a civil 
partnership. Other (both religious and non-religious) voices raise objections to 
extending protection for conscientious objection where it allows an individual, on 
the basis of their religion or belief, to discriminate against others on another 
equality ground. No participant in our research argued either for an unrestricted 
right to conscientious objection or enforced uniformity in every instance. All 
agreed on the desirability of avoiding disciplinary action or litigation wherever 
possible.  
 
  While public debate is frequently couched in terms of protection (or not) for 
conscientious objection, legal judgments are not. In Ladele and McFarlane, the 
Court of Appeal focused its reasoning on the proportionality of the restriction of 
their right to freedom of religion or belief and the nature of a reasonable 
accommodation in each situation. These judgments suggest that conscientious 
objection should be viewed as, at most, a residual form of protection, to be 
invoked only if situations have not been resolved through the usual 
considerations of proportionality or accommodation.  
 
  Interviewees deployed a mixture of types of argument in support of their 
positions on particular cases: utilitarian arguments („what is the harm in letting X 
do what he or she wishes to do?‟); arguments based on general principles 
(„people delivering public services shouldn‟t be allowed to pick and choose who 
they deliver them to‟); and empirical arguments (for example, competing 
„evidence‟ as to the suitability of prospective adoptive parents or foster carers). 
Each may be a valid contributor to decision-making in a given case. However, 
the relative weight to be accorded to each will vary in each case and decision-
makers may need policy guidance as to how to perform this balancing exercise.  
 
 The debate about religion or belief claims competing with others is sometimes 
portrayed as „religious‟ versus „secular‟; however, our research suggests that 
the lines are not so clearly drawn. Members of religion or belief groups argued 
both for and against extending protection for religiously-inspired conscientious 
objection. This is not surprising since legal cases reflect ideological and 
theological disputes that are also taking place within some religious 
organisations.  
 






 The exceptions in the Equality Act 2010 designed to deal with competing 
interests in relation to religion or belief are controversial and are clouded in legal 
uncertainty. This is caused both by ambiguity in the text of the exceptions and 
discrepancies between the text and the Explanatory Notes. This has generated 
concerns that the exceptions may be misunderstood and misapplied. Further 
litigation concerning the exceptions appears likely.  
 
  There is a lack of clarity about the relationship between protection against 
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief and freedom of religion or belief 
under Article 9. Consequently, there is a need to differentiate more clearly those 
situations that are most appropriately addressed on the basis of freedom of 
religion or belief and those that are best addressed on the basis of non-
discrimination. 
 
In the next chapter, we explore the social impact and significance of the law. This 
considers the discussion that has opened up within Christianity (and to a lesser 
extent other religious communities) about the impact of equality and human rights 
law on religions and their adherents and how to respond to it. 
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7.  Responses to equality and human rights law in relation to 
religion or belief  
  
7.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of law, and responses to it, outside the courtroom. 
It identifies „narratives‟ about the impact and significance of equality and human 
rights law in relation to religion or belief. These narratives are not entirely distinct in 
relation either to their content or to those that articulate them; however, they capture 
broad attitudes and understandings about the law. We pay particular attention to the 
Christian „marginalisation‟ narrative which is exceptionally high-profile in 
contemporary public and media debate.  
 
This chapter also examines the limitations of law as a means of addressing 
discrimination and the perceived problem of excessive litigation. The chapter also 
presents interviewees‟ views about the role of the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC). The chapter closes with a discussion of approaches to 
resolving dilemmas or disputes relating to religion or belief in social contexts.  
 
7.2  Attitudes to the law  
 Trade unions, those concerned with equality strand/s, and groups situated in the 
„belief‟ strand generally viewed the expansion of legal protection for, and regulation 
of, religion or belief as positive. David Pollock commented that domestic case law 
was „beginning to make a coherent whole‟ (with the exception of those relating to the 
definition of belief; see section 5.2). Sally Brett, Senior Equality Policy Officer for the 
Trades Union Congress, was „pleased with the direction of travel‟ in religion or belief 
cases. 
 
Some, but not all, interviewees affiliated to minority religion or belief groups shared 
this positive view. Differences of opinion were apparent between co-religionists. For 
example, some Muslim, Sikh and Hindu interviewees viewed equality and human 
rights laws as guarantors of a level playing field between religions and beliefs and (as 
one Muslim interviewee put it) an „ally‟ of communities that face particular 
disadvantage. Some also described equality and human rights as being congruent 
with the values at the heart of their beliefs. Khalid Sofi commented that theological 
perspectives which might suggest a tension with conferring equal treatment on 
grounds of sexual orientation or gender may not be resolvable: 
 
... but that doesn't mean that Muslims can discriminate: everyone is 
treated equally and that‟s the end of it.  
(emphasis in original) 






It was noticeable that Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and Jewish participants in this research 
did not generally voice concern about the „trumping‟ of religious interests. Some had 
sympathy with Christian claimants in cases concerning matters of conscience. 
However, even where they acknowledged that theological positions held by some of 
their adherents might conflict with gender or lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
(LGBT) equality, they did not perceive this as something that was likely to bring them 
into conflict with the law. Jasdev Singh Rai of the British Sikh Consultative Forum, 
observed that: 
 
The big issue is about [the imposition] on Christians of secularist values, 
which are that all sexual orientations should be accepted by law. It‟s a 
conflict between two streams of European thought - between the 
secularists and the Christians … We won‟t ever accept a homosexual 
priest in the gurdwara [Sikh place of worship]. But will the law get its way 
round that? I don‟t think so.  
 
Such comments suggest that the absence of „competing rights‟ cases involving non-
Christian claimants does not necessarily denote the absence of competing interests 
or of discrimination in these communities. Rather, it may indicate a sense that the law 
is perceived to have little or no purchase on the operation of some religious 
associations or communities defined by religion - and that litigation is not the 
preferred route for resolving any tensions that do arise.  
 
7.3  The Christian ‘marginalisation’ narrative  
The most distinct - and vehemently argued - narrative was that relating to the 
perceived marginalisation of Christianity. This has, in turn, opened up debate about 
how, if Christians are being marginalised, they should best respond. Differences of 
view emerged within our research both about the diagnosis of the „problem‟ and the 
most appropriate response (see also section 7.4).  
 
Some commentators who think that Christianity is being marginalised view this as a 
problem created, or at least exacerbated, by laws which promote equality and 
diversity. An inquiry into „the freedom of Christians in the UK‟ by Christians in 
Parliament (2012: 5) identifies as its main finding that: 
  
Christians in the UK face problems in living out their faith and these 
problems have been mostly caused and exacerbated by social, cultural 
and legal changes over the past decade. 
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The Christian Institute (2009: 5) argues in its report, Marginalising Christians: 
Instances of Christians Being Sidelined in Modern Britain, that there is a „growing 
feeling that “equality and diversity” is code for marginalising Christian beliefs‟. The 
report cites cases such as Ladele, Eweida, Catholic Care and Hall and Preddy v Bull 
and Bull as evidence for this claim. It catalogues „cases of discrimination‟ against 
Christians in recent years in the legal and social sphere. These include instances of 
intolerance towards Christian teachers and pupils; violent attacks on Christian clergy 
and churches; „prejudiced stereotypes‟ of Christians in the entertainment media; 
misapplication of public order laws which have caused Christians to be detained for 
expressing their faith in public; and an „astonishing level of intolerance‟ against 
Christians by public authorities.  
 
Several of the examples involve misinterpretations of the law; for example, an 
instance in 2006 when several firemen were disciplined by the Strathclyde Fire Board 
employers for refusing to march in a „gay pride‟ rally. The employer later apologised 
for having failed to take into account the firemen‟s religious beliefs (Christian 
Institute, 2009: 47). Such examples suggest a need to distinguish (perceived) 
problems with the law itself from problems arising from its misapplication, which may 
be addressed by, among other means, improved guidance for employers and public 
authorities.  
 
Other examples in the report are expressions of opinion about intolerance; for 
example, the report quotes BBC presenter Jeremy Vine, a practising Anglican, as 
saying that he did not think he could mention his literal belief in Christ on his radio 
show. Such opinions may be well-founded but are not in themselves proof of actual 
intolerance or hostility.  
 
The report is selective in its account of case law; for example, it states that in one 
case, Amachree v Wandsworth Borough Council, a housing officer was dismissed for 
gross misconduct after initially being suspended for suggesting „in general 
conversation‟ to a terminally ill service user that she could „seek help from God‟ 
(Christian Institute, 2009: 48). The Employment Tribunal judgment in the case notes 
that this version of events was disputed by the service user, who had complained to 
the council that she had been left „shocked‟ and „very upset‟ after a „half hour lecture‟ 
by the officer suggesting that she was ill because she did not believe in God.191 The 
judgment also clarifies that the officer was dismissed on two counts of gross 
misconduct, the second relating to a press release issued with his permission by his 
                                               
191 Amachree v Wandsworth Borough Council ET Case No. 2328606/2009, 9 August 2010, 
para. 13. 
 






legal representative, the Christian Legal Centre (CLC); this had breached the service 
user‟s confidentiality by revealing facts from which she could be identified.192  
 
The significance of legal judgments  
The Amachree case illustrates the perils of quoting selectively from complex legal 
judgments, especially when those partial accounts achieve media prominence.193 
This is particularly important given the centrality of certain legal cases to the 
argument that Christianity is being marginalised in Britain. The vast majority of 
Christian respondents to the general survey undertaken for this research cited cases 
such as Ladele, McFarlane and Johns as evidence that Christians are being 
penalised for their beliefs and that significant areas of public life are being placed „out 
of bounds‟ for Christians. Typical comments were that equality law had created a 
„general atmosphere of intolerance and intimidation‟ for Christians and that „other 
religions and lifestyle choices have been given preferential treatment in the legal 
system over and above the Christian faith‟. With a few exceptions, respondents 
based their view that Christianity is being marginalised or penalised on their 
understanding of legal cases rather than on personal experience.  
 
Some Christian interviewees also viewed certain legal cases as pivotal - particularly 
those relating to matters of conscience (see section 6.5). For these participants, 
there are general problems with the way domestic courts and tribunals have handled 
religion or belief cases, which have in turn been particularly disadvantageous to 
Christians. The problems they identify include an overly narrow judicial interpretation 
of Article 9 (see section 5.3); a tendency for judges to stray beyond the bounds of 
their competence to interpret matters of religious doctrine (section 5.4); and the 
perceived „trumping‟ of religious rights, especially where they conflict with claims 
based on sexual orientation (sections 6.4 and 6.5). One interviewee hoped the UK 
cases going to the ECtHR would bring about a „sensible rebalancing‟ in which 
religious rights would be accorded greater weight than in the domestic courts. Dr Don 
Horrocks saw the cases as evidence of a wider movement to place religion „at the 
bottom of the pile of human rights in a clear hierarchy: 
 
                                               
192 Paras. 19, 26 and 28. 
 
193 See, for example, Melanie Phillips „Just for once, the Archbishop is right ... treating 
Christians as cranks is an act of cultural suicide‟, Mail Online, 14 December 2009. This 
states that the housing officer „encouraged a client with an incurable medical condition to 
believe in God‟ and that, „As a result, [he] was marched off the premises, suspended and 
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What we feel is that the human rights and equality agenda is being used 
as a blunt instrument to silence religion … through legal decisions in the 
courts. People are prepared to go to court on political agendas and 
certainly the secular humanists are using equality legislation to remove 
religion from the public sphere. They are trying hard to do it, and they have 
had some success.  
 
It is difficult to interpret whether the prominent legal cases do, in fact, indicate a 
broad trend of anti-religious or specifically anti-Christian discrimination. The 
Christians in Parliament inquiry report (2012: 5) ventures that:  
 
The recent wave of Christians in the courts does not in and of itself 
demonstrate that Christianity is badly treated. However, the frequency and 
nature of the cases indicates a narrowing of the space for the articulation, 
expression and demonstration of Christian belief. 
 
As noted in section 4.4, legal judgments may raise important matters of principle but, 
being highly fact specific, are not necessarily representative of common experience 
or a reliable indicator of the place of religion or belief (or particular religions or beliefs) 
in society. Chapter 3 established that there is an inadequate evidence base 
concerning religious discrimination of all kinds. Perceived or reported instances of 
religious discrimination may differ from legal definitions of discrimination and this 
makes it hard to aggregate from specific instances of prejudice or hostility to 
establish a pattern of discrimination. By any measure, Muslims experience 
discrimination of a greater frequency and seriousness than other religious groups 
(section 3.4). Joyce Miller, who has led on community cohesion for the Religious 
Education Council of England and Wales, argued that British Muslims‟ experience of 
racism, religious hostility, social deprivation and educational underachievement:  
 
... combine to form a totally different experience from that of an individual 
Christian who feels they are persecuted ... Christians and Christianity have 
huge power in this country; the individual legal cases are unfortunate and 
misguided - but this doesn‟t compare at all to … the experience of whole 
minorities. 
 
As noted in section 3.4, the nature and extent of discrimination against Christianity 
has not been comprehensively studied but is likely to vary with class, skin colour and 
type of Christianity, as well as by geography and between rural and urban locations. 
This suggests the need for a more nuanced analysis of the incidence of 






discrimination against Christians and its causes than the generalised marginalisation‟ 
narrative presently articulates.  
 
Diverse perspectives on the ‘marginalisation’ narrative 
As we have seen in relation to issues such as conscientious objection (section 6.5) 
and reasonable accommodation (section 5.5), there is no single Christian perspective 
on the impact of equality and human rights law. Some interviewees with Christian 
affiliation disagree that Christianity is being marginalised and view this narrative 
principally as a response to a loss of privilege.  
 
Some Christian interviewees argued that the „marginalisation‟ narrative makes it 
harder for Christians to engage effectively in debates about the role of faith in the 
public realm. Reverend Alan Green argued that:  
 
It‟s incredibly unhelpful that our engagement with those issues is to 
complain about a loss of privilege. It gives all the wrong messages … It 
seems to me very strange for Christians, looking at the model of Jesus, to 
say we're losing status, power or public persona. What Jesus teaches is 
that we should expect if we are doing our job of … responding to the 
needs of the poor and outcast that we will get into trouble for it - not that 
we get the seat at the top table.  
 
Reverend Aled Edwards observed that some „pressure groups‟ had harnessed 
legitimate concerns that religious faith isn‟t given the same force in law as other 
interests to „make a point to such an extent that they won‟t grasp the debate‟ in all its 
subtlety. By this account, legal cases have achieved notoriety because they tap into 
a sense of fear and unease among particular sections of Christianity. Jonathan 
Bartley of the non-denominational Christian think-tank Ekklesia commented that 
these fears were „genuinely held and widespread‟ but, in his view, „misguided‟.  
 
Simon Barrow of Ekklesia argued that the use of Christianity as a single label in 
conflict with the equality and human rights agenda is „an ideological attempt by 
people with a certain set of interests to block change‟ and a „misuse of a diverse 
understanding of Christianity‟. This divergence, he suggests, is between a 
subversive, radical tradition and a dominant, conservative tradition which is fearful 
that Christianity is losing its privileged status:  
 
Many Christian institutions … have built into their structures deep 
inequalities, particularly between men and women and in the area of 
sexuality and sexual identity. Therefore … they see the equality culture as 
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questioning coming from the outside, rather than asking themselves if 
they've been getting it wrong in terms of their own Christian self-
understanding and welcoming the opportunity to revisit how it is they‟ve 
ended up with a message which looks totally different to how it began 
2,000 years ago.  
  
Members of smaller mainstream Christian denominations described how this debate 
has played out among their members. Frank Kantor, Secretary for Church and 
Society of the United Reformed Church, commented that concerns among members 
of his church about cases such as Ladele, Eweida and Hall and Preddy v Bull and 
Bull were couched in terms of the „persecution‟ of Christians. His response was to 
ask:  
 
Is it persecution, or marginalisation, or is it simply a perceived loss of 
privilege … in society? This is an important distinction. Within the 
Christendom era … the Christian churches of Europe felt we had a right to 
occupy a central position … We have to reconfigure how we [make the] 
transition from the centre to … find our voice from the margins of society 
with those who are marginalised.  
 
For the Anglican Church, the debate plays out differently. Malcolm Brown, 
spokesman for the Church of England, acknowledged that the preponderance of 
Anglicans (and „token Anglicans‟) means that:  
 
The Church of England retains residual strengths as a social institution so 
we have to be particularly careful not to present ourselves as a suffering 
minority which just doesn‟t ring true … There‟s a subtlety about not playing 
the persecuted card … and [we need to] understand when minorities do 
need to play that card. 
(emphasis in original) 
 
Brown suggested that equality law „changes the nature of the questions‟ that are 
being asked of the Anglican Church; for example, in relation to issues such as civil 
partnerships on religious premises. The issue of LGBT rights was a „major bone of 
contention‟ within the Church and consequently:  
 
We‟re harassed … by the much more certain Christian pressure groups for 
whom that is almost the only cause that they‟re fighting. It‟s been pushed 
into the limelight as a source of conflict in a way we wouldn‟t have chosen.  






Julian Rivers, Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Bristol, noted that 
internal ideological or theological disputes are exacerbated when one side gains an 
advantage by „capturing‟ the language of equality and human rights in support of its 
position. For example, on the issue of women‟s ordination, the church enjoys the 
legal liberty to make up its collective mind according to its own governance structure; 
characterising the non-ordination of women as an 'issue of equality and human rights 
only makes the matter more controversial or litigious‟.  
Malcolm Brown argued that rancorous debate about LGBT rights and sexual ethics 
masks a deeper conceptual difficulty that the Church has with some aspects of 
equality legislation. This difficulty stems from the fact that equality law seeks directly 
to regulate the conduct of individuals. Brown gave the example of the case of Hall 
and Preddy v Bull and Bull:  
 
Not long ago, the law would have been on the side of the [Cornish hotel] 
owners but now things have changed; the difference is that we didn’t use 
to prosecute hotel owners who did let same-sex or unmarried couples rent 
rooms; now the … law is intruding in a way that it didn‟t before to enforce a 
social consensus. That‟s a major conceptual change in how people‟s lives 
relate to the legal structures. [The Church of England] keeps a low profile 
on this because it always comes out in the media as 'the church bashes 
gays'. But even church people who are entirely relaxed about 
homosexuality are wary of the way this appears to be a legal intrusion. 
(emphasis in original) 
 
Brown added that the effect of this change was to bypass social institutions such as 
churches and faith communities in which many people develop their sense of 
morality. This could be damaging since faith communities are important sites where 
equality and human rights are discussed and enacted; undermining such 
communities in the name of equality was therefore counter-productive.  
 
In summary, debate about the place of Christianity in British society entails nuances 
which are not adequately captured by „blanket‟ statements about the marginalisation 
of the majority religion. The debate is played out not only between Christians and 
those of another, or no, faith, but also between and within different Christian 
traditions and denominations. Some Christian interviewees were concerned that too 
vociferous a movement against the perceived sidelining of Christianity could, 
paradoxically, decrease the effectiveness of efforts to uphold the rights of Christians 
in specific instances. However, the intensity of concern among Christians who do 
believe that their faith is marginalised and penalised is evident from the responses to 
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the general survey. These responses suggest the equality law is viewed as the 
primary vehicle by which marginalisation or persecution occurs.  
  
7.4  The role of litigation  
In this section, we explore differences of view as to the role of litigation in pursuing 
claims based on religion or belief. This discussion connects to the previous section in 
that litigation is most actively pursued on behalf of Christian claimants by groups that 
combine a litigation and campaigning role.  
 
The Christians in Parliament report (2012: 5) comments that: 
 
Some of the legal activity, associated campaigning and media coverage 
has been unwise and possibly counter-productive to the positive role that 
Christians play in society. 
 
Some interviewees were critical of what they perceived as excessive or misguided 
use of litigation pursued by some Christian activists. Criticism was voiced by a range 
of interviewees representing religion or belief groups, other equality strand/s and 
business organisations. The litigation strategy and campaigning of the Christian 
Legal Centre (CLC)194 was described by one interviewee concerned with 
employment as „deliberately provocative‟. Several Christian interviewees singled out 
the Johns case (litigated by the CLC) as one which should not have been pursued.195 
However, Andrea Williams of Christian Concern, the CLC's sister organisation, 
argued that litigation is an important means of achieving justice for claimants whose 
situation would otherwise go unnoticed: 
 
It matters to these individuals and society also has to understand what‟s 
going on. Otherwise what happens is that people resign and none ever 
knows about it ... People … are scared to speak for fear of being branded 
a bigot … The Johns  judgment is seriously unjust, wrong and illiberal. 
                                               
194 The Christian Legal Centre is the sister organisation of Christian Concern, formerly known 
as Christian Concern for Our Nation. See http://www.christianconcern.com/christian-legal-
centre. 
 
195 Another case referred to by one interviewee as being weak on the facts and badly argued 
was that of Haye v London Borough of Lewisham ET Case No. 3301852/2009, 16 June 
2010, concerning a council employee who was dismissed for sending an email from her 
work account to Reverend Sharon Ferguson of the Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement 
which the tribunal described (at para. 36) as „highly offensive, homophobic … aggressive 
and violent‟. It was submitted by the CLC on behalf of the claimant that this was a case 
about free speech and that the email was a legitimate expression of her religious beliefs - 
arguments that found no favour with the tribunal.  
 






Justice must be done and we won‟t rest until it is. The alternative is to do 
nothing - then the Johns don‟t foster and no one knows about it. 
 
Concern about the risk of excessive or misguided use of litigation was expressed by 
some Christians who felt that religious interests need to be defended through forms 
of social action such as mediation, negotiation, guidance and public argument, with 
litigation used only as a last resort. Dr Don Horrocks commented that: 
 
We are great supporters of mediation before going to court. We are not a 
group that wants to take things to court. We should reserve [litigation] for 
issues of real strategic importance.  
 
Richard Kornicki argued that:  
 
Some cases with a high media profile are doing more damage to the 
religious cause than they could possibly know. Arguing a poor case on the 
basis of alleged „victimhood‟ is not helpful.196 
 
Charles Wookey argued that „picking a fight with the whole equalities framework‟ was 
unnecessary and could be counter-productive:  
 
We have to be vigilant in cases where Christians might be discriminated 
against, but there‟s a presumption that the whole thrust of this legislation is 
about victimising Christians which I don‟t think it is. And there‟s a danger 
that we provoke a kind of secularist response if we make that 
presumption.  
 
Some interviewees were concerned about the „collateral damage‟ that might be done 
to claimants whose cases had become particularly high-profile as a result of 
campaigning. For example, in the case of Amachree v Wandsworth, a press release 
issued by the CLC with the claimant‟s permission contributed to his eventual 
dismissal by breaching the confidentiality of a service user, an action which 
                                               
196 In the Johns judgment, Munby LJ (at paras. 32 and 34) described the arguments 
advanced by the Christian Legal Centre as being couched in „extravagant rhetoric‟, „at 
best tendentious in their analysis of the issues‟ and „a travesty of reality‟. 
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constituted gross misconduct (see section 7.3).197 We are not aware of research 
documenting the experience of claimants across a range of cases. 
 
Jonathan Bartley noted that the dynamic of events leading up to high-profile cases 
was similar: there had been little or no mediation; each side had acted defensively 
and when campaigning groups became involved, positions became polarised and 
entrenched. Bartley argued that: 
 
There is a clear agenda from pressure groups to whip things up. Cases 
which could be sorted out locally are jumped on ... and when they lose a 
case, it contributes to the narrative that Christians are being persecuted, 
so it becomes a vicious circle.  
 
Many interviewees viewed litigation as symptomatic of failure, whoever instigated it. 
This included those who had been involved in legal action, such as Kashmir Singh of 
the British Sikh Federation who advised the claimant‟s family in the „expensive and 
protracted‟ Watkins-Singh case. One Christian interviewee argued that:  
 
Nobody apart from a few radicals on one side or another should be 
coming anywhere near a court or be wasting people‟s time and money. It‟s 
not by accident that those cases have come to court - it‟s indicative of a 
loss of perspective amongst us. I don‟t need to side with one group or 
another; I‟d like everyone to behave with a degree of courtesy to each 
other. It obviates the need to say „my rights are going to trump yours‟. 
 
In summary, there was a broad consensus among our interviewees that litigation is a 
weapon of last resort to be reserved for cases of strategic importance. This might 
include cases which establish new and important principles or that test an uncertain 
area of law. Concern was expressed most strongly by interviewees who viewed 
excessive or misguided use of litigation as detrimental to the purpose of protecting 
religious believers from discrimination.   
 
7.5   The limitations of law  
Allied to concern that there has been excessive litigation concerning religion or belief 
is a view that the law is limited in its capacity to address complex questions of 
                                               
197 Andrea Williams of Christian Concern rejected the suggestion that Mr Amachree‟s case 
had been damaged by the press release as „he would have been fired anyway‟ and the 
publicity ensured that Wandsworth Council could not „get rid of [him] quietly‟. She added 
that „It‟s last resort to use the media … The client has to make a judgment and they 
understand what could happen. We care about our clients very deeply and we would 
never put them in any media exposure that we felt they couldn‟t handle‟.  






multiculturalism and social identity in modern Britain. As one London roundtable 
participant put it, „courts may simply not be the right place to have this conversation‟. 
As this section examines, the law may also be used in ways that have unintended 
consequences.  
 
Addressing structural disadvantage 
Some commentators argue that litigation and divisive debate about, for example, 
symbols of faith may be „diverting attention from the real problems of disadvantage 
and exclusion experienced by ethno-religious groups‟ (Hepple, 2011: 43). Some 
interviewees, especially those from minority religious communities, viewed the law 
as, at best, irrelevant to addressing structural discrimination and disadvantage.  
 
Interviewees from Muslim communities argued that over the past decade, they had 
been at the „receiving end‟ of a largely top-down process of defining and redefining 
individuals and communities. Wahida Shaffi of the Bradford Muslim Women‟s Council 
commented that public discourse about racism had been eclipsed by a focus on 
religious (Islamic) identity. While „race‟ and „religion‟ were equally valid in any 
discussion around human rights and inequality, the preoccupation with a particular 
approach to „socially engineered integration‟ had not addressed deep-seated 
problems of poverty and disadvantage in her community (see also section 3.3). Shaffi 
added that her community had been alarmed at how cases concerning the wearing of 
face veils could „play into the hands of far right organisations‟ or become the subject 
of provocative media coverage. This reminds us that the significance of cases should 
be assessed by how they reverberate in the social sphere as well as for the legal 
principles they enshrine.  
  
The limitations of law to address inequality was sometimes framed within a larger 
perceived tension between the „religious‟ and the „secular‟ worlds (see section 2.5). 
Shaykh Faiz Siddiqi of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal observed that:  
  
I don‟t think we‟re going to see equality emerging through the arm of the 
law. Individual cases may highlight the problem but will never eradicate it. 
That can only be done through a global discussion between faith and 
secularity. 
 
That „global discussion‟ may also need to entail tensions within the concept of 
equality itself. This tension is between the traditional notion of formal equality, 
requiring that cases be treated alike, and substantive notions of equality, requiring 
equality of opportunity and outcome to address the relative disadvantage and social 
exclusion of particular groups (Bribosia and Rorive, 2010; McCrudden, 2005; Vickers, 
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2011). The public sector equality duty is one vehicle through which substantive 
equality might be addressed in relation to religion or belief; this is discussed in 
section 9.4.  
 
Unintended consequences of equality law 
Interviewees situated in both the religion and belief and other equality strands argued 
that equality law has produced unintended consequences which must be recognised 
and responded to. In particular, it was seen as having encouraged an undue 
insistence on the assertion of competing identities and set different groups on an 
„intellectual collision course‟ (see also sections 6.4 and 6.8). Legal interventions 
could in turn make positions more entrenched and compromise harder to achieve. 
Charles Wookey argued that: 
 
We have to think carefully about the way that equality legislation has been 
developed and used if we‟re not going to … sow social division based on 
people‟s assertion of their identity based on protected characteristics. 
That‟s the opposite of what we want to do - and it‟s a continuing risk. 
  
Interviewees identified the potential for adversarial approaches to be pursued both 
between different religions or beliefs and between religion and claims based on other 
equality grounds. Malcolm Brown, Director of Mission and Public Affairs for the 
Church of England, referred to this as a kind of „me too-ism‟:  
 
One of the anxieties we have about the culture of equalities is that it can 
transmit the idea that … if other faiths are protected in some of their 
practices because they‟re intrinsic to that faith, then we ought to be 
protected in practices which actually aren‟t intrinsic to ours. It changes the 
way people think about the practice of their faith - it‟s an unintended 
consequence. 
 
This observation appeared to be borne out by a large number of responses to the 
general survey from those identifying as Christian; for example, one commented that 
either „everything goes or nothing goes‟, while another argued in favour of „one law 
for all … if a Christian nurse can‟t wear a cross then a Muslim nurse can‟t wear her 
religious accoutrements‟.  
 
Reverend Sharon Ferguson argued that:  
 
The law gives people permission to change their thinking. Because [the 
characteristics] are kept separate, it supports this notion that there is a 






conflict between being gay and being a person of faith. It means that 
within the gay community, faith is seen as the enemy. [Part] of my work is 
trying to bring faith to the LBGT community and the views on that side of 
the fence are just as entrenched.  
  
Several interviewees spoke of the need to lower the emotional temperature of 
discussion about religion or belief since „copy-cat‟ claims for legal recognition and 
protection were suppressive of debate. A participant involved in inter-faith matters 
argued that competing claims should be viewed within the context of „good relations‟ 
and not only equality:  
 
Equality provides a framework in determining what is just … but that 
doesn‟t mean we shouldn‟t try to reach informal accommodation in ways 
which don‟t put people in a difficult position. The question 'what are 
reasonable expectations about the way in which people should behave?' is 
a different question from 'what does the law require?' It‟s part of living in a 
comfortable society [to resolve disputes] short of litigation, even where I 
could choose to litigate.  
(emphasis in original) 
 
This observation has implications for the „good relations‟ mandate of the EHRC, 
which are discussed in the next section.  
  
7.6  The role of the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
Established under the Equality Act 2006, the EHRC has a mandate to promote 
equality, enforce the law, protect human rights and ensure good relations in society. 
It has powers to enforce equality law and can take legal cases on behalf of 
individuals to test and extend the right to equality and human rights, as well as legal 
action to prevent breaches of the Human Rights Act.  
 
The Commission’s work on religion or belief
 
Legal interventions  
The EHRC has intervened in a number of cases concerning religion or belief (see 
also Appendix 8). These include the following interventions: 
 
 Ladele and McFarlane v UK and Eweida and Chaplin v UK; in the former, the 
EHRC supported the decision of domestic courts (section 6.5); in the latter, it 
argued that domestic case law „currently fails adequately to protect individuals 
from religious discrimination in the workplace‟ (section 5.4).  
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 Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull: the EHRC funded and led the discrimination 
claim against the owners of a Cornish hotel who refused to let a double room to 
a same-sex couple. The EHRC also funded both Mr Preddy and Mr Hall‟s 
successful defence to Mr and Mrs Bull‟s appeal.  
 
 Johns v Derby City Council: the EHRC adduced evidence on, inter alia, the 
impact of views opposed to, and disapproving of, same sex relationships and 
lifestyles on the development and well-being of children and young people, 
including gay and lesbian children and young people.198 
 
 Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and Wales: 
in the appeal of the adoption agency, Catholic Care, to the High Court, the court 
accepted the EHRC‟s argument that the Charity Commission is a public 
authority and must therefore consider the Human Rights Act when making 
decisions on charity applications.199  
 
 R (E) v JFS Governing Body, concerning the school‟s refusal to admit a child 
because his mother converted to Judaism in a progressive synagogue (see 
section 9.3). The EHRC argued that the school‟s use of an ethnic-based test in 
selecting students did not comply with the Race Relations Act and that it had to 
intervene in order to preserve the same protection against racial discrimination 
for Jews as for anyone else.200  
 
 Ghai v Newcastle City Council: the EHRC argued that to deny the claimant an 
open air funeral pyre for his own funeral would breach his rights under Article 8 
ECHR (the right to private and family life), as well as under Article 9. 
 O'Donoghue and Others v United Kingdom: the EHRC submitted to the ECtHR 
that an indiscriminate scheme requiring immigrants without settled status to pay 
large fees to obtain permission from the Home Office to marry anywhere other 
                                               
198 Johns v Derby City Council at para. 23. 
 
199 [2010] EWHC 520.The matter was remitted to Charity Commission to reconsider, the 











than in an Anglican church was a violation of the right to freedom of religion, 
among other rights.201  
 
The EHRC has produced or commissioned research on religion or belief in Britain 
(Perfect, 2011; Weller, 2011; Woodhead, 2011; Woodhead with Catto, 2009) and 
maintains a Religion or Belief Network for those interested in religion or belief issues 
from an equalities or human rights perspective.202 The Commission provides generic 
guidance on equality, human rights and religion or belief on its website.203  
 
Critical perspectives  
A number of interviewees concerned with both the religion and belief strands, as well 
as other equality strands and employment, were critical of what they knew of the 
EHRC‟s track record on religion or belief. The nature of the criticism varied.  
 
Strong criticism came from those Christian interviewees who objected to the 
Commission‟s intervention in cases concerning religion or belief and sexual 
orientation. They saw the EHRC as partial and lacking credibility in relation to its 
religion or belief mandate. This was expressed as „supporting fashionable 
bandwagons‟ and being „partisan and narrow - in with the secularists and the gay 
lobby‟. One noted that the Commission had „never intervened on behalf of religion or 
belief‟.204  
 
Other religion or belief groups were also critical of the EHRC‟s record. Jasdev Singh 
Rai commented that, „There‟s a lack of competence right from the top [of the 
Commission] in this sensitive area‟. Singh Rai had not viewed the Commission as a 
credible potential mediator in the dispute over the staging in Birmingham of Behzti 
(Dishonour), which depicted rape and murder in a gurdwara and was believed by 
some Sikhs to have maligned Sikhism (for further details on this issue, see Nye and 
Weller, 2012: 40). Jon Benjamin of the Board of Deputies of British Jews observed 
                                               
201 No. 34848/07, 14.12.2010. The Home Office scheme purported to prevent sham 
marriages but did not, in fact, address the question of whether the proposed marriages 
were genuine or not. The ECtHR ruled that the scheme had led to multiple violations of 
Convention rights, including Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) read together with 







204 This comment was made before the Commission‟s intervention in the cases of Eweida 
and Chaplin. 
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that the EHRC was „not a body that we would necessarily regard as our first port of 
call‟. He had also found the Commission „unhelpful‟ with regards to its intervention in 
the JFS case, which he said had not been preceded by consultation with the Board of 
Deputies; however, there had been a welcome acknowledgement of this 
subsequently. The National Secular Society criticised the Commission‟s decision not 
to take up several issues which the society had brought to its attention; such as 
equality concerns related to the Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998 (see 
section 9.3).  
 
Several interviewees covered by both the religion and belief strands commented on 
the demise of the Religion or Belief Consultative Group (RBCG) which was formed in 
2004 and from 2008 acted as the advisory body to the EHRC on religion or belief.205 
Accounts of the group‟s demise in 2010 varied, but appeared to reflect, among other 
issues, a fissure between the religion or belief strands and a lack of trust both 
between RBCG members and in the EHRC‟s competence and impartiality in the area 
of religion or belief. Some interviewees noted that trust in the EHRC was damaged 
by the appointment as a Commissioner in 2007 of Joel Edwards, then head of the 
Evangelical Alliance. His appointment, despite his view that same-sex relationships 
are sinful, drew criticism from, among others, the National Secular Society, LGBT 
organisations and some trade unions.206  
 
Some equality specialists and trade unions we interviewed expressed more general 
reservations about the Commission‟s work on religion or belief. One noted that it 
appeared to have „ducked the issue‟ of competing rights and equality claims as being 
„too difficult‟. This was a missed opportunity, since „one of the arguments for bringing 
the equality remits together is that it would be a more powerful and thoughtful way of 
bringing these difficult areas together‟. Several interviewees from religion or belief 
                                               
205 The RBCG was formed under the auspices of the Department for Trade and Industry as a 
reference group for the religion or belief strand during the pre-parliamentary and 
parliamentary stages of Bill which became the Equality Act 2006 and which established 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission. It subsequently redefined its role as a 
strand-related consultative group. It was chaired throughout by Barney Leith OBE of the 
Bahá‟í community of the UK. After a period of declining attendance, in February 2010, the 
Church of England, the Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Free Churches' Group, the 
Methodist Church and the Salvation Army withdrew from the RBCG. The remaining 
members were various representatives of smaller faith communities, the British Humanist 
Association and the National Secular Society. Agreement could not be found on 
continuing the RBCG and it was wound up. This information was provided in 
correspondence with Barney Leith in May and November 2011.  
 
206 See „Interview: new equality commissioner on gays as sinners‟, Pink News, 6 November 
2007. See also „EHRC commissioner row‟, Equal Opportunities Review, 1 December 
2007. 
  






groups and those concerned with other equality strands suggested there was 
confusion among employers about the balance of the EHRC‟s advice-giving and 
enforcement roles. It was suggested that these „carrot‟ and „stick‟ functions should be 
better articulated to the public given the contentious nature of this equality strand.  
 
Criticism of the EHRC was not universal. A small number of interviewees, mainly 
from minority religion or belief groups, considered that negative views of the 
Commission‟s record were problems of perception rather than substance. Several 
also acknowledged that any national human rights institution was likely to have 
encountered difficulty due to the variegated nature of religion or belief and complexity 
of competing equality claims. The commissioning of this research was also 
acknowledged by several interviewees to be a valuable step to inform policy options  
relating to religion or belief.  
 
Potential roles for the EHRC 
Interviewees suggested three broad areas in which the EHRC could play a 
constructive role: „myth-busting‟; developing guidance; and developing its „good 
relations‟ mandate. These roles were viewed as inter-linked as a means of avoiding 




Several interviewees concerned with both the religion and belief strands, other 
equality strands and employment advocated a myth-busting role about legal cases 
and issues which have prompted divisive debate. This was viewed as a way of 
changing the „mood music‟ and discouraging divisive public debate. Simon Barrow 
argued that: 
 
The establishment of an evidence base for public discussion is a major 
issue - an equality body ought to try to put on record a reasonable and fair 
account of the legal contestation. Otherwise the evidence base becomes 
limited to quite distorted press accounts. 
                                               
207 In its March 2011 consultation paper, Building a Fairer Britain: Reform of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, the Government Equalities Office (2011c) proposed to 
remove the EHRC‟s mediation and conciliation powers and aspects of its good relations 
mandate „because we believe it creates unrealistic expectations about what an equality 
regulator and national Human Rights Institution can achieve‟. In its initial response to the 
consultation, the EHRC argued that this could lead to an increase in lengthy and 
expensive litigation by forcing private and public sector organisations down the more 
costly compliance rather than conciliation route. See 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/about-us/vision-and-mission/government-
consultation-on-our-future/.  
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Shaista Gohir of the Muslim Women‟s Network UK, suggested that by publishing 
accessible summaries of cases, the EHRC could help dispel the erroneous 
impression that „Muslim groups are seen as given priority by being allowed to wear 
headscarves whereas a Christian can‟t wear a cross‟ - an impression which had been 
damaging to community relations. Carola Towle, National Officer (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual and transgender equality) for Unison, argued that the EHRC needed to 
„prick the bubble of the perception‟ that tension between sexual orientation and 
religion was either inevitable or impossible to resolve.  
 
Guidance  
Several interviewees suggested that the EHRC could provide accessible, practice-
based guidance that „brings the legislation to life‟ and supports principled decision-
making. Lucy Vickers, Professor of Law at Oxford Brookes University, suggested 
that, in keeping with guidance on, for example, gender equality, religion or belief 
guidance could extend beyond strict legal requirements to establish „rules of thumb 
for managers that are easily achievable, good practice‟. Rose Doran, Senior Advisor 
with the Local Government Group, commented that the Commission could also 
showcase examples of good practice from public authorities and equip communities 
to hold public bodies to account for their duties in relation to religion or belief. It was 
noted that guidance should establish the value of using human rights principles as a 
basis for handling competing equality claims.  
 
It was acknowledged that controversy surrounding certain cases meant that the 
drafting of guidance by the EHRC would be sensitive. It may also need „bridge some 
gaps‟ or areas of uncertainty, for example concerning the definition of belief (section 
5.2). We examine employers‟ perspectives on existing guidance in section 8.5.  
 
Some religion or belief groups expressed a preference for developing their own 
guidance which would address issues of particular concern for their adherents. For 
example, Richard Kornicki suggested from a Roman Catholic perspective that „we 
need to provide clarity to our community so they know what the law does or doesn‟t 
require and what the law permits‟. However, he suggested that the Catholic Church 
would be likely to seek the EHRC‟s endorsement of the guidance as an accurate 
reflection of the law. Jit Jethwa of the Hindu Forum of Britain suggested that religion 
or belief groups could be used more extensively as a source of expertise for such 
guidance. Several Muslim interviewees noted that mosques would be effective 











Several interviewees, mainly but not only from the religion strand, argued that the 
EHRC‟s work on religion or belief naturally rests with its mandate to promote good 
relations. Reverend Aled Edwards, who is a member of the EHRC‟s Wales 
Committee, argued that a powerful form of social action was to bring together groups 
or individuals who do not normally interact: 
  
If the Commission becomes a purely regulatory body with a stick, those 
conversations might become more difficult. 
 
Yann Lovelock of the Network of Buddhist Organisations similarly argued that the 
EHRC could play an „honest broker‟ role in order to prevent the need for litigation, a 
role that government agencies could not credibly play. Interviewees from minority 
religious communities viewed this role as extending to developing closer links with 
communities. Dr Husna Ahmad of the Faith Regen Foundation suggested that this 
should not be confined to consultation on issues that the Commission chose to 
prioritise. 
 
Pragna Patel of Southall Black Sisters called for the EHRC to acknowledge and 
respond to disparities of power on the basis of class, caste, gender, disability and 
sexuality within minority religious communities. She suggested that the Commission 
needed to monitor the effects of including religion or belief as a protected 
characteristic in the Equality Act 2010 and particularly its inclusion within the public 
sector equality duty:  
 
[The EHRC] should work with the most vulnerable, those with less chance 
to articulate inequalities. They need to argue for the interest of those who 
don‟t have power, not those who already have it. They need to look at 
what religion being an equality strand means for communities since it is 
often the most authoritarian interpretations that are dominant and they 
have specific consequences for the human rights of the most vulnerable 
within [those communities].  
 
No interviewee called for the EHRC to be involved in more legal intervention. While it 
was acknowledged that this might sometimes be necessary to test areas of the law 
and establish clarity, the overwhelming emphasis across our interviews was the need 
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7.7  Approaches to dispute resolution outside the courtroom 
If litigation is to be used selectively, there is a requirement to pre-empt or resolve 
disputes relating to religion or belief by other means. These might be disputes 
involving competing equality strands; between an individual and an employer; or in a 
community setting (see also Afridi and Warmington, 2010; Malik, 2008a). Drawing on 
discussion of legal cases and issues in preceding chapters, this section examines 
principles and practical approaches that were proposed by our interviewees as a 
basis for pre-empting or resolving disputes in the workplace or community. These 
were often described as „rules of thumb‟ that might guide employers, service 
providers or other groups when disputes involving religion or belief arise. Each is 
congruent with the human rights legal principles outlined in section 6.2, though they 
were often expressed in non-legal terms.  
 
Principles or ‘rules of thumb’ underpinning dispute resolution 
 
Proportionality 
As we have seen, the principle of proportionality is central to judicial consideration of 
whether interference or disadvantage based on religion or belief is justified in a given 
case. The principle was also considered invaluable for decision-makers outside the 
courtroom, though it was often expressed in different language; for example, „using 
the least restrictive option‟ or „not using a sledgehammer to crack a nut‟. The House 
of Lords judgment in Begum established that there is no procedural requirement for 
employers or other institutions to show that they have applied a step-by-step 
approach to achieving proportionality as courts or tribunals do (section 6.2). 
However, several interviewees argued that such an approach may assist decision-
makers to „get it right‟ by ensuring that they consider whether a particular intervention 
has a legitimate aim and whether the means employed are an effective and 
proportionate method of achieving it. This is one of the key ways that human rights 
principles provide a practical framework for making decisions in difficult situations 
(see also Afridi and Warmington, 2010: 25-28).208  
 
‘Do no harm’ 
The principle most frequently invoked by interviewees was that of „do no harm‟. This 
was also expressed as „do as you would be done by‟ and „equality without infringing 
the rights of others‟. At a general level, the principle suggests a position of mutual 
restraint, according to which individuals or groups refrain from asserting human rights 
or equality claims if to do so entails harm to others; for example, because it 
                                               










compromises health and safety or places an undue burden on colleagues. As 
discussed in section 5.5, the „do no harm‟ principle was raised in relation to requests 
for reasonable accommodation of religion or belief in the workplace. In this context, 
the principle was considered a useful means of distinguishing situations in which 
claims for reasonable accommodation are refused for compelling reasons as 
opposed to merely a disinclination to embrace religious or cultural difference.  
 
The principle was also invoked in favour of allowing individuals conscientiously to 
object to certain tasks if no material harm was caused to colleagues or to people 
using a service (section 6.5). However, the application of the principle was 
controversial in this context since perceptions of harm differed. For example, some 
interviewees would have accommodated Lilian Ladele‟s request to abstain from 
performing civil partnerships on the grounds that no-one would have been harmed by 
so doing; it was argued that harm to a hypothetical claimant should not be a bar to 
accommodation. However, others perceived the need to consider the actual or 
potential harm to the reliability and non-discriminatory ethos of the service and 
consequently to others using or delivering that service. These participants also 
observed that in Ladele-type situations, colleagues of the person seeking 
conscientiously to object may experience harm beyond pure offence, and may not 
always feel able openly to express the effect upon them. These differences of view 
remind us that perceptions of harm are always context dependent and could 
therefore form part of the assessment of proportionality in a given instance.  
 
‘There is no right not to be offended’ 
It is important to distinguish between harm and offence. As noted in section 5.5, 
interviewees and survey respondents from a variety of stakeholder groups stated that 
pure offence should rarely be a determining factor in the resolution of disputes; 
provisions in the Equality Act 2010 covering victimisation and harassment 
established the threshold for acceptable conduct and beyond that there was, as one 
interviewee put it, „no right not to be offended‟. The notion of vicarious offence was 
considered to be suppressive of open discussion about religion or belief in social 
contexts. Malcolm Brown, spokesman for the Church of England, suggested that this 
principle applied whoever was claiming to be offended:  
  
We have this concept of religious offence … [yet] it seems to me that the 
idea that the purpose of a religion is to be offended doesn‟t fit with what 
we believe about God - it appears to be running to the defence of a deity 
who can perfectly well look after himself! [At the same time] if others are 
offended by the public expression of someone‟s religion, or even a person 
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attempting to argue religious questions in public ... I think that is copycat 
behaviour and it‟s quite unacceptable. 
 
Respect for the value of religions and beliefs to their adherents  
Several interviewees from religious groups proposed as a „rule of thumb‟ simply the 
recognition that religions are important to their adherents.209 It was argued that 
religion was too often viewed in a knee-jerk way as „the problem‟, or as an impulse 
that „overspills into violence or irrationality‟ and should be constrained in the private 
sphere. As argued above, this observation does not necessarily entail protection from 
offence for a particular religion; however, it establishes at the minimum a respect for 
the intrinsic value of religions to their adherents. As noted in section 6.2, this is also 
expressed as respecting the „believer‟ rather than the „belief‟ (Evans, 2009b: 30).  
 
This principle is concerned with the very basis for protecting freedom of religion or 
belief and prohibiting discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. This is 
sometimes viewed instrumentally; for example, in relation to advancing social 
cohesion and inclusion or fostering civic virtue (Ahdar and Leigh, 2005: 52-63). For 
some commentators, stronger arguments for protection rest on the realisation of a 
common good. Evans (2009a: 200) argues that, „When individuals and belief 
communities are able to enjoy their freedom of religion or belief democratic society 
itself is a beneficiary‟.  
 
Personal and institutional autonomy  
As noted in section 5.5, the principle of personal autonomy was endorsed by many 
interviewees as an approach to the accommodation of religion or belief. The 
suggestion is that individuals should be free to pursue their own preferences subject 
only to reasonable limitations imposed in the interests of others. The principle of 
personal autonomy was given nuanced interpretation by many of our participants. It 
was acknowledged that it will sometimes have to be balanced against the integrity of 
the organisation and the imperative to achieve its objectives. As noted in section 5.4, 
nearly all participants argued that individuals whose religion or belief is important to 
them, have a responsibility to make sensible career choices that avoid foreseeable 
conflict with the law or professional practice; moreover, they may sometimes have to 
make considerable personal sacrifices.  
 
Several interviewees from religion or belief groups emphasised the principle of 
institutional autonomy. According to this principle, religions or beliefs are expressed 
                                               
209 Interviewees invoked this principle specifically in relation to religious belief; however, it 
might apply equally to the holder of a philosophical belief for whom that belief is of 
overriding importance. 






primarily in institutions that are separate from the state and these institutions should 
be free to organise their own internal life largely free from state intervention.  
The liberal concern with individual autonomy may sometimes be in tension with that 
of institutional autonomy. As discussed in section 2.3, both are integral to the concept 
of „progressive multiculturalism‟ in a religiously- and culturally-diverse society.  
 
However, predominant weight may need to be given to the interests of vulnerable 
individuals where they conflict with those of the dominant members of a group. Malik 
(2008a: 17-20) advocates a „zero tolerance‟ approach to practices that involve 
violence or coercion towards vulnerable individuals. In such contexts, there is also a 
need to promote the autonomy of those individuals and to empower them within the 
community concerned since they may not wish, or be able, to exit it. 
 
The inherent value of diversity 
Several interviewees commented that diversity is an inherent social good. This 
connects to normative arguments for multiculturalism (section 2.3); as one 
interviewee put it, this is an argument in favour of society (and particular social 
institutions) resembling „a salad rather than a stew‟. By this account, each individual 
in a social institution benefits from being part of a diverse whole. Religion or belief is 
one aspect of that diversity. This proposition underpins the presumption towards the 
accommodation of religion or belief in the absence of compelling reasons for 
restriction (examined in section 5.5). It helps explain why institutions should bear a 
degree of inconvenience or cost to permit such accommodation, such as the cost of 
providing prayer or reflection rooms or meeting dietary requirements. Several 
interviewees observed that this proposition is also supported by pragmatic 
arguments; for example, that employees who feel comfortable in a workplace are 
likely to be more committed and productive. Interviewees acknowledged that these 
arguments applied not only to religion or belief. For example, one noted that a large 
employer in Wales had accommodated a request by an individual who was HIV 
positive to have a protected space where they could discreetly take their medication; 
this was analogous to requests for prayer or reflection rooms, since both involved a 
recognition that „we are not all the same‟.  
 
7.8  Ground rules for conducting public debate 
This section examines some „ground rules‟ proposed by research participants and in 
the literature for conducting public debate on religion or belief.  
 
A persistent theme of this research was that public discussion of equality, human 
rights and religion or belief is sometimes unduly intemperate and tends to accentuate 
conflict. An example of such conduct is that of a columnist in an independent 
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Anglican newspaper, who described the leadership of gay rights organisations as „the 
Gaystapo‟.210 Some sections of the mainstream media were viewed by many 
interviewees as playing an unhelpful role in shaping and exacerbating conflicts (see 
also Afridi and Warmington, 2010: 27). Several interviewees concerned with the 
religion or belief and other equality strands proposed ground rules for approaching 
public discussion or negotiation of differences in particular settings. These 
approaches are not peculiar to disputes connected to religion or belief. However, 
interviewees acknowledged that the existential importance of religions or beliefs to 
their adherents, and the potential for tension with other equality strands, can make 
such disputes appear intractable and in greater need of principled approaches to 
resolution.  
 
Respecting the integrity and legitimacy of others’ positions 
One ground rule was the requirement to respect the integrity and legitimacy of the 
position of each party to a dispute. It was noted that impugning the motives of others 
tends to close down any possibility of dialogue. Reverend Aled Edwards recalled that 
during the debate in the Church in Wales about the ordination of women to the 
priesthood:  
 
Integrity was an important principle. There seemed to be a value in 
describing both positions as having integrity even though they were 
passionately opposed. When people feel anger and where there is 
legitimacy to their conviction, it goes a long way if you recognise that 
legitimacy.  
 
Stychin (2009: 754) argues that conditions - or „ethical rules of engagement‟ - should 
be attached to entry into the public sphere (see also section 6.5). He suggests that 
acceptance of these conditions is a minimum requirement for groups or individuals 
who seek to negotiate a particular outcome in a context where competing interests 
are at stake. One set of conditions is proposed by the 2008 Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission in Quebec; this was aimed at addressing what it called a „crisis of 
perception‟ with regard to the accommodation of minority religious and cultural 
practices, stemming largely from erroneous or partial understanding of such 
practices. It suggested as a set of ethical reference points for any negotiation 
process: 
                                               
210 The columnist, Alan Craig, stated that „gay-rights stormtroopers take no prisoners as they 
annex our wider culture, and hotel owners, registrars, magistrates, doctors, counsellors, 
and foster parents … find themselves crushed under the pink jackboot‟. See „Anglican 
newspaper defends “Gaystapo” article‟, The Guardian, 8 November 2011. 
  
 






… openness to the Other, reciprocity, mutual respect, the ability to listen, 
good faith, the ability to reach compromises, and a willingness to rely on 
discussion to resolve stalemates. The institution of a culture of 
compromise largely centres on all of these factors that foster the 
coordination of action and the peaceful, concerted resolution of disputes. 
(Bouchard and Taylor, 2008: 55) 
 
Jennifer Nedelsky (cited in Stychin, 2009: 753) suggests that tolerance must extend 
to viewpoints that are incomprehensible to oneself. This requires an „imaginative 
capacity to put ourselves in the position of another‟ and „taking others‟ perspectives 
into account in order not to be limited by one‟s own interests and idiosyncrasies‟. 
 
The role of mediation  
Several interviewees acknowledged that where each party to a dispute struggles to 
recognise the integrity of the other‟s position, the intervention of a mediator can be 
critical. Aled Edwards underlined the value of: 
 
... conduits or ambassadors who have access to the sides of the debate 
and the capacity to hold both views with respect. 
 
An example of this was the role he played in the case of Shambo, a bullock sacred to 
a Hindu monastic community, which was ordered to be slaughtered after testing 
positive for bovine tuberculosis.211 The community used the mediation to request a 
police guard of honour for Shambo as he was taken away: 
  
So a community experiencing a degree of grief in terms of their faith 
values could see honour being shown to them. It also meant that Shambo 
left … in relative peace. The police were able to say 'we have a job to do 
here in law but we will do it in a way that doesn‟t unnecessarily offend 
you'. That sense of meeting what is not an unreasonable request goes a 
long way. 
 
Interviewees noted that „grassroots‟ mediation has also used to resolve disputes 
within religious communities. Tehmina Kazi of British Muslims for Secular Democracy 
noted that the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) had offered to 
mediate between Dr Usama Hasan and the trustees of his mosque in east London 
                                               
211 R (Swami Surayanda) v Welsh Ministers [2007] EWCA Civ 893. 
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(where some service users had objected to his publicly-stated views on evolution and 
women who choose not to cover their hair). 212 Had it not been for mediation:  
 
 …the whole issue would have been about their freedom of religion versus his 
 freedom of speech. So I think it is very important to empower groups like 
 MINAB, who do a lot of grassroots work to prevent these issues making it to 
 the courts.  
  
Mediation may also take place within families; for example, the east London-based 
charity Positive East, which supports people living with HIV-Aids, had, according to 
its Community Development Officer Fazal Mahmood, „acted as a bridge where 
[someone‟s] sexual orientation confronts the religious positioning of their family‟. The 
charity had also played this role at a community level; for example, it had facilitated 
dialogue between religious groups and those concerned with other equality strands 
on issues such as hate crime and forced marriage.  
 
Several interviewees noted that spending cuts had imperilled their organisation‟s 
capacity to conduct community-based mediation or provide informal advocacy. It is 
not possible to generalise from these observations about the impact of cuts to third 
sector organisations; however, the value of intermediate organisations is evident 
from the instances of mediation cited in this section.  
 
The process of negotiation 
Several interviewees emphasised that the resolution of disputes concerning religion 
or belief is not a „zero sum‟ game. Amanda Ariss suggested that decision-makers 
should „resist the psychological temptation automatically to side with one party or 
another‟ even though it may be uncomfortable to tell both parties to a dispute that 
they can‟t have all their demands met. Steve Williams of Acas commented that the 
first step towards negotiating differences was to reach agreement on the exact nature 
of the problem; too often, disputes were magnified by erroneous or mismatched 
perceptions. This may be especially the case where discussion is conducted in public 
view. Williams noted that mediation has the best chance of succeeding before legal 





                                               
212 See „London imam subjected to death threats for supporting evolution‟, The Guardian, 6 
March 2011. 
 






The importance of a safe environment 
Several interviewees recognised that „good faith‟ solutions are more easily achieved 
in a safe environment. This was especially important in relation to minority religious 
communities created by post-war immigration. Reverend Alan Green noted that:  
 
... an immigrant community that is vulnerable and feels itself under threat 
and is worried about losing its values and direction needs a great deal of 
nurture in order to … engage openly with the values of liberal British 
culture. It can't just be enforced or imposed, either by a more enlightened 
Muslim position [or] … by government.  
 
Wahida Shaffi expressed the need for „small localised spaces‟ where groups can 
work out what equality and human rights mean in relation to religion or belief in 
particular localities:  
 
Discussions … in the public sphere are robust and argumentative … 
media-driven and government-driven ... We should have these 
discussions in a manner that is far more constructive. There is inevitably a 
lot of fear around these issues; it has been a very tense and dark period in 
the last decade, for Muslim communities in particular.  
 
Participants also advocated the creation of safe spaces for discussion within 
workplaces and public institutions.213 Several health and social care practitioners at 
the Cardiff roundtable commented that there was a strong perception that if someone 
„said the wrong thing‟ about religion or belief and equality in public sector setting it 
could be „career threatening‟. One noted that „the moment you say something 
contentious or ignorant, people put you into a little box‟. Practical examples of 
implementing equality, human rights and religion or belief in the health and social 
care setting are examined in section 9.2.  
  
7.9 Conclusion  
Communities defined by religion or belief appear to have markedly different attitudes 
towards equality and human rights law. Interviewees from minority communities 
tended to view the law as a guarantor of a „level playing field‟ and an „ally‟ of 
communities that face particular disadvantage. At worst, the law was deemed by 
                                               
213 The approach of the supermarket Asda has been positively evaluated for, among other 
initiatives, its communication forums which include daily site meetings, weekly „Listening 
groups‟ and monthly representative meetings. Action on religion or belief has emerged 
from the forums; for example, ways to celebrate certain religions within a store and the 
introduction of prayer rooms in a number of stores (Foster, 2009). 
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these interviewees to be irrelevant to the achievement of substantive equality and the 
amelioration of disadvantage. 
 
By contrast, there is a strong narrative articulated by some strands of Christian 
opinion which sees equality law as the primary vehicle by which Christianity is being 
marginalised and penalised in modern Britain. However, this view is not universally 
shared by Christians and some view the „marginalisation‟ narrative as a response to 
a loss of privilege. The evidence base concerning discrimination against Christians 
(and those of other religions or beliefs) is incomplete; however, the evidence that 
does exist suggests the need for a more nuanced analysis of the incidence of 
discrimination against Christians than the generalised „marginalisation‟ narrative 
presently articulates.  
 
Some Christian interviewees were concerned that too vociferous a movement 
against the perceived sidelining of Christianity could, paradoxically, decrease the 
effectiveness of efforts to uphold the rights of Christians in specific instances. These 
interviewees expressed particular concern about the excessive use of litigation; the 
Christian Legal Centre was singled out for criticism for having pursued some cases 
that were weak on the facts and/or badly argued.  
 
Allied to concern that there has been excessive litigation concerning religion or belief 
is a view that the law is limited in its capacity to address complex questions of 
multiculturalism and social identity in modern Britain. Interviewees situated in both 
the religion and belief and other equality strands argued that equality law has 
produced unintended consequences. In particular, it was seen as having sometimes 
encouraged an undue insistence on the assertion of competing identities and set 
different groups on an „intellectual collision course‟.  
 
Interviewees proposed principles or „rules of thumb‟ as a basis for pre-empting or 
resolving disputes in the workplace or community. These were congruent with 
principles in human rights law, though they were commonly expressed in non-legal 
terms. Proportionality (or the „least restrictive‟ approach) was commonly invoked, as 
was the principle of „do no harm‟. Some interviewees situated in the religion strand 
proposed, as a general principle, respect for the intrinsic value of religions or beliefs 
to their adherents; however, it was acknowledged that this does not necessarily entail 
protection from offence. The principles of personal and institutional autonomy were 
also endorsed by several interviewees, though it was recognised that these might 
sometimes conflict. Several interviewees also commented that diversity is an 
inherent social good; this added ballast to the argument that institutions should bear 






a degree of cost or inconvenience in order to accommodate religion or belief within 
reasonable limits.  
 
Many interviewees were concerned to address the intemperate and divisive nature of 
much public discussion of religion or belief. Among the ground rules proposed was 
the requirement to respect the integrity and legitimacy of the position of each party to 
a dispute. This might sometimes require a process of mediation and the creation of 
„safe spaces‟ for the negotiation of differences.  
 
Several interviewees were critical of what they knew of the EHRC‟s track record on 
religion or belief. Some (especially Christian) interviewees perceived the EHRC to be 
lacking in competence in relation to religion or belief and/or more supportive of LGBT 
rights. Interviewees suggested three broad areas in which the Commission could 
play a constructive role: myth-busting about particular cases and issues; developing 
guidance; and developing its „good relations‟ mandate. These roles were viewed as 
inter-linked as a means of avoiding litigation through improved decision-making and 
greater use of mediation and conciliation. 




8.  Implementing equality and human rights in relation to religion 
or belief in the workplace 
 
8.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines problems faced and solutions reached by decision-makers in 
the workplace in relation to equality and human rights and religion or belief. 
Preceding chapters discussed evidence relating to discrimination in the workplace 
(section 3.5); the state of the law affecting the workplace (especially section 5.5 on 
the concept of reasonable accommodation); and the principles or „rules of thumb‟ that 
decision-makers (including workplace managers) might adopt (section 7.7). The 
emphasis in this chapter is on evidence relating to practical experience of 
implementation.  
 
8.2  Evidence about management handling of religion or belief 
Few research studies have focused on management experience of handling religion 
or belief. Studies have focused either on the experience and grievances of 
employees (Denvir et al., 2007; Savage, 2007) or cases that have reached 
Employment Tribunals (Fitzpatrick, 2007).  
 
A key study into management experience of handling religion or belief in the 
workplace was conducted on behalf of Acas and the Chartered Institute of Personnel 
and Development (CIPD) (Dickens et al., 2009). It indicates a prevailing uncertainty 
and lack of knowledge among employers (Dickens et al., 2009: 7-8).214 This study 
also examined management handling of sexual orientation; managers‟ uncertainty 
related to the handling of each equality strand separately; and potential tensions 
between them. Managers were unclear about „the priority employers should give to 
accommodating religious beliefs versus other employee needs that are not as clearly 
protected by law‟ (Dickens et al., 2009: 52). They were also unsure about „how to 
draw a line between allowing people to express their faith versus disallowing 
proselytising, or hostility towards LGB [lesbian, gay and bisexual] people‟ (Dickens et 
al., 2009: 52-53). There was a view that managers are generally reluctant to address 
issues arising from employees‟ religion or belief and/or sexual orientation compared 
to other strands such as race, disability or gender (Dickens et al., 2009: 7).  
 
The research suggested that, whilst religion or belief and sexual orientation 
presented some common management dilemmas, on the whole they were found to 
                                               
214 The aim of this study was to „reappraise‟ the experience and knowledge of employers five 
years after the employment equality regulations on religion or belief and sexual orientation 
came into force, hence the focus on these two equality strands. The research comprised a 
one-day deliberative event involving a sample of 48 managers of different levels of 
seniority from organisations of different sizes in the private, public and voluntary sectors.  






be „distinct entities, requiring different approaches and solutions‟. Effective handling 
of religion or belief was perceived to require proactive administrative responses from 
employers - in particular around the accommodation of practical requests such as 
attendance at services, space for worship and dress requirements (Dickens et al., 
2009: 52). This was based on an assumption that employees were likely to be open 
about their religion or belief. By contrast, managers perceived that employees are not 
generally open about their sexual orientation; management handling was necessarily 
more „low key‟ and the onus on employers was to maintain a tolerant and respectful 
culture in a climate of „changing moral values‟ (see also Bond et al., 2009: 55-56).  
 
The research identifies examples of effective practice in the handing of religion or 
belief and/or sexual orientation (Dickens et al., 2009: 53-54). Some apply to generic 
management practice; for example, consistent practice around flexible working to 
accommodate religious needs as well as other reasonable employee requests; and 
educating managers in the use of discipline and grievance procedures, together with 
informal dispute resolution and use of mediation. Others are specific to religion or 
belief and sexual orientation; for example, demonstrating that an organisation has a 
tolerant culture by supporting events and employee networks concerned with each 
equality strand; and building consideration of religion or belief and sexual orientation 
into Equality Impact Assessments.215 
 
Barriers to effective practice included engrained workplace cultures of harassment 
and bullying and a perception, especially among small organisations, that measures 
were too costly or onerous. Some managers expressed concern that perceived 
tensions between the two strands could inhibit effective practice - for example, where 
it was felt that open discussion of sexual orientation might offend religious 
employees.  
 
A further study into management handling of conflict between religion or belief and 
sexual orientation was conducted by Stonewall (Hunt, 2009). This formed the basis 
for guidance aimed at employers. Interviews with equality and diversity specialists 
from a range of sectors suggested low levels of confidence about tackling negative 
attitudes towards lesbian, gay and bisexual people when these were „justified and 
motivated by religion and belief‟ (Hunt, 2009: 1). However, such incidents were found 
to be „very rare‟. This study suggested that organisations that were most confident 
about responding to, and preventing, perceived conflicts were those that had 
developed - and communicated to all staff - explicit policies about equality and 
                                               
215 For a summary of good workplace practice in relation to religion or belief (as well as age 
and sexual orientation) collated from diverse sources of guidance, see Bond et al. (2009: 
79-83). 




diversity. Successful organisations had thought in advance about how they might 
respond to issues of conflict and had „established where they would draw the line 
between acceptable expression of faith and unacceptable discrimination in 
employment and service delivery‟. They had worked proactively with lesbian and gay 
staff and staff who belonged to religious networks to seek common ground.  
When incidents did occur, successful organisations had used third party mediators to 
try to resolve issues, but had robust disciplinary procedures to help resolve more 
complex issues. 
 
Similar findings are presented in a study of „managing the interface‟ between sexual 
orientation and religion in the further and higher education sectors in England 
(Lifelong Learning UK, 2010). It found that where equality and diversity was 
embedded in the ethos of learning providers, relations between the two equality 
groups tended to be mutually respectful. In other circumstances, there was the 
potential for „significant tension and difficulty‟ (Lifelong Learning UK, 2010: 6). The 
study recommends an „anticipatory approach‟ to managing the inter-relationship 
between the two equality strands rather than simply responding to incidents as they 
arise.  
 
A study of integration in the workplace in relation to religion or belief, age and sexual 
orientation similarly emphasised the importance of having formal equality-related 
structures and, in particular, dedicated diversity and equality specialists (Bond et al., 
2009: 71). This was a common factor across a range of organisations considered by 
the study to be successful in their handling of equality, regardless of the precise form 
that their equality policies took.  
 
8.3  Survey on ‘managing equality, human rights and religion or belief in the 
workplace’ 
The online survey conducted for this research presents a different picture to that in 
the Acas/CIPD study (see Appendix 7). The 47 respondents generally appraised their 
workplace and their own knowledge very positively in relation to the handling of 
religion or belief. As in the Acas/CIPD study, respondents were a mixture of middle 
managers, diversity and equality officers and human resources managers, as well as 
a small number of senior executives. However, it is important to note that the 
respondents were self-selecting and their responses do not constitute a statistically 
significant sample; for example, it was not possible to sample between different sizes 
of employer or different sectors. Around 70 per cent of respondents were from the 
public sector (with 23 per cent from the private sector and 7 per cent from the 
voluntary sector). Almost 90 per cent of respondents were from large organisations 
with 500 or more staff. Nearly all had their headquarters in the UK (89 per cent), with 






just over a third of the total based in Wales. Only one respondent was from an 
organisation with a religious affiliation (Islam).  
Summary of responses  
The results of the workplace survey are presented in Appendix 7. This section 
presents a summary of responses.216 Overall, the survey indicates high levels of 
confidence among respondents about their own knowledge and understanding and 
their ability to access appropriate guidance and support to handle religion or belief.  
 
 Three-quarters of respondents view religion or belief as central to a person‟s 
identity and support the concept of reasonable accommodation; one noted that 
they had „a general starting point that reasonable accommodation is the desired 
aim‟.  
 
 Most said that their workplace made active provision for religion or belief; for 
example, 80 per cent had a multi-faith, prayer, reflection or quiet room in their 
workplace. 
 
 More than two-thirds said their workplaces had policies or procedures in place 
to enable them to respond systematically to requests for flexible working to 
permit observance of religion or belief (both time off work and flexibility during 
the working day).217 Less than half had policies or procedures in place to 
respond to requests to wear clothing, jewellery or symbols in observance of 
religion or belief. 
 
 58 per cent said that their workplace had a group or network concerned with 
religion or belief. This was less than for LGB employees (71 per cent) and those 
with a disability (68 per cent). However, it was more than for groups covering 
gender or race (each 55 per cent); transgender (38 per cent); or age (36 per 
cent). 
 
 Around three-quarters of respondents said that their workplace provided 
adequate training for employees on avoiding discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief.
                                               
216 In each case, the figure given is the proportion of respondents who answered the relevant 
question. The figures for response rates are shown in Appendix 3. 
  
217 This did not necessarily indicate that requests would be accommodated, but that there 
was a mechanism for considering requests consistently. 




 Around three-quarters considered that their workplace had adequate policies 
and procedures in place to deal with the day-to-day accommodation of religion 
or belief.  
 
 Eight in ten respondents considered that their workplace deals effectively with 
bullying and harassment based on religion or belief.  
 
 Around two-thirds of respondents said that their workplace provides adequate 
advice and support about how to resolve disputes that might arise between 
claims based on religion or belief and claims based on another equality strand. 
 
 Almost all respondents knew where to go for guidance on the law regarding 
equality, human rights and religion or belief or advice on policies or procedures 
in their own workplace. 
 
 Knowledge of specific cases was generally high. The cases that were most 
familiar to respondents were (in order of familiarity) Eweida v British Airways, 
Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull, Ladele v London Borough of Islington, Chaplin 
v Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, McFarlane v Relate 
Avon Ltd and Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council. Generally, the 
more familiar a case, the more it was considered to have wide applicability. For 
example, Eweida was not only the most familiar case (92 per cent had some or 
detailed knowledge of it), but was also rated highest for significance.  
 
It is not possible to generalise from these results given that respondents were self-
selecting and disproportionately situated in large, public sector organisations. 
However, the results indicate that the prevailing lack of confidence suggested in the 
Acas/CIPD research - and the impression created by specific legal cases of poor 
management handling of disputes concerning religion or belief - are not necessarily 
representative of all employers.  
 
8.4  Problems and solutions related by interviewees 
This section examines the practical experience of employers, practitioners and trade 
union representatives interviewed for this research.  
 
Areas of difficulty  
Competing claims 
In keeping with findings from the literature (section 8.2), interviewees generally 
indicated that management confidence tends to be lowest when dealing with 
conflicting equality claims, almost invariably between religion or belief and sexual 






orientation. One large private sector employer had established an inter-faith staff 
network and a group for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) employees. 
Fissures had emerged both between religious faiths and between religious and LGBT 
employees. The employer noted that:  
 
Whilst we have a code of conduct and ethics and policies, [you can‟t 
regulate] what goes on between two individuals in the restroom.  
 
Carola Towle of Unison commented that the perception of the problem of competing 
religious and sexual orientation claims was greater than the actual problem; she 
added, however, that: 
  
There‟s still an idea that both of these are tricky and highly personal 
characteristics, and in combination even more so. We say that while there 
may be personal issues caught up in them, in terms of managing staff … 
you treat these issues as you would … other aspects of discrimination or 
misunderstandings between colleagues. But managers go into startled 
rabbit mode and think that they can‟t follow normal management practice. 
 
One employer noted that such tensions were rare but tended to flare up quickly when 
they occurred; managers could be caught unawares and be unsure of the proper 
response in contrast to their handling of more „routine‟ issues.  
 
Fear of litigation 
Employers (or those familiar with workplace issues) suggested that managers were 
often fearful of possible litigation and consequent reputational damage. This fear is 
likely to be especially prevalent among larger employers with prominent brands and 
can lead to „knee jerk‟ decision-making. As one large private sector employer 
observed:  
 
It‟s often when the media are involved that companies tend to panic and 
think we had better back down … because of the reputational risk … 
That‟s the biggest challenge for us - to educate our line managers so 
when these issues occur, at recruitment, training or further down the line, 
that they‟re equipped to deal with it and make the right decisions ... You‟re 
always on the back foot as a bigger company.  
 
Larger companies had also experienced problems ascertaining the profile of religions 
or beliefs among their employees, since the provision of such information was 




voluntary and staff were sometimes reluctant to provide it. This hampered efforts to 
be proactive in accommodating religion or belief.  
 
Assessing proportionality  
 A fear of litigation was compounded by uncertainty created by a heavy reliance in 
case law on the principle of proportionality. Interviewees did not suggest that 
proportionality was an inappropriate guide to action; however, they noted that 
apparently contradictory judgments based on different facts created uncertainty for 
managers as to the parameters of what they have to accommodate (see section 4.4). 
Practitioners at the Cardiff roundtable had noted that „lazy‟ managers were often 
tempted to „hide behind policies‟ as a way of evading consideration of dilemmas 
relating to religion or belief. There was a temptation to interpret policy as providing 
„blanket‟ rules in order to provide certainty; however, indiscriminate rules had actually 
created „hassle and problems because they leave no room for dialogue and 
compromise‟.  
 
Uncertainty about what practices are protected by law 
Several interviewees commented that managers were uncertain about the legal 
definition of belief (see section 5.2). They also struggled to differentiate „religious‟ 
from „cultural‟ or purely personal practices in considering requests from employees to 
diverge from corporate dress codes. For example, one employer had received 
requests to consider henna skin decorations, tattooed crosses and thread bracelets 
as manifestations of religion or belief. Difficulties also emerged when co-religionists 
had different preferences for dress. For example, one employer had received a 
request from younger Sikh men to wear a patka (a simple cloth head covering 
commonly worn by Sikh boys or during sport) in preference to a turban; however, 
older Sikh employees considered this disrespectful.  
 
Alan Beazley of the Employers Forum on Belief (now part of the Employers‟ Network 
on Equality and Inclusion), had received numerous queries from employers 
concerning the distinction between „religion‟ and „culture‟ and between obligatory and 
non-obligatory practices; for example, employers were unsure how much leave staff 
should reasonably be allowed to mourn or to attend the Hajj. The forum also had a 




Human rights as the ‘bedrock’ 
Health and social care practitioners at the Cardiff roundtable advocated using human 
rights alongside equality law as a „lens‟ for considering staff requests for 






accommodation of their religion or belief. This enabled managers to move beyond 
considerations of whether (say) a dress code request related to „religion‟ or „culture‟ 
or was an obligatory or discretionary aspect of a belief. While the Equality Act „lens‟ 
dictated a focus on legal compliance, human rights encouraged an approach focused 
on individual flourishing. As one participant commented, „Is it „faith‟ or „culture‟? Does 
it matter if we are looking for effective practice?‟ (emphasis in original). It was also 
noted that a human rights perspective discourages the unhelpful tendency created by 
equality law to „put people in boxes‟ rather than explore the multiple identities and 
discrimination that individuals may experience.218 Indeed, this research suggests that 
an approach based on human rights may be more satisfactory in the long term than 
one based principally on equality, notwithstanding the problems which some 
interviewees perceive with the domestic courts‟ approach to protecting freedom of 
religion or belief.  
 
Organisational approach to equality and diversity 
Interviewees reinforced the recommendations in the literature (section 8.2) for a 
workplace ethos that expressly endorses equality, diversity and human rights and is 
underpinned by clear and well-communicated policies (see, e.g., Foster, 2009). 
Amanda Ariss commented that: 
 
It is important for employers to have an active equality and diversity policy, 
which is a living part of the workplace culture … [This increases] the 
likelihood that people understand that there are ground rules at work about 
how to behave with their colleagues. It provides a foundation statement 
and [makes it] … more possible to have the difficult conversations that 
people sometimes need to have. 
 
Steve Williams similarly argued that employers need to have a clear and consistent 
policy for dealing with the accommodation of religion or belief requests since it is 
inconsistency that commonly gives rise to discrimination claims. He suggested that 
policies be based on the principles arising from case law; for example, the Azmi case 
had established that discrimination was justified if it was for a compelling reason 
connected to a person‟s ability to do their job.  
 
                                               
218 The coalition government‟s Equality Strategy published in December 2010 refers to a 
„new approach to tackling inequality: one that moves away from treating people as groups 
or „equality strands‟ and instead recognises that we are a nation of 62 million individuals‟ 
(HM Government, 2010: 9). It adds that „new legislation and increased regulation have 
produced diminishing returns‟ and that equality „has come to mean political correctness, 
social engineering, form filling and box ticking‟ (HM Government, 2010: 5).  
 




Communicating this principle could „introduce a confidence factor‟ across 
organisations where confidence was presently lacking. Decisions predicated on 
moral or value judgments alone were not a sound basis for resolving dilemmas or 
disputes. Such an approach also made it more likely that line managers would 
respond appropriately to issues that flared up without the need for the intervention of 
senior staff. Steve Williams noted that inept handling by line managers who lacked a 
clear decision-making framework could „corrupt‟ a dispute at the outset and make it 
harder for experienced staff to resolve it further up the line. 
  
Wendy Irwin, Head of Diversity at the Royal College of Nursing (RCN), observed that 
institutions benefitted from having charters or codes of conduct that set out 
expectations of desirable behaviour and not merely measures to penalise „bad‟ 
behaviour. The RCN‟s „Dignity Charter‟ for members and staff was an example of this 
approach.219 
 
The benefits of engraining equality and diversity in workplace culture were 
demonstrated by National Grid. Simon Langley, UK Lead Manager for Inclusion and 
Diversity, observed that „Faith@Work‟ and „Pride@Work‟ staff networks had jointly 
addressed a situation in which an evangelical Christian employee had discriminated 
against another employee on grounds of their sexual orientation. National Grid‟s 
„Islam@Work‟ group had worked successfully with the director of security to address 
myths around Islam.  
 
Creativity and negotiation  
Interviewees gave examples of how compromises had been found to permit 
accommodation of religion or belief even when to do so appeared to contradict 
general policies or practices:  
 
 West Midlands Police had a corporate policy of photographing each member of 
staff, but after negotiation agreed that Muslim women could be photographed 
wearing face coverings. 
 
 Sodexo, which provides services in hospitals among other settings, worked with 
the National Health Service to organise a consultation among staff about the 
„bare below the elbow‟ policy which is designed to minimise the spread of 
infection. The policy required the wearing of short sleeves and permitted only 
the wearing of a wedding ring. As a result of the consultation, it was agreed that 
                                               
219 See http://www.rcn.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/318633/003587.pdf. 
 






Sikh staff could continue to wear a kara (religious bangle) and would follow 
additional disinfecting routines.220  
 
 Female Muslim health care staff had also experienced problems with the „bare 
below the elbows‟ policy due to concerns about modesty. Initially, Department 
of Health guidance permitted no exceptions (Department of Health, 2009: 16). 
However, interviewees observed that creative local solutions were found and 
these have resulted in amended national guidance. For example, staff are now 
permitted to wear three-quarter length sleeves and disposable plastic over-
sleeves.221  
  
 Female Muslim staff had found creative ways round the need to „scrub up‟ 
alongside male colleagues and the low cut of gowns worn in operating theatres. 
They „scrubbed up‟ several minutes before their male colleagues and wore two 
gowns, one back and one front, and a surgeon‟s hood rather than a smaller cap 
to cover their head.  
 
8.5  Guidance on religion or belief in the workplace  
As noted in section 7.6, several interviewees proposed that the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) produce accessible, practice-based guidance that 
„brings legislation to life‟ and reflects developing case law. The Acas/CIPD research 
quotes managers as saying there is a shortage of practical and evidence-based 
guidance about religion or belief and sexual orientation relative to other equality 
strands (Dickens et al., 2009: 52).  
 
Existing guidance 
Acas (2010) has produced guidance on putting the Equality Act 2010 into practice in 
relation to religion or belief, with good practice examples. It provides an overview of 
the law and guidance on commonly raised issues. It covers how employers might 
respond if an employee manifests their religion or belief „in a way that breaches your 
Equality Policy or other workplace policies‟. For example, „Employers are entitled to 
expect that employees will not discriminate against or harass colleagues and that 
they will deliver services to customers in a non-discriminatory manner‟ (Acas, 2010: 
18).  
 
                                               
220 For a full account of the consultation procedure, see Godwin (2011). 
 
221 See „Fresh guidance on bare below the elbow‟, Nursing Times, 30 March 2010. 
 




Some large employers have produced guidance for decision-makers; for example, 
NHS Employers has produced guidance on dress codes and discrimination which 
draws heavily on the Azmi case.222 The Department of Health has also issued a 
practice guide on religion or belief (Department of Health, 2009). Other guides exist 
into the law in this area (for example, Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development, 2003) but are outdated and/or do not provide practical examples. 
 
As noted in section 7.6, some religion or belief groups expressed a preference for 
guidance which addresses the needs of their adherents. Some have produced such 
guidance. For example, the Muslim Council of Britain has produced a good practice 
guide for employers and employees on „Muslims in the workplace‟ (Muslim Council of 
Britain, 2005). It provides detailed guidance on, among other issues, how religion or 
belief intersects with other equality grounds; it notes, for example, that: 
 
It is … fundamental that Muslim employers and employees understand 
that they have an obligation to respect the rights of other minority groups 
protected by equality laws, such as women, people of different sexual 
orientations and people of other or no religious affiliations, as well as 
minorities within the Islamic faith.  
(Muslim Council of Britain, 2005: 22)  
 
Other religion or belief groups have produced more general guidance in collaboration 
with others; for example, St Ethelburga‟s Centre for Reconciliation and Peace (2008) 
has produced guidance on the provision of prayer rooms and quiet spaces in the 
workplace.  
 
Groups concerned with other equality strands have produced guidance which covers 
religion or belief; for example, Stonewall (Hunt, 2009) and Lifelong Learning UK 
(2010). Voluntary sector organisations have also done so; for example, the 
Employers Network for Equality & Inclusion (of which the former Employers Forum on 
Belief is now part) offers bespoke guidance and thematic guides on a subscription 
basis.  
 
Interviewees expressed different views on the adequacy of existing guidance. Some 
found the Acas (2010) guidance adequate to their needs, while others found it (and 
other sources) too general. These employers said that they researched issues in 










detail as they arose, seeking specific legal advice or general advice from religion or 
belief groups or organisations such as Stonewall.  
 
Overall, our research suggests that existing sources of guidance are either not in a 
useful format or are not known about. A web-based source which gathered diverse 
sources in one place would be a useful first step that the EHRC could take (see also 
section 7.6). Further, existing sources tend to cover equality law alone; new guidance 
which integrated human rights and equality case law and principles might address 
the limitations of using the equality „lens‟ in isolation.  
  
8.6  Conclusion 
Studies of management experience of handling religion or belief in the workplace 
indicate a prevailing uncertainty about how to respond to instances where an 
employee‟s religious belief appears to conflict with others‟ protection from 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. However, evidence suggests that 
such instances are rare; they can be prevented or mitigated by the development of 
policies which integrate equality and human rights principles and are promoted as 
part of a tolerant and inclusive workplace culture. An anticipatory approach is 
preferable to a reactive one.  
 
Some studies suggest that managers‟ uncertainty extends to the handling of religion 
or belief more generally, but this appears not to be uniform between different types 
and sizes of employer. Survey respondents from larger public sector employers 
expressed high levels of confidence about their knowledge and understanding and 
the policies and practices of their organisations.  
 
A fear of litigation was viewed by interviewees as a barrier to principled decision-
making; it tended to produce knee jerk decisions which may complicate the resolution 
of grievances. Managers also lamented the lack of certainty created by fact-specific 
and apparently contradictory legal judgments; however, interviewees and roundtable 
participants acknowledged that „blanket‟ rules create only an illusion of certainty and 
militate against dialogue and negotiation.  
 
Participants advocated the integration of human rights and equality principles in the 
handling of religion or belief (and indeed all equality strands). It was noted that, used 
in isolation, the equality „lens‟ can produce a narrow focus on legal compliance based 
on single characteristics, while human rights principles encourage a more holistic 
focus on individual flourishing. Indeed, this research suggests that an approach 
based on freedom of religion or belief may be more satisfactory in the long term than 
one which is based principally on equality. This in turn creates a case for 




(re)educating decision-makers about human rights as a basis for decision-making 
about religion or belief in the workplace.    
 
Some interviewees expressed a need for more accessible practice-based guidance 
on the handling of religion or belief. Equality specialists suggest that this should be 
based on principles emerging from case law as to the limited circumstances in which 
indirect discrimination may be justified, combined with steps which extend beyond 
strict legal requirements to establish „rules of thumb‟ for easily achievable, good 
practice. A web-based source which gathered existing sources in one place would be 
a valuable contribution to more confident and consistent management practice.  






9.  Implementing equality and human rights in relation to religion 
or belief in public services 
 
9.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines selected issues concerning equality, human rights and 
religion or belief that arise in the context of public services. Previous chapters 
discussed the dilemma posed by requests by public servants to abstain from certain 
tasks on conscientious grounds (for example, pharmacists; see section 6.5); and 
controversy surrounding the sexual orientation exceptions for organisations relating 
to a religion or belief that are contracted to deliver public services (section 6.7). 
Chapter 8 examined issues relating to employment in the public sector. The 
emphasis in this chapter is on the legal and practical concerns that arise in the 
design and delivery of public services. We examine (i) health and social care and (ii) 
education in view of their size and relevance to all communities in England and 
Wales. The chapter also discusses the public sector equality duty in relation to 
religion or belief and the different notions of equality that might guide its 
implementation. 
 
9.2  Health and social care 
This section examines practical concerns relating to the implementation of equality 
and human rights in relation to religion or belief in health and social care. It is not a 
comprehensive digest of matters relating to implementation, but highlights examples 
raised by our interviewees and the Cardiff roundtable of health and social care 
practitioners, as well as those that have arisen in case law.  
 
The ethics of self-disclosure  
A small number of cases have drawn attention to the ethical concerns that arise 
when health or social care practitioners discuss their religion or belief with a patient 
or service user. In one instance, a GP (Dr Richard Scott) who suggested to a 
vulnerable patient that he might benefit from a Christian faith above his own religion 
is being investigated by the General Medical Council (GMC) for having „crossed the 
line‟.223 In another, a nurse (Caroline Petrie) was suspended, but later reinstated, 
after a patient complained that she had offered to pray for her.224 
 
                                               
223 The patient complained, saying he was „very upset‟ about the consultation and what he 
saw as the „belittling‟ of his own religion. See „Christian GP “crossed the line” in discussing 
religion with patient‟, Pulse, 22 September 2011.  
 
224 „“Praying nurse” returns to work‟, The Guardian, 6 February 2009. 




The area is subject to two distinct sets of guidance; one addressed to doctors from 
the GMC and the other addressed to all practitioners from the Department of Health. 
The GMC guidance advises doctors that: 
 
You must not express to your patients your personal beliefs, including 
political, religious or moral beliefs, in ways that exploit their vulnerability or 
that are likely to cause them distress. 
(General Medical Council, 2006: 19)225  
 
In addition, doctors are advised:  
 
You must not unfairly discriminate against [patients] by allowing your 
personal views to affect adversely your professional relationship with them 
or the treatment you provide or arrange.  
(General Medical Council, 2006: 10)226  
 
The Department of Health guidance is more specific about the possible 
consequences of self-disclosure. It states that:  
 
Members of some religions … are expected to preach and to try to convert 
other people. In a workplace environment this can cause many problems, 
as non-religious people and those from other religions or beliefs could feel 
harassed and intimidated by this behaviour … [S]uch behaviour, 
notwithstanding religious beliefs, could be construed as harassment under 
the disciplinary and grievance procedures.  
(Department of Health, 2009: 22) 
  
Debate about self-disclosure intensified in 2011 with the publication of a brief 
guidance note by the Medical Defence Union (MDU).227 This cited parts of the GMC 
                                               
225 The GMC has issued supplementary guidance, which advises doctors that, „You should 
not normally discuss your personal beliefs with patients unless those beliefs are directly 
relevant to the patient‟s care. You must not impose your beliefs on patients, or cause 
distress by the inappropriate or insensitive expression of religious, political or other beliefs 
or views. Equally, you must not put pressure on patients to discuss or justify their beliefs 
(or the absence of them)‟. See General Medical Council (2008). 
  
226 As of November 2011, a new draft of this guidance is under consultation (General Medical 
Council, 2011). This appears to tighten the wording of this section of the guidance by 
removing the word „adversely‟, thereby requiring GPs to challenge their colleagues' 
behaviour if there is any effect to the professional relationship caused by their personal 
views (GMC, 2011: 17).  
 






and Department of Health guidance. However, discussion focused on a reference to 
a letter published in the Daily Telegraph in 2009 from a senior GMC official which 
stated that: 
 
Nothing in the GMC‟s guidance … precludes doctors from praying with 
their patients … Any offer to pray should follow on from a discussion which 
establishes that the patient might be receptive. It must be tactful, so that 
the patient can decline without embarrassment - because, while some 
may welcome the suggestion, others may regard it as inappropriate. 
(emphasis added)  
 
In keeping with this guidance, participants at the Cardiff roundtable suggested that 
the ethics of self-disclosure are entirely dependent on the particular context and the 
practitioner‟s relationship with the service user. Some had personal experience of 
praying with distressed patients who appeared to have found the experience „hugely 
therapeutic‟. Participants also considered it unrealistic and undesirable to place a 
practitioner‟s religion or belief entirely „out of bounds‟ of caring relationships. 
However, they observed that if expressions of the practitioner‟s religion or belief are 
not expressly requested by the service user, or are a replacement for another course 
of action such as medication, then they are likely to be unethical and unprofessional. 
In assessing whether discussions of religious matters are consensual, the relative 
vulnerability of the service user is likely to be a factor; for example, a patient might 
consent to say prayers with their doctor for fear of causing offence or damaging a 
relationship on which they depend. A subsequent complaint by a patient or service 
user would normally indicate a lack of consent.  
 
No participant at the Cardiff roundtable suggested that practitioners have a right to 
express their beliefs to patients or that this should be viewed as a matter of freedom 
of expression. The justification for self-disclosure rested wholly on the therapeutic 
value to the service user in the particular context in which it occurred. 
 
A different view was expressed by Andrea Williams of Christian Concern, who 
suggested that to deny caring professionals the right to talk about their belief: 
 
... makes us not human, not real - it‟s not natural for me not to talk about 
my faith. It‟s about the ability to be natural. [Dr Richard Scott] was being 










genuinely loving and genuinely natural - giving all the best advice and 
extending love by opening up this conversation. 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that caring professionals frequently come into 
conflict with guidelines on self-disclosure; for example, the MDU has received only 
seven queries about this area of practice in two years.228 However, participants in 
Cardiff suggested that it was crucial for practitioners to have the opportunity to 
explore their different stances and beliefs within their professional setting; „otherwise 
it all becomes very covert and that is not helpful to anyone‟. The revision of 
professional guidance, and the ongoing high-profile case concerning a GP, appear 
likely to keep this issue in the public eye.  
 
Religion or belief of service users 
 
Contextual evidence about religion or belief and health 
A review of evidence for the EHRC‟s Triennial Review, How Fair is Britain?, reveals 
large differences in self-reported health between groups defined by their religion 
(Allmark et al., 2010: 48-49).229 Muslims are the most likely to report „not good‟ health 
and also have the highest prevalence of limiting long-term illness and disability.230 
Available evidence does not suggest significant differences in indicators of common 
mental disorder between religious groups (Allmark et al., 2010: 49). Several 
qualitative studies highlight the way in which certain religious identities - notably a 
Muslim identity - may result in negative experiences in healthcare settings (Allmark et 
al., 2010: 49). Common themes include feelings of exclusion, dismissiveness and 
lack of engagement with professionals. Some particular religiously-based health 
needs or choices are not at present routinely accommodated by the NHS, such as 
the desire to avoid porcine- or alcohol-derived drugs or a preference for same-sex 
services (Allmark et al., 2010: 49). In terms of the causes of health inequalities 
between religious groups, factors include socio-economic status and deprivation; 






229 This finding is based on the 2001 Census data for Great Britain and the Health Survey for 
England 2004. 
 
230 For example, age standardised rates of limiting long-term illness (LLTI) for all people for 
Great Britain were highest among Muslims for both males (21.4 per cent) and females 
(24.3 per cent), though males and females reporting 'any other religion' and also Sikh 
females, had high rates. Jewish males (12.6 per cent) and females (12.8 per cent) were 
the least likely to report an LLTI when age standardised rates were compared (Allmark et 
al., 2010: 48). 






discrimination at societal level; unresponsive and inappropriate health service 
provision; religiously informed patterns of behaviour and life-style choices; and 
networks of association and support that shape access to information and resources 
(as well as norms and expectations of behaviour) (Allmark et al., 2010: 51). However, 
the interplay between these factors requires further explication. The interplay of 
discrimination and low social status, operating both within the healthcare sector and 
in wider society, seems to account for much of the excess health burden experienced 
by Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims (Allmark et al., 2010: 51). 
 
Department of Health guidance identifies numerous ways in which the religion or 
belief of patients or service users might impinge upon their care and treatment. 
These include: reproductive medicine, abortion, contraception and neonatal care; 
„end of life‟ concerns such as brain death, organ donations and care for the corpse; 
palliative care, including religious communities‟ interpretations of the relationship of 
body/mind/soul/spirit; the types of treatment and drugs used, such as avoidance of 
porcine-, bovine- or alcohol-based substances; gender issues, such as same-sex 
wards and respect for modesty; and spiritual interpretations of diseases, for example 
in mental health (Department of Health, 2009). It is beyond our scope to examine all 
of these; this section presents our participants‟ experience of implementation and, in 
particular, the relevance of equality and human rights standards and mechanisms.  
 
Equality and human rights impact assessments  
Participants at the Cardiff roundtable emphasised the value of Equality Impact 
Assessments (EIAs) as a means of bringing about „very positive changes to policy in 
relation to religion or belief‟. In one instance, a hospital chaplaincy team had recruited 
a Welsh-speaking Christian minister because an EIA revealed that Welsh-speaking 
patients didn‟t feel their needs were being fully met. In another, an EIA had revealed 
a gap in staff training about the sensitive handling of patients‟ sacred artefacts while 
in hospital.  
 
EIAs were viewed as particularly valuable in the context of expenditure cuts since 
they enabled decision-makers to make informed and principled decisions about the 
allocation of resources. They had also been used to improve the uptake of services. 
For example, an EIA had highlighted barriers that some religious communities 
perceived to becoming blood donors. Discussion groups with different religious 
communities had clarified the nature of their misgivings, which ranged from 
theological understandings to concerns among Muslim women about lying uncovered 
on a bed while blood was taken. This had led to some women-only sessions and the 
provision of blankets to cover donors during the procedure. Faith-based focus groups 
had also been used to seek to improve the uptake of cancer services among some 




minority religious communities. One equality specialist in an NHS Trust commented 
that wards for cancer patients had religious guides to support staff decision-making 
about, for example, end of life care. The Trust had also recruited lay chaplains and 
developed a contact sheet to ensure patients‟ religious needs were met in an 
emergency.  
 
These examples from Wales indicate the utility of proactive equality mechanisms to 
identify and address needs arising from patients‟ religion or belief. Participants in 
Cardiff also emphasised the value of human rights principles and the Human Rights 
Act (HRA) as a vehicle for enabling practitioners who design services „to think about 
them in the context of dignity and respect‟. Participants suggested that integrated 
equality and human rights assessments were a useful way of carrying out a holistic 
appraisal of an individual‟s needs, whether related to their religion or belief or any 
other aspect of their identity. Human rights „created the space for conversations to be 
had around difficult issues within organisations‟, including religion or belief. 
Participants noted that voluntary sector organisations and institutions, such as the 
Children‟s Commissioner for Wales, had „driven discussions about dignity and 
respect in public services‟, underpinned by a focus on both national and international 
human rights obligations.231  
 
However, the Cardiff roundtable provided evidence that implementation may fall short 
of human rights standards, particularly in relation to groups that lack a powerful 
voice. One participant familiar with children‟s services noted that children‟s religious 
identity was frequently overlooked by practitioners; for example, children were not 
always able to access chaplaincy services. Thus „the most voiceless sector of the 
community gets the least focus on how services ought to be provided in terms of any 
sort of faith identity‟. 
  
Religion or belief and mental health 
Department of Health guidance notes that some religious interpretations of mental 
health conditions are different from medical interpretations. For example, it states 
that some religious communities might interpret mental illnesses as a spiritual reality 
caused by, for instance, a demonic attack to which the appropriate response is 
religious, not medical, intervention (Department of Health, 2009: 33). Practitioners in 
Cardiff noted that, while mental health may be subject to different understandings, it 
                                               
231 The mandate of the Children‟s Commissioner for Wales is expressly based on the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). See http://www.childcom.org.uk/en/about-
us/. Children‟s rights have been especially prominent in the policy landscape in Wales. 
Under the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011, Welsh Ministers 
have a general duty to have regard to the CRC with respect to new laws or policies from 
May 2012 and in the exercise of any of their functions from May 2014. 






was important not to create an „urban mythology‟ about the attitudes of certain 
religious communities. Well-intentioned efforts to provide culturally- and religiously-
sensitive services could have the unintended consequence of attributing to 
communities or individuals beliefs that they may not, in fact, hold. One mental health 
specialist commented that:  
 
If a group does see things differently to how I would see mental illness and 
psychiatric services, our role is purely to uphold that person‟s right to 
quality services, dignity and respect; access to information, advocacy and 
so on, rather than to seek to influence how any individual or group might 
see their mental health. 
 
This participant added that people with mental health problems (and especially those 
in hospital) were commonly unable to exercise their right to practice their religion or 
belief. This could sometimes be complicated by the fact that people in a psychotic 
state commonly display florid symptoms focused on religion, even if they have no 
religious belief before becoming unwell. This had sometimes become a barrier to 
giving serious consideration to the needs of mental health patients in relation to 
religion or belief.  
 
Supporting confident decision-making 
Participants at the Cardiff roundtable and some interviewees commented on the 
need for greater religious and cultural „competence‟ among practitioners. Participants 
noted that even relatively experienced staff could be tentative and lack confidence 
when discussing religion or belief and fearful of exposing gaps in their knowledge or 
understanding. As one noted:  
 
We need to develop … the positive skills of cultural competence - to say, 
„that is different - tell me about it‟, rather than „that is different - let's not go 
there‟. 
  
Another noted that religion and sexuality were issues where people start to shut 
down: 
 
The starting point is fear … The vocabulary and the milieu in which you 
can share these concepts and ideas - it‟s almost prohibited. 
 
These comments again underline the benefit of using equality and human rights 
mechanisms to create a space in which sensitive issues can be addressed and 
competing interests balanced. Nevertheless, participants in Cardiff suggested that 




there was considerable scepticism amongst „decision-making establishments‟ in the 
health and social care sector about the need for proactive equality or human rights 
approaches. Such approaches were viewed as requiring a „business case‟ and as 
secondary to clinical safety. The result was often a „tick box‟ approach. The 
roundtable emphasised the importance of leadership - from, among other actors, the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) - to champion equality and human 
rights standards and principles as policy tools at a time of shrinking resources.  
9.3 Education 
This section examines issues of equality and human rights that arise in relation to 
religion or belief in schools.232 Sandberg (2011a: 166) notes that laws concerning 
religious education and worship in schools, and the legal status of schools 
designated as having a religious character, are complex and contradictory.233 
Moreover, it is questionable whether they are sustainable in the light of changing 
social norms; increased protection for the rights of the child; and the development of 
equality and human rights law (Hepple, 2011: 119; Sandberg, 2011a: 150).  
 
This section considers five broad areas in relation to equality and human rights:  
 
 admissions;  
 employment of teaching staff;  
 religious education;  
 religious worship; and 
 reasonable accommodation of religion or belief.  
 
                                               
232 For comprehensive accounts of the law relating to religion or belief in education, see 
Knights (2007, Chapter 4); Rivers (2010, Chapter 8); and Sandberg (2011a, Chapter 8). 
Dinham and Jackson (2012) examine religion in relation to educational provision since the 
Second World War, focusing on policy initiatives.  
 
233 Schools with a religious character are colloquially known as „faith schools‟; however, this 
term is misleading as schools without a religious character cannot be viewed as secular in 
view of the law on religious education and collective worship (Rivers, 2010: 234; 
Sandberg, 2011a: 160-61). 
 






Admissions criteria based on religion or belief 
State-maintained schools may be designated as having a religious character when 
they are established by a religious body or for religious purposes.234 The Equality Act 
2010 contains an exception applying to such schools which permits them to give 
preference to members of their own religion or belief when they are 
oversubscribed.235 The exception only applies to religion or belief discrimination; 
schools with a religious character cannot discriminate on other grounds such as race.  
 
The JFS case 
The distinction between religion or belief and race is not watertight. In R (E) v JFS 
Governing Body, the Supreme Court ruled by a narrow margin that a state-funded 
school for Orthodox Jews which tested applicants for matrilineal descent was acting 
on the basis of ethnic origin, meaning that their admission requirement constituted 
direct racial discrimination (Barber, 2010: Cranmer 2010a; Graham, 2012: 95-97). 
The judgment was welcomed by some for preserving the same protection against 
racial discrimination for Jews as for other groups.236 
 
                                               
234 These may be „foundation‟ or „voluntary‟ schools. Foundation schools are run by their own 
governing body, which employs the staff and sets the admissions criteria. Voluntary 
schools are those established by voluntary bodies (as opposed to „community‟ schools 
which are established by the state). Voluntary schools are divided into „voluntary-aided‟ 
and „voluntary-controlled‟ schools. Voluntary-aided schools are virtually all religious in 
character. As with foundation schools, the governing body employs the staff and sets the 
admissions criteria. Voluntary-controlled schools are run by the local authority and, as with 
community schools, the local authority employs the staff and sets the admissions criteria; 
however, this may include allowing the school to discriminate on grounds of religion or 
belief. Independent schools, which are funded by fees mainly paid by parents, may also 
be designated as having a religious character. Another type of school is supplementary 
schools that operate (largely unregulated) outside the mainstream education system, such 
as Muslim madrassas (Cherti and Bradley, 2011). Discussion in this chapter focuses on 




235 Equality Act 2010, Schedule 11, para. 5. As explained above, voluntary-aided schools 
with a religious character control their own admissions policy and therefore have wide 
discretion to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief. Some voluntary-controlled 
schools also discriminate on grounds of religion in their admissions. Research by the 
Accord coalition found that around one third of local authorities that have one or more 
voluntary-controlled schools with a religious character in their jurisdiction permit those 
schools to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in some way when they are 
oversubscribed. Changes to admissions procedures for voluntary-controlled schools are 
subject to local consultation. See http://accordcoalition.org.uk/campaigning-for-inclusive-
admissions-in-local-voluntary-controlled-faith-schools/. 
 
236 For example, the Equality and Human Rights Commission intervened in the case in 
support of the claimant; see http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/hafan/canolfan-
cyfryngau/2009/december/commission-welcomes-supreme-court-ruling/. 




However, it caused considerable controversy among communities adhering to the 
Orthodox Jewish tradition. According to David Frei of the United Synagogue, the 
judgment „fundamentally misunderstands the nature of our religion‟. Frei commented 
that the „artificial‟ religious practice test set out in the JFS judgment (based on, for 
example, dietary laws, observance of the Sabbath and regular attendance at a 
synagogue) „flies in the face‟ of the Orthodox religious law of matrilineal descent:  
  
We‟ve had to invent forms of religious practice which are sufficient to 
satisfy the Supreme Court‟s new definition of [who is Jewish], whilst not at 
the same time deterring Jewish children coming to these schools, who 
may come from homes which are not [religiously observant]. 
 
McCrudden (2011: 30) comments that the case highlights the potential conflict 
between the individualistic and associational aspects of freedom of religion. 
Moreover, it raises difficult questions about how far courts can „truly understand a 
normative system other than the legal system‟ (see also section 5.4). The claimant in 
the JFS case considered himself Jewish while the Office of the Chief Rabbi did not. 
The court was thus faced with considering evidence as to who was regarded as 
Jewish by different traditions of Judaism. Jon Benjamin of the Board of Deputies of 
British Jews noted that the JFS case had created the possibility of legal challenge to 
other faith-based welfare services; for example, Jewish youth groups or homes for 
the elderly:  
 
The concern is that Jewish people should have access to the services 
they need … and if equality laws force [services] to throw open their gates, 
that could have a significant impact on the provision of scarce resources 
tailored to the specific needs of one community.  
  
The principles at stake in the JFS case are likely to continue to reverberate. The case 
illustrates the uncertainty surrounding the interface between racial and religious 
discrimination (Rivers, 2010: 257). More broadly, it highlights the distinction between 
the private sphere of a religious community and how state-funded bodies with a 
religious character may act in the public arena.  
 
Other equality and human rights concerns relating to faith-based admissions  
According to Hepple (2011: 119), an unresolved issue is whether the fact that the law 
allows publicly funded schools to use faith-based admissions criteria is compatible 
with Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
(the right to education) and Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination). Sooner or 
later, Hepple argues, the government is likely to be called upon to provide evidence 






to support a defence that this discrimination because of religion or belief is necessary 
and proportionate in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others under Article 9(2) ECHR. Such concerns have become more 
acute, he argues, „in the context of the envisaged growth of academy or “free” 
schools which are not accountable to local authorities‟.237  
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) expressed concern about faith-based 
admissions in its scrutiny of the Equality Bill (JCHR, 2010). It noted that the 
government‟s principal justification for permitting schools with a religious character to 
discriminate on religious grounds in their admissions policies is that it is necessary in 
order to protect the right of parents (under Article 2 Protocol 1 ECHR) to access 
education for their children in accordance with their religious convictions (JCHR, 
2010: 7-8). The JCHR was not persuaded by this justification because Article 2 
Protocol 1 does not, in fact, impose a duty on the state to establish schools with a 
religious character; for example, it cannot be relied upon by Muslim parents to 
require the state to establish Muslim schools in areas where only schools of other 
faiths exist.  
 
The JCHR (2010: 8) was also unconvinced by the argument that schools with a 
religious character must be able to have faith-based admissions criteria in order to 
maintain their distinctiveness and a „plurality of provision‟. Evidence adduced in 
relation to Church of England schools suggested that plurality of provision had been 
preserved even where those schools did not have faith-based admissions criteria.238 
The JCHR noted that the argument about preserving plurality may carry more weight 
in relation to other schools with a religious character such as Jewish, Muslim, Hindu 
or Catholic schools since there are far fewer of these schools for families to choose 
                                               
237 Academies that are designated as having a religious character are allowed by law to give 
priority to faith applicants if they are oversubscribed; see 
http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/leadership/typesofschools/b0066996/faith-
schools/faith. „Free‟ schools (new academies that do not replace predecessor schools) 
must allow for 50 per cent of places to be allocated to children without reference to faith if 




238 See, for example, evidence presented to the JCHR by the Church of England which 
states that „our schools continue to be for those of no faith, those of other faiths and those 
of the Christian faith‟ (JCHR, 2009: Ev 190). 
 




from.239 Overall, the JCHR (2010: 9) concluded that „the exemption permitting faith 
schools to discriminate in their admissions on grounds of religion or belief may be 
overdrawn‟. 
 
The social impact of religious discrimination in school admissions is a matter of 
contention. There is evidence that schools with faith-based admissions criteria may 
favour those from higher socio-economic backgrounds (Tough and Brooks, 2007: 
16). For example, a study of schools in London with faith-based admissions criteria 
showed that they have higher ability and lower free school meal intakes compared to 
the neighbourhoods in which they are located (Allen and West, 2009).240 In relation to 
school admissions, controversy has also surrounded the practice of some schools 
with a religious character of interviewing pupils and parents, ostensibly to assess the 
commitment of the family to the religious faith, and whether such practices are a form 
of covert selection and therefore unfair (Meredith, 2006).241 Concerns are also 
expressed about the effect of faith-based admissions criteria on community cohesion, 
particularly in areas where there is a high degree of residential segregation 
(Berkeley, 2008; Cantle et al., 2009; Oldham Independent Review, 2001).242 More 
generally, „the genuineness of faith schools is routinely undermined by frequent 
media reports of parents becoming “religious” so that their children can attend what 
they perceive to be better schools‟ (Sandberg, 2011a: 160).  
 
The Church of England (Church of England Board of Education and National Society 
for Promoting Religious Education, 2011: 2) acknowledges that in relation to primary 
                                               
239 As of January 2011, there were almost 7,000 schools with a religious character, or 
roughly one-third of the total number of state-funded schools. Around two-thirds of these 
were Church of England schools and a third Catholic. All but 58 state-funded schools with 
a religious character were associated with the major Christian denominations. Around 60 
per cent of schools with a religious character are voluntary-aided schools. See 
http://education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s001012/sfr12-2011.pdf. 
 
240 The study noted, however, that these differences between voluntary-aided and community 
schools vary geographically; they are very marked in London and quite marked in the 
north-west, but the differences are less pronounced in other regions. 
 
241 The Church of England‟s advice to its schools is that when deciding membership or 
commitment to the Church, „the only criterion to be taken into account is attendance at 
worship‟ (Church of England Board of Education and National Society for Promoting 
Religious Education, 2011: 7). 
 
242 Teaching unions and others have criticised a provision in the Education Bill 2011 to 











school admissions, „where there is a very heavy demand for places … the 
relationship between admissions based on church affiliation and on local residence 
can be a cause of contention‟. However, it says that in the „vast majority of primary 
schools this is not an issue‟. The Church notes that its secondary schools have a 
wide variety of patterns in admissions: most offer places on a neighbourhood basis, 
while a minority stipulate a percentage of faith-based places (typically 50 to 80 per 
cent of places). Recently revised advice to Diocesan Boards of Education on 
admissions notes that:  
 
Church of England schools should be able to show how their Admissions 
Policy and practice demonstrates the school‟s commitment both to 
distinctiveness and inclusivity, to church families and the wider community. 
(Church of England Board of Education and National Society for 
Promoting Religious Education, 2011: 5) 
 
The Bishop of Oxford, the Right Reverend John Pritchard, who heads the Church of 
England's Board of Education, had previously said that a maximum of 10 to 15 per 
cent of foundation places „feels right‟ to keep the ethos of a Christian school while 
serving the community.243 However, the revised advice to diocesan boards does not 
specify an optimum percentage of „open‟ and „foundation‟ places, noting that in 
individual schools, the balance between them will depend on ethos, history and 
tradition, and local circumstances.244 The advice document notes that the Church of 
England national office will regularly review the national picture of admissions 
arrangements in Church of England schools and will report biennially to the Church 
and to government starting in September 2012.  
 
Faith-based admissions policies are likely to become more rather than less 
widespread with changes contained in the Education Act 2011 which make it easier 
to establish voluntary-aided schools.245 In November 2011, the Accord Coalition246 
                                               
243 See „Bishop: Open school access even if standards fall‟, BBC News website, 22 April 
2011. 
 
244 Foundation places are those offered to „children whose parent(s) or carers are faithful and 
regular worshippers in an Anglican or other Christian Church‟. Open places are those 
available for children from the local neighbourhood, irrespective of religious affiliation. 
 
245 Schedule 11 of the Act removes the requirement for those wishing to establish a 
voluntary-aided school to get prior consent from the Secretary of State. 
 
246 Among other issues, Accord campaigns „to make admissions and recruitment policies in 
all state-funded schools free from discrimination on grounds of religion or belief‟. It 
includes religious groups, humanists, trade unions and human rights campaigners. See 
www.accordcoalition.org.uk.  




launched a campaign to prevent voluntary-controlled schools with a religious 
character from being able to discriminate on grounds of religion in their admissions.  
 
Alison Ryan, Policy Adviser of the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL), 
called for more nuanced equality and diversity arguments to be developed in relation 
to school admissions; for example, minority religion or belief groups might argue on 
egalitarian grounds for more schools based on their faith in order to redress the 
present balance. However: 
 
What concerns ATL is where people interpret diversity as „if you have one 
of those, we want one too and we‟ll all be separate enclaves‟. We don‟t 
think that‟s a worthy aim. 
  
Paul Pettinger of the Accord Coalition argued that the impact of faith-based 
admissions policies requires further research, since it is not known how many 
children lose out on a place at their local or preferred school because they have the 
„wrong‟ religion or no religion.  
 
Employment of teaching staff 
Under the School Standards and Framework Act (SSFA) 1998, in foundation or 
voluntary-controlled schools with a religious character, „reserve‟ teachers can be 
appointed who are selected for their fitness to give the required religious education 
and are specifically appointed to do so.247 In the case of „reserved‟ teachers, 
preference can be given in the appointment, pay and promotion of people holding 
those posts to persons whose religious opinions accord with those of the school or 
who attend religious worship or who give (or are willing to give) religious 
education.248 The holders of reserved posts can be dismissed by reference to any 
conduct incompatible with the religion of the school; this might include conduct in the 
teacher‟s private life.249 In a voluntary-controlled school with a religious character, the 
number of such reserved teachers may not exceed one-fifth of the total number of 
teachers.250 In a voluntary-aided school, all teachers may be treated as reserve 
teachers.251  
 
                                               
247 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, Section 58(2). 
 
248 Section 60(3), (5)(a). 
 
249 Section 60(3), (5)(b). 
 
250 Section 58(3). 
 
251 Section 60(5). 






The JCHR (2010: 6-7) argued that these provisions may be in breach of the 2000 
European Union Framework Employment Directive, on the basis that „the reservation 
of such posts is not restricted to circumstances where it can be shown that a 
genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement to adhere to a particular 
religious belief can be said to exist‟ (see also Vickers, 2009b). Formal complaints to 
this effect have been made to the European Commission by the British Humanist 
Association and the National Secular Society (British Humanist Association, 2011b: 
National Secular Society, 2011: 2). 
 
Several interviewees for this project expressed concern about the practical impact of 
these provisions in the SSFA. Paul Pettinger noted that it is difficult to gather 
evidence beyond the anecdotal as to their impact since information about 
employment practice is often confidential and is highly variable between schools. 
Alison Ryan commented that such evidence as does exist suggests that the 
provisions:  
 
… create real problems for someone who is not religious, or has a 
different religion, or simply chooses not to use their religion and wants to 
get a job on their own merits. People will self-select and not think of 
applying to certain schools with prescriptive practices … Gay teachers 
especially feel more vulnerable.  
 
These interviewees expressed further concern about a clause in the Education Bill 
which introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to permit voluntary-
controlled schools that transfer to Academy status to apply preference in the 
appointment, promotion or remuneration of all teachers in accordance with the 
religious tenets of the school; that is, to give them the same freedom to discriminate 
as that enjoyed by voluntary-aided schools.252 The BHA (2011a: 2) notes that this 
measure could potentially extend discrimination on religious grounds to many posts 




                                               
252 Clause 58 of the Education Bill introduced on 27 January 2011; Clause 62 in the version 
of the Bill as amended at 2 November 2011.  
 
253 The BHA (2011a: 2) quotes Minister of State for Schools Nick Gibb as stating that „the 
Secretary of State would only allow this change when a strong proposal was made and a 
thorough consultation was carried out‟. However, the BHA notes that there is no statutory 
guarantee that future Secretaries of State will not simply allow all schools to make this 
change. 
 




Religious education  
Religious education (RE) is compulsory in all state-funded schools. It is not part of 
the national curriculum but is determined locally.  
 
RE in schools without a religious character 
In schools without a religious character, RE must be „in the main Christian, whilst 
taking account of the teaching and practices of the other principal religions 
represented in Great Britain‟.254 As Sandberg (2011a: 155) notes, the law appears to 
walk a tightrope. For example, it is forbidden for RE to be taught by means of „any 
catechism or formulary which is distinctive of a particular religious denomination (but 
this is not to be taken as prohibiting provision in such a syllabus for the study of such 
catechisms or formularies)‟.255 Thus, the law embodies an assumption that 
Christianity is the norm, whilst also recognising religious plurality and requiring 
religious neutrality.256  
 
The precise balance is determined by local regulatory bodies known as Standing 
Advisory Councils for Religious Education (SACREs), which advise local authorities 
on matters of RE and collective worship (see Department for Children, Schools and 
Families, 2010, Chapter 4). Interviewees generally endorsed the SACRE model as a 
means of harnessing local knowledge and ensuring local accountability. However, 
there is some controversy around membership of SACREs, since there is no 
requirement for them to include representatives of non-religious belief groups such 
as humanists, as would be required if the law were to be read in compliance with the 
Human Rights Act (HRA). In practice, some SACREs address this anomaly by co-
opting humanists as members.257  
 
                                               
254 Education Act 1996, section 375(3). 
 
255 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, schedule 19, para. 2(5). 
 
256 The case of Lautsi v Italy No. 30814/06, 18.3.2011 illustrates the unsettled nature of 
debate about religion in schools at the European level. The Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that the compulsory display of crucifixes 
in Italian classrooms does not restrict the right of parents to educate their children in 
conformity with their convictions and the right of schoolchildren to believe or not believe. 
This overturned a previous unanimous Chamber judgment. The Grand Chamber held (at 
paras. 71-72) that the cross was a „passive symbol‟ which did not „denote a process of 
indoctrination‟ on the state‟s part. The case placed great emphasis on the „margin of 
appreciation‟ – that is, the discretion that the ECtHR grants states in fulfilling their 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. It noted (at para. 70) that 
there is „no European consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols in 
state schools‟. For discussion of this case, see McGoldrick (2011). 
 
257 See http://www.humanism.org.uk/education/sacres-and-ascs/about-sacres. See also 
Dinham and Jackson (2012: 294, note 4). 






The law provides for the accommodation of the religion or belief of parents. In 
schools without a religious character, parents may request that a pupil be „wholly or 
partly excused‟ from receiving RE and the pupil will be so excused until the request is 
withdrawn.258 Teachers‟ religious freedom is also protected; for example, none can 
be required to teach RE.259 Several interviewees noted that the law is anomalous in 
not expressly protecting children‟s right to religious freedom. As Sandberg (2011a: 
157) argues, this appears out of step with the shift towards greater protection for the 
rights of the child and the fact that courts have entertained religious freedom claims 
from schoolchildren; for example, in the cases of Begum, Watkins-Singh and 
Playfoot.  
 
RE in schools with a religious character 
In foundation or voluntary-controlled schools with a religious character, the rules are 
broadly similar to those which apply in a school without a religious character. In both, 
RE must be in accordance with an agreed syllabus and must be non-
denominational.260 A key difference relates to parental rights: whereas in schools 
without a religious character, parents have the right to opt out of RE, in foundation or 
voluntary-controlled schools, parents have a right to opt in; that is, to request that 
their children receive RE in accordance with the religion or religious denomination of 
the school.261 As with admissions and employment, voluntary-aided schools with a 
religious character enjoy more freedom than foundation or voluntary-controlled 
schools (Petchey, 2008). In these schools, RE must be in accordance with the 
religion or religious denomination of the school.262 There is a parental right to opt out 
of this denominational education and receive the kind of non-denominational RE that 
they would in schools without a religious character.263 
 
Some commentators question the adequacy of the opt-out clause as a means of 
protecting the religious liberty of individuals who do not want to participate in the 
teaching of doctrinal religion where the pressure to conform may be great 
(Mawhinney, 2006; Mawhinney et al., 2012). Several interviewees noted that parents 
                                               
258 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, section 71(1) 
 
259 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, section 59(3) 
 
260 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, Schedule 19, paras. 2(5) and 3  
 
261 Schedule 19, para. 3(3) 
 
262 Schedule 19, para. 4 
 
263 Schedule 19, paras. 4(3)-(4); this applies if it is not reasonably convenient for parents to 
send their children to a school in which a non-denominational syllabus is in use. 
 




and children do not always know about their right to opt out and may fear becoming 
isolated if they exercise it. Joyce Miller, Vice Chair of the Religious Education Council 
of England and Wales, argued for a broad and non-instructional approach to RE: 
 
It‟s a fundamental principle that RE in community schools should never 
suggest that one religion is better than another or that having a religious 
interpretation of life is intrinsically better than having a non-religious 
interpretation of life. Everything should be open and „up for grabs‟ ... the 
values of critical engagement and a wish to understand and learn from 
what others believe are what underpins it all.264 
 
Several interviewees observed that where voluntary-aided schools present their  
religious tenets as objective truth, and do not include the perspectives of other 
religions or of those with no religion, children‟s right to freedom of religion or belief 
may be compromised, since it cannot be assumed that children share their parents' 
religion. Several interviewees expressed particular concern about the teaching of 
creationism and „intelligent design‟ in „free‟ schools and academies which control 
their own curriculum.265  
 
Exemption of the curriculum and RE from the prohibition of discrimination 
Some interviewees expressed concern about the fact that the Equality Act 2010 
contains a broad exemption for the content of the curriculum and of RE from the 
prohibition of discrimination on any protected characteristic - including sexual 
orientation.266 In its scrutiny of the Equality Bill, the JCHR (2009: 72) was concerned 
by the risk that, if the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
                                               
264 See also the practice code for RE teachers developed by the Religious Education Council 
of England and Wales (2009: 2), which urges teachers to „strive for fair and accurate 
representation of religious and non-religious beliefs by drawing on sound scholarship and 
a range of voices‟. 
 
265 There are no definitive data on the number of UK schools which teach creationism. The 
Department for Education states that, „We do not expect creationism, intelligent design 
and similar ideas to be taught as valid scientific theories in any state-funded school‟. See 
http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/leadership/typesofschools/freeschools/freeschoolsfa
qs/a0075656/free-schools-faqs-curriculum/#faq4. However, in August 2011, an 
evangelical church's bid to open a free school passed the first round of the selection 
process, despite announcing that it planned to teach creationism in science lessons; see 
„Free school with creationism on the agenda is on the eve of bearing fruit‟, Times 
Educational Supplement, 12 August 2011. 
 
266 Equality Act 2010, section 89(2). The Equality Act 2006 exempted the content of the 
curriculum and the teaching of RE from the prohibition on discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief alone. The exemption contained in the 2010 Act is thus significantly 
broader. 
 






did not apply to the curriculum, „homosexual pupils would be subjected to teaching, 
as part of the religious education or other curriculum, that their sexual orientation is 
sinful or morally wrong‟.  
 
The 2010 Act does include in the prohibition of discrimination the delivery of the 
curriculum, i.e. the way in which education is provided.267 The government had 
sought to reassure the JCHR that this provision would ensure that schools which 
teach the tenets of their faith, including the views of that faith on sexual orientation 
and same-sex relationships, could not „present these views in a hectoring or 
harassing or bullying way which may be offensive to individual pupils or single out 
individual pupils for criticism‟ (JCHR, 2009: 73). The JCHR was not persuaded by 
this argument. It argued that the broad exemption covering the curriculum and RE 
was „likely to lead to unjustifiable discrimination against gay pupils‟. It noted that there 
was an important distinction between a curriculum which imparts to pupils in a 
descriptive way the fact that certain religions view homosexuality as sinful and 
morally wrong, and a curriculum which teaches a particular religion‟s doctrinal 
beliefs as if they were objectively true. In the latter case:  
 
It is the content of the curriculum (the teaching that homosexuality is 
wrong), not its presentation, that is discriminatory.  
(emphasis in original) 
 
Non-statutory advice for schools issued by the Department for Education (2011a) on 
the 2010 Act does not directly address this issue. It is not possible to quantify the 
extent to which the JCHR‟s concerns are borne out in practice. By way of context, 
there is evidence that young people who attend secondary schools with a religious 
character in Britain are more likely to report homophobic bullying than their peers in 
schools without a religious character (Hunt and Jensen, 2007: 3). The JCHR (2009: 
72-73) notes that the breadth of the exemption covering the curriculum and RE 
makes it difficult to see „how a gay pupil … who felt that they were being taught that 
they are of less moral worth because of an inherent characteristic‟, could invoke any 
protections under equality law. This creates at the minimum a requirement to monitor 
the impact of the newly-broadened exemption, in particular on lesbian, gay, bisexual 





                                               
267 Equality Act 2010, Section 85(2)(a). 
 





It is compulsory for all state-funded schools to hold a daily act of collective 
worship.268 In schools without a religious character, this must be „wholly or mainly of 
a broadly Christian character‟.269 In schools with a religious character, worship must 
be in accordance with that character.270 Parents have a right to withdraw children and 
children over the age of 16 have a right to withdraw themselves from daily worship.271  
 
Several interviewees and participants in the London roundtable argued that the law 
on collective worship is unsatisfactory and unworkable. Some questioned why pupils‟ 
right to opt out is limited to those over the age of 16. Joyce Miller noted that the law 
and government guidance on it are „a mess‟ and may appear to provide protection for 
proselytising groups to carry out their activities in schools. The BHA (2011a) argues 
that the law „impedes schools‟ ability to provide good inclusive assemblies, is 
prescriptive and in practice is widely flouted‟. Knights (2007: 113) suggests that the 
law „seems out of kilter with the notion of a multicultural society and may not reflect 
the religious beliefs of the majority in any event‟ (see also Mawhinney, 2006). As with 
RE, there is concern that parents and pupils may not know about their right to opt 
out; moreover, as Paul Pettinger noted, pupils who do so may feel isolated and risk 
missing out on other aspects of the assembly, including ethical and moral discussion.  
 
The law does permit flexibility. In the case of schools without a religious character, 
the requirements do not apply to every act of worship, but to „most such acts‟ in a 
given school term, with the precise balance to be determined by SACREs at a local 
level.272 In some cases, SACREs have agreed determinations for schools to have 
worship that is multi-faith rather than of a broadly Christian character (see, for 
example, Brent SACRE, 2006: 4, 26-30). Such determinations are made upon 
application by the school, not by parents or pupils, although the school may choose 
to consult them (Department for Education, 1994: 22-23). Moreover, the flexibility in 
the law allows schools that so choose to make all their acts of worship wholly 
Christian and instructional. The law thus affords relatively little power in relation to 
collective worship to parents or pupils, and no direct recourse save that of opting out 
if, for example, a school decides to change from one arrangement to another.  
 
                                               
268 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, Section 70. 
 
269 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, Schedule 20, para. 3(2). 
 
270 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, Schedule 20, para. 5.  
 
271 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, Sections 71, 71A. 
 
272 Schools Standards and Framework Act 1998, Schedule 20, para. 4. 






Reasonable accommodation of religion or belief in schools 
Several high-profile cases have concerned pupils‟ right to wear clothes or jewellery in 
observance of their religion or belief; for example, Begum, Watkins-Singh and 
Playfoot. As noted in section 6.2, schools may find themselves on the „front line‟ of 
decision-making about the complex social and political challenges posed by 
multiculturalism and questions of identity - decisions which may need to withstand 
considerable scrutiny as claims make their way into legal process. Kathryn James, 
Director of Policy of the National Association of Head Teachers, noted that schools 
needed clear guidance, for example in relation to uniform and access to prayer 
rooms: 
 
The law is not clear for schools. It feels as if it is a minefield for many 
school leaders ... Such issues can disrupt schools for days while there is 
discussion about what can be allowed and what is discriminatory. 
 
Some guidance has been produced by government (Department for Education, 
2011b), as well as by religion or belief groups (for example, Muslim Council of Britain, 
2007) and other agencies (Coles, 2008). There may be value in the EHRC making 
such guidance available in a single place. It is also important that guidance goes 
beyond minimum compliance to establish easily achievable good practice in relation 
to the accommodation of religion or belief in schools.  
 
Interviewees offered several instances of such practice; for example, Reverend Alan 
Green of Tower Hamlets Inter Faith Forum noted that it was part of the „hospitable 
culture‟ of Church of England schools to serve halal food for Muslim pupils. 
Interviewees also related how tensions relating to religious dress had been resolved 
through negotiation; for example, in relation to pupils who wished to wear a niqab veil 
(the solution being for them to wear the full veil while outside the school gates but to 
make arrangements such that these could be taken off during the school day). Joyce 
Miller argued that such accommodations:   
 
… depend on the school being a respectful place where people are not 
going to be subjected to any sort of inappropriate behaviour … 
Accommodation is the only sensible way of dealing with these issues, 
otherwise it becomes confrontational and it always emphasises „the other‟, 
whereas what we should be talking about is a community that feels safe 
and secure for everyone that‟s in it.  
 




The principle of personal autonomy equally extends to the right to opt-out of blanket 
policies that insist upon the wearing of religious dress (Kazi, 2010) (see also section 
7.7). 
 
Several interviewees expressed concern that the proliferation of schools that are 
accountable to central rather than local government may risk depriving them of the 
experience that local authorities have developed in managing issues relating to 
religion or belief in schools, especially in areas with high religious diversity.  
 
Summary of issues relating to religion or belief in schools  
Sandberg (2011a: 168) argues that the law concerning religion in schools appears 
„outmoded‟ and in tension with the „new religion law‟ based on human rights and 
equality. Concerns identified in this section include the necessity and proportionality 
of faith-based admissions policies. They also include the wide discretion given to 
voluntary-aided schools to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in the 
employment of all teachers, without there being any requirement to demonstrate that 
a genuine, legitimate and justified occupational requirement exists. The law also 
appears out of step in not expressly protecting the rights of the child; for example, in 
relation to RE and collective worship. The entry into the education system of new 
religious providers setting up „free‟ schools and academies, and the likely expansion 
in the number of voluntary-aided schools, is likely to heighten concerns. There is a 
need to monitor the practical impact of discrimination that is permitted within the 
education system, in relation to admissions; employment; and the broad exemption 
for the content of the curriculum and RE from the prohibition of discrimination, 
particularly in relation to sexual orientation. This role might be taken on by the EHRC 
or the JCHR, as well as by civil society organisations. 
 
9.4 Public sector equality duty 
As explained in section 4.3, the Equality Act 2010 extends and strengthens the public 
sector equality duties which previously applied only to race, sex and disability 
(Vickers, 2011: 136-38). The new single general public sector equality duty applies to 
all protected characteristics, including religion or belief. The duty has three elements. 
Public authorities must have due regard to the need to:  
 
 eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is 
prohibited by the Act;  
 
 advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant charac-
teristic and persons who do not share it; and 
 






 foster good relations between persons who share a relevant characteristic and 
persons who do not share it).273 
As the duty only came into force in April 2011, assessment of its practical impact is 
premature.274 This section discusses the problems and opportunities presented by 
the implementation of the duty in relation to religion or belief. 
Concerns about the public sector equality duty in relation to religion or belief  
Some commentators and participants in this research are opposed in principle to the 
inclusion of religion or belief in the new single duty and/or express strongly negative 
views about its likely impact - but for different reasons and from different 
perspectives.  
 
At the level of principle, the concern is that the duty will „lead to a greater visibility for 
religion in the public sphere, and, if only as a product of its higher visibility, that will 
involve some level of acceptance or normalising of religion in public life‟ (Vickers, 
2011: 146). The suggestion is that, even though the duty also covers lack of religion 
or belief, its inevitable consequence will be to imply an endorsement of religious 
belief on the part of public authorities.  
  
In some cases, the reservations expressed echo concerns about the general anti-
discrimination protection for religion and belief; for example, concerns that religion or 
belief is essentially different from other characteristics and liable to be in tension with 
some of them (see section 6.3; see also Vickers, 2011: 138-42) and that it is 
sometimes hard to define (section 5.2).  
 
The National Secular Society and some humanist participants also had misgivings 
about transposing a duty conceived in the context of race, gender and disability into 
the more contested realm of religion and belief. David Pollock noted that religions 
and beliefs, unlike all the other protected characteristics, make potentially 
                                               
273 Equality Act 2010, Part 11, Section 149 
 
274 In addition, the specific duties that are designed help public bodies perform the general 
equality duty better only came into force in England in September 2011. These duties, 
contained in the Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011, require public 
bodies to be transparent about how they are responding to the equality duty; for example, 
by requiring them to publish relevant, proportionate information showing compliance with 
the equality duty and to set equality objectives. Lessons may be learned from the 
experience of implementing Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Section 75 
places a duty on public authorities to have due regard to the need to promote equality of 
opportunity on nine grounds, including „religious belief‟, and regard to the desirability of 
promoting good relations on three grounds, also including „religious belief‟.  
 




controversial claims about the world and how one should behave; he feared that 
some more vocal religion or belief groups might use the duty to „stir up a hornets‟ 
nest‟. The interests of those with no religious belief, he suggested, were likely to be 
neglected or overridden (see also Vickers, 2011: 142-43). Pollock commented that 
public authorities would have to rely on „unreliable‟ Census data to estimate the size 
of religion or belief communities (see also section 2.2) or else undertake their own 
„intrusive‟ data-gathering exercises.  
 
The End Violence Against Women coalition (EVAW) opposed the inclusion of religion 
or belief in the second and third limbs of the equality duty („advancing equality of 
opportunity‟ and „fostering good relations‟). This was because, among other reasons, 
EVAW was concerned that the duty „may increase pressure on public bodies to 
accept culturally relativist arguments that women from certain religious backgrounds 
can be treated differently from other women experiencing abuse‟ (EVAW, 2009: 2). 
EVAW also noted that „it is often the more traditional and sometimes reactionary 
groups that are most effective at mobilization and engaging in debate‟. Even 
interviewees who were more positive about the duty expressed concern that some 
religious groups might (as one equality specialist observed) use it to „browbeat‟ public 
authorities to promote religion (or a particular religion) and that public bodies might 
„panic and cave in even if the point made has no legal validity‟.  
 
EVAW and other groups concerned with gender equality expressed concern about 
the increased contracting out of core public functions to religious organisations (see 
also British Humanist Association, 2007b). They were particularly troubled about 
moves to increase the involvement of religious providers in abortion and sexual 
health services (see section 1.3) and services relating to violence against women. 
Rose Doran of the Local Government Group noted that commissioning and 
procurement processes needed to build in prescriptions on the promotion of 
particular religious views by providers. She added that religious providers could 
themselves be more pro-active in providing such reassurances (see also section 6.6 
in relation to the employment practices of religious organisations).  
 
From a different perspective, some interviewees from religious organisations also 
expressed reservations about the inclusion of religion or belief in the new single duty. 
For some (mainly Christian) interviewees, this was based on a lack of confidence that 
public authorities were well-equipped to implement it. One commented that public 
authorities had become increasingly „secularised‟ and were thus ill-suited to taking on 
a more pro-active role with regard to religion. Generally, Christian interviewees who 
were concerned about the „trumping‟ of religious claims by those based on gender or 
sexual orientation felt that this would also happen in relation to the public sector 






equality duty. Several Christian interviewees referred to what they saw as the general 
„religious illiteracy‟ of public authorities (see also section 2.5); these interviewees 
noted that public bodies sometimes restricted funding to inter-faith initiatives, rather 
than those of particular religious groups, or denied funding to religious groups out of 
a misplaced fear that they would use it as an opportunity to evangelise. 
 
Interviewees of all types acknowledged the difficulty that public authorities face in 
identifying authoritative representatives of religious communities (see also section 
2.6). Vickers (2011: 144) notes that determining who represents a religion, and thus 
whose equality needs to be advanced, or whose good relations need fostering:  
 
… may involve deciding whose is the authentic voice of the religion or 
belief, a decision no one is in a position to make, least of all workers in 
public authorities upon whom such decisions are likely to fall.  
 
Julian Rivers of the University of Bristol added that a particular risk for decision-
makers is they might „slip into thinking about religion as [they do] about race, which 
doesn‟t work as an overall strategy because it treats religions as immutable, 
monolithic blocks‟.  
 
Opportunities presented by the public sector equality duty  
Several interviewees and roundtable participants were positive about the potential for 
using the new single duty to address disadvantage associated with religion or belief 
and consider the needs of communities holistically. They commonly shared some of 
the concerns expressed above about the challenges of implementation but felt that 
these could be overcome. These included interviewees concerned with sexual 
orientation; for example, Sam Dick of Stonewall argued that: 
 
We must not forget that many lesbian, gay and bisexual people also have 
a religion or belief. The [public sector equality duty] provides a real 
opportunity to actively consider different groups beyond [single] identities 
and to see them in the round as having different identities. It goes beyond 
[preventing] discrimination to a more active consideration of people‟s 
needs. 
  
Amanda Ariss of the Equality and Diversity Forum argued that the duty could be:  
  
… a very good way of dealing with the persistent inequality of life chances 
affecting, for example, Muslim women … There is clearly an argument that 
public action is needed to address that persistent inequality. Cohesive 




communities are not possible when particular groups, whether defined by 
race, religion or any other characteristic, are falling way behind. 
 
Ariss commented that the duty embodies a „reasonable expectation‟ that all public 
authorities will make some effort to discover who lives in their area and what their 
needs are. Participants in Cardiff added that this might involve using qualitative as 
well as quantitative methods; collecting reliable quantitative data about religion or 
belief was a „huge problem‟ for public bodies since people often declined to provide 
this information and did not understand why it was being requested.  
 
Reverend Aled Edwards of Cytûn noted that the devolved authorities in Wales have 
taken a „strong and distinctive line‟ in promoting the equality duty.275 He commented 
that the practicalities of the duty for faith communities were being „worked out almost 
on a daily basis‟ in diverse areas of policy and practice; for example, it had come into 
play in discussions about whether care home residents were entitled to transport to 
take them to a place of worship. The duty had also influenced discussions around the 
procedures for emergency planning in relation to the timely release of bodies to 
families in accordance with religious requirements. 
 
Respondents to the workplace survey to whom the public sector equality duty was 
applicable showed high levels of awareness of the extension of the public sector 
equality duty to religion or belief (see Appendix 7). More than three-quarters knew 
where to go for guidance about the duty and said they understood what it requires in 
relation to religion or belief. However, only 1 in 5 respondents agreed that the duty 
„will make a significant difference to the way their organisation approaches equality in 
relation to religion or belief‟.  
  
Different conceptions of equality 
Vickers (2011: 147) argues that in assessing the wisdom of extending the public 
sector equality duty, it is important to have regard to the overarching aims of 
discrimination law in promoting equality between different groups; however, 
„determining what “promoting equality” might require is both complex and contested‟.  
 
The traditional conception of equality is „formal‟ or „symmetrical‟ equality, which 
requires that like cases be treated alike. This is widely viewed as too narrow: it can 
lead to equally bad treatment, is limited to achieving parity for individuals rather than 
groups and provides little basis for positive action. Vickers (2011: 147-48) outlines 
three more substantive concepts of equality. The first is a model which focuses on 
                                               
275 In one indication of this, the Wales specific duties were not delayed (as in England) and 
came into force on 6 April 2011.  






the link between equality and individual dignity and identity. Vickers (2011: 150-51) 
suggests that this conception is problematic in relation to religion or belief; for the 
reasons discussed above, it is doubtful that religion and belief can be identified as 
clear categories with a single identity capable of being recognised and „given value‟ 
or „celebrated‟ for their own sake. Moreover, to do so may be divisive and cause 
resentment among those with different religions or beliefs and those with none. By 
the same token, there is no requirement on public authorities to, for example, avoid 
using the word „Christmas‟ in a misguided attempt to treat all religions equally. 
 
The second model focuses on disadvantage and redistribution (Vickers 2011: 152-
53). This understanding of equality is focused on „identifying where religion is 
causally linked to disadvantage, and then trying to reorder or implement public policy 
to address this issue‟. Thus, for example, if health promotion messages are not 
reaching particular religious communities, leading to lower health outcomes for those 
groups, then using some resources to reach them would be an appropriate action in 
response to the duty (see section 3.3 for discussion of the causal link between 
religion or belief and socio-economic disadvantage). 
  
The third model is based on equality as a means of addressing social exclusion and 
promoting participation (Vickers, 2011: 153-55). Vickers suggests that this approach 
provides the strongest basis for developing the religion and belief duty. The model 
starts from the premise that equality is best achieved by ensuring greater 
participation in decision-making by marginalised groups. It involves both recognition 
of marginalised groups to permit their involvement in civic life and redistribution of 
resources to break cycles of disadvantage. Thus, it combines the focus (in model 
two) on economic disadvantage with an emphasis on full participation in society for 
excluded groups, including where those groups are defined by religion.  
 
Equality specialists who participated in this project generally endorsed substantive 
notions of equality which were broadly congruent with the second and third models 
proposed by Vickers. Participants in the London roundtable suggested that the public 
sector equality duty provided a vehicle for public bodies to address persistent 
disadvantage and to focus on the exclusionary effects of certain policies or practices. 
For example, in a Begum-type situation, a substantive equality „lens‟ would lead 
decision-makers to the conclusion that:  
 
… a „no-headscarf‟ rule operates as an exclusionary rule for large numbers of 
women for whom the knock on effect will be to deny them access to [education 
or] employment. 




Some religion or belief groups embraced a similar notion. For example, Shaykh Faiz 
Siddiqi, speaking from a Muslim perspective, observed that women and ethnic 
minorities had „hammered on the door to break down the institutionality of 
discrimination‟ against them. Religion or belief groups might do the same; however, 
religion or belief was a „more sensitive and emotive area‟ and it remained to be seen 
whether entrenched discrimination associated with this characteristic would succeed 
in the same way.  
 
Challenges of implementation 
The discussion in this section suggests that public authorities will need to develop 
nuanced understandings of equality in order to identify the approach best suited to 
each of the different protected equality grounds in their locality. As Vickers (2011: 
158) argues, a „one size fits all‟ approach is „likely to be dangerous, as treating 
religion and belief equality in the same way as other grounds is likely to lead to the 
realisation of exactly the concerns voiced by those opposing the extension of the 
duty‟. For example, an approach which emphasises individual identity may be well 
suited to addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation, but potentially 
divisive when applied to religion or belief. However, a view of equality based on 
promoting social inclusion may help public bodies target their activities as they 
develop the religion and belief duty, since „only where religion or belief is standing in 
the way of achieving such an aim should action be targeted on grounds of religion 
and belief‟ (Vickers, 2011: 157).  
 
Practitioners at the Cardiff roundtable emphasised that substantively addressing 
discrimination also requires a focus on outcomes and not just on minimum legal 
compliance. This in turn required „smarter‟ approaches by public authorities across 
sectors and organisations; for example, the setting of coordinated equality outcomes 
across the health, social care and welfare systems. Several interviewees added a 
note of caution that public austerity risks stifling creative approaches to implementing 
the public sector equality duty, as well as exacerbating structural inequalities.  
 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined a range of ethical and practical concerns relating to 
religion or belief in the context of public services.  
 
A key ethical concern arises when practitioners discuss their personal beliefs with a 
service user. Participants in this research suggested that the justification for self-
disclosure rests entirely on the therapeutic value to the service user in the particular 
context in which it occurs; they did not view it as a matter of the practitioner‟s right to 
freedom of expression. Incidents where practitioners are considered to have 






transgressed professional guidelines are rare, though intensely controversial when 
they do occur. 
 
Participants emphasised the value of using equality and human rights proactively to 
shape policy and practice and to carry out a holistic appraisal of individuals‟ needs, 
whether related to their religion or belief or any other characteristic. Equality and 
human rights impact assessments were viewed as particularly valuable in the context 
of expenditure cuts since they enable decision-makers to make informed, principled 
and transparent decisions about the allocation of resources. 
 
In relation to education, concerns include the necessity and proportionality of faith-
based admissions policies and the wide discretion given to voluntary-aided schools 
to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in the employment of teachers. The 
entry into the education system of new religious providers setting up „free‟ schools 
and academies, and the expansion in the number of voluntary-aided schools, has 
heightened these concerns.  
 
There is a need to monitor the practical impact of discrimination that is permitted 
within the education system, in relation to admissions; employment; and the broad 
exemption for the content of the curriculum and RE from the prohibition of 
discrimination, particularly in relation to sexual orientation. This role might be taken 
on by the EHRC or the JCHR, as well as by civil society organisations. 
 
Participants expressed strongly divergent views about the extension of the public 
sector equality duty to include religion or belief. Some were opposed in principle 
and/or felt that the duty in relation to religion or belief would in practice be divisive 
and unworkable. Concerns included the potential for vociferous religion or belief 
groups to „browbeat‟ public authorities and the difficulty of identifying authentic 
representatives of religious communities. Other participants were more positive about 
the potential for using the new single duty to address persistent disadvantage 
associated with religion or belief and focus on the exclusionary effects of certain 
policies or practices. This perception rests on a substantive understanding of equality 
as a vehicle to address social exclusion and promote participation among 
marginalised groups defined by religion or belief, rather than one which emphasises 





10. Conclusions: advancing debate and practice  
 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on evidence and insights from this research in order to propose 
ways of advancing debate and practice in relation to equality, human rights and 
religion or belief in England and Wales.  
 
The chapter does not address recommendations to specific actors since the points it 
raises are potentially relevant to a wide range of bodies. Among these are public 
authorities; employers and employers‟ organisations; trade unions; religion or belief 
groups; equality and human rights bodies and civil society groups, as well as the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and the parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). 
 
10.2 Areas of broad consensus 
A persistent theme of this research has been the intemperate nature of much public 
debate about equality, human rights and religion or belief. In particular, there is 
palpable anxiety about specific cases which are viewed by some groups as both 
demonstrating and perpetuating an anti-religious (or, more commonly, a specifically 
anti-Christian) bias. Among our participants, the most contentious of these were 
cases in which individuals or agencies wished to abstain on grounds of religious 
conscience from providing services to others on the grounds of their sexual 
orientation. These cases have gained an exceptionally high public profile. However, it 
is important that this divisive current of debate does not obscure the areas where 
there is (or is potential for) consensus. Debate is likely to be advanced if these areas 
can be identified and, as far as possible, insulated from the more rancorous tone 
which has characterised the „public conversation‟ about equality, human rights and 
religion or belief in recent years.  
 
The role of religion or belief groups in the formation of law and policy  
Our interviews suggested a degree of consensus among groups situated in both the 
„religion‟ and „belief‟ strands (as well as groups concerned with other equality 
strands) that religion or belief groups are legitimate interest groups like any other but 
should have no privileged role in the formation of law and policy. In particular, most 
interviewees - including a majority of those situated in the „religion‟ strand - 
suggested that there is no room for „truth claims‟ or claims of moral superiority based 
upon a particular religion or belief in matters of law and policy. There were 
differences of emphasis within this broadly articulated position. However, it is notable 
that interviewees from both religious and non-religious perspectives considered that 






views based upon religious doctrine should not influence the formation of law and 
policy. 
 
Reasonable accommodation of religion or belief 
We found a high degree of consensus about the desirability of making reasonable 
accommodation for religion or belief in the workplace, particularly in matters of dress 
codes and flexible working patterns. Virtually all participants agreed that individuals 
whose religion or belief is important to them have a responsibility to make sensible 
career choices and may have to make personal sacrifices to avoid conflict with the 
law or professional guidelines. We also found broad consensus about the type of 
criteria which might reasonably restrict the manifestation of religion or belief in 
particular instances, such as health or safety concerns; business efficiency; and 
detrimental impact on colleagues.   
 
We found an equally strong presumption towards the accommodation of religion or 
belief where these criteria do not apply or are not compelling. This was sometimes 
expressed in terms of the principle of personal autonomy and the inherent value of 
diversity in social settings. It was also viewed as making good business sense.  
Views differed (including between co-religionists) as to what was „reasonable‟ in 
particular instances. Such disagreements are inevitable in view of decision-makers‟ 
reliance on the principle of proportionality which, being context-specific, precludes 
hard and fast rules or predictable outcomes. Nevertheless, our findings indicate a 
high degree of acceptance of what might be termed „routine‟ accommodation of 
religion or belief, in stark contrast to approaches elsewhere in Europe.  
 
The role of litigation  
Another matter on which the majority of interviewees and roundtable participants 
agreed was the undesirability of pursuing litigation except as a „weapon of last 
resort‟. Litigation may be necessary in some circumstances to challenge individual 
injustice or to clarify an area of law. However, the suggestion is that wherever 
possible, claims based on religion or belief should be pursued through forms of social 
action such as mediation, negotiation, guidance and public argument, with legal 
action reserved for cases of real strategic importance. Interviewees overwhelmingly 
viewed litigation as symptomatic of failure, whoever instigated it.  
 
Allied to concern that there has been excessive and/or misguided litigation 
concerning religion or belief is a view that the law is limited in its capacity to address 
complex questions of multiculturalism and social identity in modern Britain. As one 
roundtable participant put it, „courts may simply not be the right place to have this 





temperature of public discussion about religion or belief since „copy-cat‟ claims for 
legal recognition and protection were divisive and suppressive of debate. Some 
participants suggested that excessive or misguided pursuit of litigation could, 
paradoxically, decrease the effectiveness of efforts to uphold the rights of individuals 
to manifest their religion or belief by appearing to „pick a fight‟ with the equality and 
human rights framework. Further, a litigious environment was broadly viewed by 
participants as inimical to proportionate and balanced decision-making: a fear of 
litigation was likely to produce knee-jerk responses which tended to escalate and 
harden divisions rather than diminish them.  
 
The value of proactive equality and human rights approaches  
Participants concerned with employment and service delivery emphasised the value 
of using equality and human rights standards and tools proactively to shape policy 
and practice. Equality and human rights impact assessments were viewed as 
particularly valuable in the context of expenditure cuts, since they enable decision-
makers to make informed and transparent decisions about the allocation of 
resources. In relation to religion or belief, these tools had been used both to increase 
the uptake of services and to improve them. A clear lesson to emerge from this 
experience was the imperative to use human rights alongside equality mechanisms 
as a „lens‟ for examining policy and practice: for example, a human rights perspective 
enabled managers to move beyond considerations of whether (say) a dress code 
request related to „religion‟ or „culture‟ or was an obligatory or discretionary aspect of 
a belief. While the Equality Act „lens‟ dictated a focus on legal compliance and 
distinct characteristics, human rights permitted an approach focused on individual 
flourishing.  
 
This focus on equality and human rights as a framework for decision-making reminds 
us that the most productive level of engagement for those who wish to advance 
debate and practice on religion or belief is with policy-makers, practitioners and 
managers in the workplace, and not solely with legal process. 
 
Principles for resolving disputes outside the courtroom 
If litigation is to be used selectively, there is a requirement to pre-empt or resolve 
disputes relating to religion or belief by other means. There was a significant degree 
of overlap between the principles or „rules of thumb‟ proposed by interviewees and 
roundtable participants as a basis for doing so.  
 
The most commonly invoked principle was „do no harm‟. At a general level, the 
principle suggests a position of mutual restraint, according to which individuals or 
groups refrain from asserting claims if to do so entails harm to others. In the context 






of the workplace, the principle was considered a useful means of distinguishing 
situations in which claims for reasonable accommodation are refused for compelling 
reasons as opposed to merely a disinclination to embrace religious or cultural 
difference. The principle was also invoked in favour of allowing religious believers 
conscientiously to object to certain tasks if no material harm was caused to 
colleagues or to people using a service. However, the application of the principle was 
controversial in this context, with disagreement as to who - or what - was harmed (or 
not) in specific instances. These differences remind us that perceptions of harm are 
context dependent and therefore form part of the assessment of proportionality in 
each case.  
 
The principle of proportionality (or the „least restrictive‟ approach) was also commonly 
invoked by participants. Interviewees situated in the religion strand proposed, as a 
general principle, respect for the intrinsic value of religions or beliefs to their 
adherents; however, it was generally acknowledged that this does not guarantee 
protection from offence. The principles of personal and institutional autonomy were 
also broadly endorsed, though it was recognised that these might sometimes conflict. 
The application of these „rules of thumb‟ in specific instances may be a matter of 
contention. Nevertheless, the articulation of a set of broad principles provides a 
starting point for the negotiation of differences.  
 
10.3 The conduct of public debate 
Also critical is the process by which decisions are made, differences are identified 
and resolutions (however contingent or partial) are achieved. Where consensus does 
not exist, it is all the more important that public debate is conducted in a manner 
which encourages rather than closes down possibilities for resolution.  
 
Ethical ‘rules of engagement’  
Participants in this research identified „ground rules‟ for approaching public 
discussion or negotiation of differences in particular settings. It is suggested that 
acceptance of these „rules of engagement‟ is a minimum requirement for groups or 
individuals who seek to negotiate a particular outcome in a context where competing 
interests are at stake. The ethical reference points proposed by participants include 
the requirement to respect the integrity and legitimacy of the perspective of others. 
Also important are good faith and openness to those whose viewpoints are 
incomprehensible to oneself. This approach is premised on the assumption that the 
balancing of competing interests is not a „zero-sum‟ game. Nor is it one that is suited 
to abstract determinations. Rather, the imperative is to conduct nuanced analysis of 
the context in each case through dialogue and, where necessary, with the support of 





Creating spaces for the negotiation of differences 
Many participants observed that „good faith‟ solutions are more easily achieved in a 
safe environment. This was especially important in relation to minority religious 
communities. Participants perceived the need to create localised spaces where 
groups can work out what equality and human rights mean in relation to religion or 
belief in particular localities, free from the pressure created by adversarial, media-
driven debate. Participants also advocated the creation of safe spaces for discussion 
within workplaces and public institutions, noting that decision-makers are frequently 
fearful and lack confidence about resolving dilemmas or disputes about religion or 
belief. Examples of successful mediation or negotiation of differences in communities 
and workplaces underline the value of this approach. 
 
Debate about legal cases  
A number of contentious legal cases have, to a large extent, set the contours of 
public and media debate about equality, human rights and religion or belief. Legal 
judgments may raise important matters of principle and it is healthy for these 
principles to be debated in public. However, legal cases are by their very nature an 
unreliable indicator of common experience or the place of religion or belief (or 
particular religions or beliefs) in society. Each case is highly fact- and context-specific 
and there are invariably contingent reasons why some claimants make it to court 
while other potential claimants do not. Thus, considerable caution is required when 
seeking to generalise from specific cases or to assess their social, as well as legal, 
significance. Public commentators are not always sufficiently circumspect. As a 
result, responses to high-profile cases may make conflicts between religion or belief 
and other interests appear more intractable or prevalent than they actually are. This 
is especially so when understanding is reliant upon media reports or the views of 
lobby groups and is not also informed about the detailed circumstances and legal 
reasoning in each case. If public debate is to advance, it requires a sound evidence 
base, a minimum requirement of which is an accurate and balanced account of the 
legal contestation.  
 
‘Religious’ versus ‘secular’ perspectives  
Discussion about religion or belief can involve different perspectives which appear to 
be mutually unintelligible; for example, one participant argued that „secularists‟ 
concerned about the representativeness of religious community leaders do not 
understand „how religions work‟. This may explain why debate has at times become 
so acrimonious, as specific legal cases or policy matters act as a „lightning rod‟ for a 
broader perceived gulf between the „religious‟ and the „secular‟. Indeed, some (but 
not all) participants situated in the „religion‟ strand were vehement in their criticism of 






what they perceived as a combative „secular‟ agenda to constrain the significance of 
religion in public life.  
 
However, our research suggests that when specific issues are probed in detail, the 
lines are not always so clearly drawn. For example, members of religion or belief 
groups (including co-religionists) argued both for and against extending protection for 
conscientious objection where an individual feels that their religious beliefs compel 
them to abstain from providing services to same-sex couples. This is not surprising 
since legal cases often reflect ideological and theological disputes that are also 
taking place within religious organisations. It is important to remember that the rights 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender believers are centrally at stake in this debate 
- a perspective that is overlooked in debates framed as religious versus secular.  
 
Further, recognition of the foundational differences between religious and non-
religious perspectives on human rights should not mask their shared concern about 
social injustice and commitment to a set of human rights standards and principles 
enshrined in law. There is much scope for dialogue between these two perspectives, 
for example, about the meaning of human dignity and what it means to live an 
authentic and flourishing life.  
 
The Christian ‘marginalisation’ narrative 
Much political and media debate about religion or belief is shaped or influenced by 
the insistent narrative articulated by some strands of Christian opinion which sees 
equality law as a means by which Christianity is being marginalised and penalised in 
Britain. However, this view is not universally shared by Christians, some of whom 
view the „marginalisation‟ narrative as a response by a particular Christian tradition to 
a loss of privilege. The evidence base concerning discrimination against Christians is 
incomplete; however, the evidence that does exist suggests the need for a more 
nuanced analysis of the incidence and seriousness of discrimination against 
Christians than the generalised „marginalisation‟ narrative presently articulates. It is 
important also to contextualise claims of discrimination against particular religious 
communities: one clear trend from existing evidence is the greater prevalence of 
discrimination against Muslims compared to other groups defined by their religion. 
 
10.4  Legal ‘pressure points’ 
This report has examined areas where the law is perceived to be unclear, under 
strain and/or vulnerable to future challenge. This section summarises these areas as 






 The definition of „belief‟ is widely perceived to be unclear as a result of case law 
and managers are uncertain about which beliefs warrant legal protection and 
which do not. 
 
 The requirement to show group (rather than solitary) disadvantage in 
discrimination cases is viewed by the EHRC and other legal specialists as 
failing to provide sufficient protection for individual believers. More broadly, 
there is concern that courts and tribunals have been too ready to dismiss 
religion or belief claims on the grounds that there has been no interference with 
the right, rather than consider in detail the justification for interference. This has 
created a perception among some religion or belief groups and legal specialists 
that Article 9 does not „deliver the goods‟ in the domestic context.  
 
 A related concern is that justification for restrictions on the manifestation of 
religion or belief should be assessed using sociological arguments rooted in the 
context of the case, rather than (as has sometimes happened) arguments about 
whether particular beliefs or practices are prescribed by a religion or belief. This 
does not preclude scrutiny of the nature of beliefs and practices, but recognises 
the inherent difficulty that secular courts face in adjudicating doctrinal or 
theological matters.  
 
 Legal concepts have been stretched uncomfortably by the inclusion in the 
Equality Act 2010 of equality grounds which are qualitatively different from each 
other and which sometimes conflict. One effect has been to magnify conflicts - 
especially between the religion and sexual orientation strands - which might not 
otherwise have become so visible or so fraught.  
 
 In particular, there are proliferating calls (especially by some Christian voices) 
for the extension of the right of conscientious objection to new and diverse 
situations. No participant advocated a carte blanche for would-be conscientious 
objectors or a blanket rejection of conscientious action. Arguments coalesce 
around the criteria by which to decide which exercises of conscientious 
objection should be accommodated in laws or procedures, and which not. This 
is an area of unresolved difficulty which requires further public debate. 
 
 There is a lack of clarity in the domestic context about the relationship between, 
on the one hand, protection for the manifestation of religion or belief under 
Article 9 and, on the other, protection against direct and indirect discrimination 
under the Equality Act 2010. The two concepts do not map neatly onto one 
another. This is thrown into sharp relief by claims by religious believers to be 






able to discriminate against others on another protected ground. Overall, there 
is a need to differentiate more clearly those situations that are most 
appropriately addressed on the basis of freedom of religion or belief and those 
that are best addressed on the basis of non-discrimination.  
 The religion or belief exceptions in the Equality Act 2010 relating to employment 
are shrouded in legal uncertainty due to ambiguities in their wording and 
discrepancies between the text of the Act and the Explanatory Notes. The fact 
that they do not expressly require proportionality to be applied makes them 
vulnerable to challenge under European Union law. The lack of clarity 
surrounding the exceptions means that they could potentially be misunderstood 
and misapplied. 
 
 Concerns arise in relation to religion or belief in schools. In relation to schools 
designated as having a religious character, these include the necessity and 
proportionality of faith-based admissions policies and the wide discretion given 
to voluntary-aided schools to discriminate on grounds of religion or belief in the 
employment of all teachers. There is a need to monitor the practical impact of 
discrimination that is permitted within the education system in relation to 
admissions; employment; and the broad exemption for the content of the 
curriculum and religious education from the prohibition of discrimination, 
particularly in relation to sexual orientation.  
 
 There is a need to strengthen the protections presently offered by the 
Arbitration Act 1996 to users of religious tribunals, particularly users from 
vulnerable groups who may be unwilling or unable to challenge tribunal 
decisions. This may be achieved through a system of monitoring through 
statutory agencies which can offer active support to users of religious tribunals.  
 
 There is concern that the extension of the public sector equality duty to include 
religion or belief may, if poorly implemented, be divisive or counter-productive. 
However, the new single duty has the potential to address persistent 
disadvantage associated with religion or belief and the exclusionary effects of 
certain policies or practices. To fulfil this potential, public authorities will need to 
develop substantive understandings of equality as a vehicle to foster social 
inclusion and promote participation among marginalised groups defined by 








10.5 Guidance for decision-makers 
Some interviewees expressed a need for more accessible, practice-based guidance 
on the handling of religion or belief in the workplace. Equality specialists suggest that 
this should include principles emerging from case law as to the limited circumstances 
in which indirect discrimination on grounds of religion or belief may be justified. Such 
guidance would specifically include advice for managers and practitioners as to how 
to make proportionate decisions in specific instances.  
 
A striking feature of our interviews was the variety of considerations that go to 
assessing proportionality. There may be utilitarian arguments (e.g. „what is the harm 
in letting X do what he or she wishes to do?‟); arguments based on general principles 
(e.g. „people delivering public services should not be allowed to pick and choose who 
they deliver them to‟) and/or empirical arguments (e.g. evidence as to the suitability 
of prospective adoptive parents or foster carers). Each may be a valid contributor to 
decision-making in a given case. However, the relative weight to be accorded to each 
will vary in each case and decision-makers may welcome advice as to the extent and 
limits of their professional discretion in performing this balancing act. 
 
Guidance which integrates human rights and equality standards and principles would 
address the limitations of using the equality „lens‟ in isolation. Such guidance should 
also extend beyond strict legal requirements to establish „rules of thumb‟ for easily 
achievable and effective practice. Future guidance should also address the 
uncertainty expressed by workplace managers about how to determine which beliefs 
warrant protection and which do not 
 
A web-based source which gathered existing sources of guidance in one place would 
be a valuable means of supporting more confident and consistent management 
practice. 
 
10.6 Future research  
The evidence base relating to the incidence and nature of discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief is incomplete and a number of suggestions on how to improve the 
evidence base have been made in other recent EHRC research (Weller, 2011: ix-x). 
 
Specific options for research suggested by this study include: 
 
 Further research to explore the views of a larger number and wider range of 
employers about the management of issues associated with religion or belief in 
the workplace. This might consist of an online or telephone survey aimed 
specifically at smaller, as well as larger, employers and private sector, as well 






as public sector, organisations asking broadly similar questions to those 
examined in this study. It might also involve a more detailed case study analysis 
of how selected employers have sought to tackle religion or belief issues in 
practice and the response of employees and trade unions to these initiatives. 
Such research could include a focus on the use of negotiation and mediation to 
resolve disputes, as well as on procedures for deciding upon and facilitating the 
reasonable accommodation of religion or belief. 
 
 Research on the implementation of the public sector equality duty in relation to 
religion or belief (as well as other characteristics). This might include case 
studies in Wales, where implementation is more advanced due to the earlier 
adoption of the specific duties that are designed to help public bodies perform 
the general equality duty better. In particular, research might address the 
development of substantive approaches to equality as a vehicle to foster social 
inclusion and promote participation among marginalised groups, including 
groups defined by religion or belief. Such research might usefully focus on 
particular sectors (e.g. the implementation of the duty in relation to health 
services) as well as on cross-sectoral approaches.  
 
 Research designed to examine the perception of some Christian groups that 
Christians experience greater discrimination than is generally acknowledged or 
measured. As Weller (2011: 55) notes, such research might explore the 
continuum of „visibility‟ and „invisibility‟ in relation to how religious discrimination 
occurs. The notion of invisibility is also relevant to future research on 
discrimination against Pagans and people from new religious movements in 
which, generally speaking, ethnicity does not play a part. 
 
 Research about the impact of minority legal orders based in religious 
communities on those that use them or are affected by them, particularly 
vulnerable groups such as women and children. Such research might establish 
the degree to which women are able to exercise autonomy, agency and choice 
within religious arbitration or mediation. 
 
 Research about children‟s views and experiences with regard to their right to 
freedom of religion or belief. Such research might have both a legal and policy 
focus; for example, it might examine options for more explicit protection for 
children‟s right to freedom of religion or belief (as distinct from that of their 






 Research about the application and impact „on the ground‟ of some of the 
religion or belief exceptions in the Equality Act 2010 and the Schools Standards 
and Framework Act 1998. This includes the exceptions which permit (i) 
discrimination on grounds of sex, transsexual status, marriage and sexual 
orientation in the context of employment for the purposes of organised religion; 
(ii) discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief by employers with an ethos 
based on religion or belief; and (iii) discrimination on grounds of religion or belief 
in the employment of teachers in voluntary-aided schools.  
 
 Research about the impact of the exemption for the content of the national 
curriculum and of religious education from the prohibition of discrimination on 
any protected characteristic - including sexual orientation; in particular, the 
impact on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender pupils. 
 
 This research bears out Weller‟s observation (2011: viii) that at present there is 
little distinctive evidence to suggest a substantially different position in Wales as 
compared to that in England. However, as the majority of the evidence that 
refers to England and Wales relates primarily to England, it is unclear whether 
such distinctiveness does not exist or whether insufficient specific research has 
been conducted (as suggested by Winckler, 2009: 125). Future studies might 
address this issue, as well the nature and extent of discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief in Scotland.  
 






Appendix 1  Interviewees 
 
 
 Name Title Organisation Date 
1 Anonymous British Airways 16 May 2011 
2 Anonymous Department for 
Communities and Local 
Government 
19 May 2011 
3 Anonymous Interfaith Network for the 
UK 
22 June 2011 
4 Anonymous NHS Employers 3 May 2011 
5 Ahmad Husna Chief Executive Faith Regen Foundation 20 May 2011 
6 Ariss Amanda Chief Executive Equality and Diversity 
Forum 
24 May 2011 
7 Barrow Simon Co-director Ekklesia 20 July 2011 
8 Bartley Jonathan Co-director Ekklesia 20 July 2011 
9 Beazley Alan Advice, policy and 
research 
specialist 
Employers Forum on 
Belief (now Employers 
Network for Equality & 
Inclusion) 
19 May 2011 
10 Benjamin Jon Chief Executive Board of Deputies of 
British Jews 
18 May 2011 
11 Brett Sally Senior Equality 
Policy Officer 
Trades Union Congress 5 April 2011 
12 Brown Malcolm Director of 
Mission and 
Public Affairs 
Church of England 20 May 2011 
13 Combs Ryan Research 
Associate 
University of Manchester 24 June 2011 
14 Copson Andrew Chief Executive British Humanist 
Association 
17 June 2011 
15 Crowley Chris President Pagan Federation 10 May 2011 
16 Day Jeremy Head of Diversity 
and Employee 
Engagement 
Sodexo 24 May 2011 
17 Dick Sam Head of Policy  Stonewall 2 June 2011 
18 Doran Rose Community 
Cohesion Advisor 
LG Improvement and 
Development 
14 July 2011 
19 Edwards Rev Aled Chief Executive Cytûn (Churches 
Together in Wales) 






20 Eliadis Pearl Human rights 
lawyer 
Montreal, Canada 16 June 2011 
21 Faiz Siddiqi Shaykh Chairman Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal 
13 July 2011 
22 Ferguson Sharon Chief Executive Lesbian and Gay 
Christian Movement 
4 April 2011 
23 Finneron Doreen Executive Director Faith-based 
Regeneration Network 
26 May 2011 
24 Frei David External and 
Legal Services 
Director 
United Synagogue and 
Registrar, London Beth 
Din 
20 May 2011 
25 Gohir Shaista Executive Director Muslim Women‟s 
Network UK 
27 May 2011 
26 Green Alan Chair Tower Hamlets Inter-
Faith Forum 
15 June 2011 
27 Hayden Jennifer Diversity Officer West Midlands Police 12 May 2011 
28 Horrocks Don Head of Public 
Affairs 
Evangelical Alliance 18 May 2011 
29 Irwin Wendy Head of Diversity Royal College of Nursing 9 June 2011 
30 James Kathryn Director of Policy National Association of 
Head Teachers 
26 April 2011 
31 Jethwa Jit President (East 
Region) 
Hindu Forum of Britain 20 May 2011 
32 Kantor Frank Secretary United Reformed Church 26 May 2011 
33 Kazi Tehmina Director British Muslims for 
Secular Democracy 
6 April 2011 
34 Kelly Liz Co-Chair End Violence Against 
Women 
27 May 2011 
35 Kidwai Saleem Secretary General Muslim Council of Wales 29 June 2011 
36 Kornicki Richard Associate Catholic Bishops‟ 
Conference for England 
and Wales 
3 June 2011 
37 Langley Simon UK Lead Manager 
for Inclusion & 
Diversity 
National Grid 31 May 2011 
38 Leith OBE Barney   Bahá‟í community of the 
UK 
25 May 2011 





staff, Lambeth Palace 
17 June 2011 










31 May 2011 
41 Lovelock Yann Representative Network of Buddhist 
Organisations and West 
Midlands Buddhist 
Council 
23 May 2011 
42 Madeiros Joy Chief Executive Faithworks 18 May 2011 
43 Mahmood Fazal Community 
Development 
Officer 
Positive East 9 June 2011 
44 Miller Joyce Vice Chair Religious Education 
Council of England and 
Wales 
5 July 2011 
45 Minogue Roddie Chief Executive Catholic Care 11 April 2011 
46 Patel Pragna Director Southall Black Sisters 16 May 2011 
47 Pettinger Paul Coalition Co-
ordinator 
Accord Coalition 10 May 2011 
48 Pollock David President European Humanist 
Federation 
6 April 2011 
49 Porteous-
Wood 
Keith Executive Director National Secular Society 6 June 2011 
50 Rivers Julian Professor of 
Jurisprudence 
University of Bristol 31 May 2011 
51 Rowson Richard  Working Ethics 5 April 2011 
52 Ryan Alison Policy Advisor Association of Teachers 
and Lecturers 
3 June 2011 
53 Sandberg Russell Lecturer at Cardiff 
Law School 
Cardiff University 8 April 2011 
54 Shaffi Wahida Director Bradford Muslim 
Women's Council (and 
specialist for women‟s 
strand of the Christian 
Muslim Forum) 
20 June 2011 
55 Shahid Raza Moulana Founder/Trustee British Muslim Forum 30 May 2011 
56 Singh Kashmir General Secretary British Sikh Federation 3 June 2011 
57 Singh Rai Jasdev General Secretary British Sikh Consultative 
Forum 
17 June 2011 
58 Sofi Khalid Legal Officer Muslim Council of Britain 23 May 2011 
59 Sparkes Graham Head of Faith and 
Unity Department 
Baptist Union of Great 
Britain 






60 Terlouw Ashley Professor in 
Sociology of Law 
Radboud University, 
Nijmegen, Netherlands 
30 June 2011 
61 Towle Carola National Officer 




Unison 10 May 2011 
62 Vickers Lucky Professor of Law Oxford Brookes 
University 
27 April 2011 
63 Williams Andrea Chief Executive 
Officer 
Christian Concern 2 December 
2011 
64 Williams Steve Head of Equality ACAS 10 June 2011 
65 Wookey Charles Assistant General 
Secretary 
Catholic Bishops' 
Conference of England 
and Wales 
2 June 2011 
66 Young-
Somers 
Debbie Rabbi West London Synagogue 9 May 2011 
 
One other interview was conducted with a representative of a Christian organisation 
who did not want the organisation named.






Appendix 2 Cardiff roundtable participants 
 
Roundtable with health and social care sector in Cardiff, 28 June 2011 
 
 Name Title Organisation 
1 Amira Bakhiet Project Co-ordinator, Minds at 
Ease 
Islamic Social Services 
Association Wales 
2 Helen Birtwhistle Director Welsh NHS Confederation 
3 Janice Boland Member, Citizens Advice 
Cymru Committee and Wales 




4 Jill Evans Senior Education & 
Development Manager 
Aneurin Bevan Health 
Board 
5 Lynne Hackett Regional Equalities Organiser Unison Cymru 
6 Ceri Harris Diversity and Equality Manager Velindre NHS Trust 
7 Yvonne Jardine Chief Executive Minority Ethnic Women‟s 
Network Swansea 
8 Martyn Jones Equalities Policy Advisor Age Cymru 
9 Voirrey Manson Senior Equality Manager NHS Wales Centre for 
Equality and Human Rights 
10 Heather Payne Consultant Paediatrician and 
Associate Dean 
Wales Deanery, Cardiff 
University 
11 Ginny Scarlett Social Justice and Research 
Participation Officer 
Mind Cymru 
12 Jim Stewart National Assembly Liaison 
Office 
Evangelical Alliance Wales 
13 Paula Walters Director NHS Wales Centre for 
Equality and Human Rights 
14 Keithley Wilkinson Equality Advisor Cardiff & Vale University 
Health Board 







Appendix 3  London roundtable participants 
 
Roundtable with academics and legal and policy experts, Matrix Chambers, 10 
June 2011 
 
 Name Title Organisation 
1 Malcolm Evans  Deputy Director of the Human 
Rights Implementation Centre, 
Professor of Public International 
Law 
University of Bristol 
2 Mark Hill QC Barrister  Pump Court Chambers 
3 Samantha Knights Barrister Matrix Chambers 
4 Maleiha Malik Professor in Law, Barrister King's College London 
5 Voirrey Manson Senior Equality Manager NHS Wales Centre for 
Equality and Human Rights 
6 Aileen McColgan Professor of Human Rights Law King's College London 
7 Mohammad Nafissi Research Advisory Member Associate, SOAS and 
Associate, Human Rights 
and Social Justice 
Research Institute 
8 Prakash Shah Senior Lecturer in School of 
Law 











Appendix 4 Questionnaire 
 
Understanding equality and human rights in relation to religion or belief 
 
This questionnaire covers the broad areas of interest to this research project. We 
recognise that not all interviewees will be able to answer all questions given the 
diversity of their experience and expertise. We are keen to explore with you those 
areas that you or your organisation are familiar with and feel confident to discuss.  
 
Please note that the term „religion or belief‟ is used here to include a lack of religion 
and any religious or philosophical belief, as in the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
Equality Act 2010. Religion or belief is a „protected characteristic‟ under the Equality 
Act, along with age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
pregnancy and maternity, race, sex and sexual orientation.  
 
Religion or belief in public life  
1. What do you think the relationship between religion or belief and the state 
should be in Britain?  
 
2. What should the role of religion or belief groups be in the formation of law and 
public policy?  
 
3. Do you have personal experience of engaging with government or public 
authorities from a religion or belief perspective?  
 
The law regarding equality and human rights and religion or belief 
4. Are there any areas of the law concerning equality and human rights and 
religion or belief - or the way that courts interpret and apply it - that concern 
you?  
 
5.   Is the law concerning equality and human rights and religion or belief clear to 
you? Is adequate guidance available about how to implement it? 
 
6.   In your view, are there competing interests in the area of equality and human 
rights and religion or belief? If so, what are they? Do you think the law strikes 
the right balance between these interests?  
  







8.   Are you aware of the extension of the public sector equality duty to religion or 
belief in the Equality Act 2010? If this duty is relevant to you, do you have any 
views about it? 
  
Achieving equality and human rights in relation to religion or belief  
9.  Have you ever experienced, managed or resolved dilemmas or disputes that have 
arisen in relation to equality or human rights and religion or belief (for example, 
in a workplace, while delivering or receiving a public service, or in a community 
setting)?  
 
10.  Can you provide any examples of what you consider to be effective (or 
ineffective) practice in preventing or resolving dilemmas or disputes involving 
religion or belief?  
 
11.  How often do such dilemmas or disputes arise in your organisation or 
community and are there any common causes? In your view, how prevalent and 
how serious are such dilemmas or disputes in your organisation or community?  
 
12.  If such a dilemma or dispute concerning religion or belief was to occur, would 
you feel confident in managing or resolving it? If not, why not?  
 
13.  What do you regard as the role of the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
in the area of equality and human rights and religion or belief?  
 
Addressing dilemmas or disputes in relation to religion or belief 
14.  Can you identify any values or principles that you think could be used to 
address dilemmas or disputes relating to religion or belief? For example, these 
might be legal, religious, moral or „common sense‟ values or principles. 
   
15.  In your view, what criteria should be used to decide whether exceptions to 
general rules or practices should - or should not - be made on the basis of a 
person‟s religion or belief (for example, if a person wants to be excused from 
performing certain tasks; wear certain clothing or symbols; or distribute 
literature relating to their religion or belief)?  
    
16.  Are there any aspects of equality and human rights and religion or belief that 










Additional concerns and follow up 
17.  Is there anything that we haven‟t discussed during this interview that you feel is 
of importance to this research? 
 
18.   Is there any literature that will give us further information or insights about what 
we have discussed (e.g. published or unpublished documents, guidance, 
surveys etc).  
 
19.  Can we follow up with you if any further questions arise during the course of our 
research? 
 
20.  Would you prefer to remain anonymous or would you agree to your comments 
being attributed by name (please see the information sheet for an explanation of 







Appendix 5 General survey 
 
About this survey 
 
Dear colleague 
This survey is part of a research project on 'understanding equality and human rights in 
relation to religion or belief'. The research has been commissioned by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission and is being conducted by the Human Rights and Social 
Justice Research Institute at London Metropolitan University. 
 
The research is exploring participants' understanding of, and concerns about, equality, 
human rights and religion or belief in England and Wales. We are interested in 
participants' views and experience of the law, policy and practice in the workplace and 
in the wider public sphere. 
 
Issues of interest include the 'reasonable accommodation' of religion or belief (for 
example, in relation to clothing and symbols); conscientious objection in the workplace 
and when delivering public services, and potential or perceived clashes between 
religion or belief and other 'protected characteristics' (such as gender or sexual 
orientation). 
 
We are keen to hear from: religion or belief groups; groups representing other equality 
'strands'; academics and legal practitioners, and individuals with knowledge and 
experience of the themes of the research. 
 
Your comments may be cited in the research but will not be attributed to you. Please 




Advice about filling in this survey 
Please note that you do not have to answer every question. 
 
You can move backwards and forwards between survey questions by clicking the 
'Prev' and 'Next' buttons. 
 
There is no facility to save a partly completed survey and return to it later. This 
means that you will need to complete the survey and submit it in the same sitting. If 
you wish to complete the survey in stages, we advise that you write your 
comments outside the survey (e.g. in a Word document) and then copy and paste 






them into the survey when you are ready to submit it. We apologise for the 
inconvenience this is likely to cause. 
 
Please note that the term „religion or belief‟ is used in this survey to include a lack 
of religion and any religious or philosophical belief, as in the Human Rights Act 1998 
and the Equality Act 2010. Religion or belief is a „protected characteristic‟ under the 
Equality Act, along with age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, sex and sexual orientation. 
 
About you 
1.  If you wish to state your name, please do so here. This is optional and any 
comments you make will not be attributed to you in the final report. 
 
2.  It will help us to evaluate your response if we know the type of organisation to 
which you are affiliated, if any. This might be a professional position that you 
hold or another type of involvement or affiliation. You may choose more than 
one option. 
o Religion or belief group 
o   Group concerned with another protected characteristic (e.g. age, disability, 
gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, race, sex, sexual 
orientation)  
o   Other (please specify)  
 
3.  It may help us to evaluate your response if you name the organisation(s) to 
which you are affiliated. If you wish to do so, please do so here. You may name 
more than one organisation.  
 
The law 
4.  Are there any areas of the law concerning equality and human rights and 
religion or belief - or the way that courts have interpreted and applied it - that 
concern you? 
 
5.  Which legal cases or issues concerning equality and human rights and religion 
or belief are most significant, in your view? (If you prefer, you do not need to 
specify the names of particular legal cases; generic descriptions will suffice). 
 
6.  In your view, are there competing interests in the area of equality and human 
rights and religion or belief? if so, what are they and do you think the law strikes 







Addressing dilemmas or disputes 
7.  Can you identify any values or principles that you think could be used to 
address dilemmas or disputes relating to religion or belief? For example, these 
might be legal, religious, moral or 'common sense' values or principles. 
 
We are interested to find out whether you think there are criteria that could be used 
to decide whether or not religion or belief should be accommodated in specific 
instances in the workplace or when delivering a public service. 
 
8.  Can you suggest any criteria that could be used to decide whether or not 
religion or belief should be accommodated in the case of employees who wish 
to wear certain clothing, jewellery or symbols? 
 
9.  Can you suggest any criteria that could be used to decide whether or not 
religion or belief should be accommodated in the case of employees who wish 
to be excused from performing certain tasks on grounds of their religion or belief 
(also known as 'conscientious objection')? 
 
10.  Can you suggest any criteria that could be used to decide whether or not 
religion or belief should be accommodated in the case of employees who wish 
to work flexibly to permit religious observance?  
 
11.  Can you suggest any criteria that could be used to decide whether or not 
religion or belief should be accommodated in the case of employees who wish 
to have prayer, meditation or quiet rooms provided; have washing or changing 
facilities provided or have certain dietary requirements met? 
 
12.  Can you suggest any criteria that could be used to decide whether or not 
religion or belief should be accommodated in the case of employees who wish 
to post or distribute literature relating to their religion or belief? 
 
13.  Please use this box to add any further comments that you consider to be 
important for this research. 
 
Thank you. The survey is now complete. 
 
Once you click 'done', your responses will go directly to the Human Rights and Social 
Justice Research Institute where they will be securely stored. Your responses will not 
be shared with any third parties and will not be attributed to you.  
This research will be completed in October 2011 and is likely to be published by the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission after that date. 






Appendix 6  Workplace survey 
 




This survey is part of a research project on 'understanding equality and human rights 
in relation to religion or belief'. The research has been commissioned by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission and is being conducted by the Human Rights and 
Social Justice Research Institute at London Metropolitan University.  
 
The research is exploring participants' understanding of, and concerns about, 
equality, human rights and religion or belief in England and Wales.  
 
In this survey, we are keen to hear from people who have responsibility for managing 
issues associated with religion or belief in the workplace. We are interested in your 
views and experience of the law, policy and practice in this area. The survey will take 
only a few minutes to complete. 
 
Issues of interest include the 'reasonable accommodation' of religion or belief in the 
workplace; 'conscientious objection' in the workplace or when delivering a public 
service, and potential or perceived tensions between religion or belief and other 
characteristics protected under equality legislation (such as gender or sexual 
orientation).  
 




Advice about completing this survey 
Please note that you do not have to answer every question.  
 
You can move backwards and forwards between survey questions by clicking the 
'Prev' and 'Next' buttons. 
 
There is no facility to save a partly completed survey and return to it later. This 
means that you will need to complete the survey and submit it in the same sitting. 
 
The term „religion or belief‟ is used in this survey to include a lack of religion and any 






Act 2010. Religion or belief is a „protected characteristic‟ under the Equality Act, 
along with age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
pregnancy and maternity, race, sex and sexual orientation. 
About you 
1.  Which one of the following best describes your area of work in your workplace? 
 
o Senior executive or director 
o Operational or middle management 
o Human resources 
o Equality and/or diversity 
 
Other (please specify)  
 
2.  What is your personal opinion about religion or belief in the workplace? You 









A person's faith is central 
to their identity and 
therefore it is important 
to take full account of the 
religion or belief 
requirements of staff. 
     
It is not always possible 
to take full account of the 
religious or belief 
requirements of staff in 




     
A person's religion or 
belief is their private 
affair and should be kept 
out of the workplace. 
     
I do not have an opinion 
about religion or belief in 
the workplace. 
     
 






About your workplace 
3.  Which one of the following best describes your organisation?  
 
o Public sector 
o Private sector 
o Charity or voluntary sector 
o Association or network 
  
Other (please specify)  
 









5.  Which of the following best describes where most of the employees of your 




o Both England and Wales 
o International 
 
















o A multi- or inter-faith perspective 
  










8.  Does your workplace provide any of the following in order to accommodate 




Yes No Don’t know Not 
applicable 
Multi-faith, prayer, reflection or quiet 
room(s) 
    
Washing or changing facilities     
Provision for special dietary 
requirements 




9.  Does your workplace have policies or procedures in place to respond 
systematically to the following types of request for accommodation of religion or 
belief? You may only choose one option per row. 
 
 Yes No Don’t know Not 
applicable 
Requests for flexibility during the 
working day to permit observance of 
religion or belief 
    
Requests for flexibility around time off 
work to permit observance of religion 
or belief 
    
Requests to wear clothing, jewellery or 
symbols in observance of religion or 
belief that are exceptions to general 
dress codes 
    
Requests to display symbols 
associated with religion or belief in the 
workplace (for example, on a wall or in 
a vehicle) 
    
Requests to abstain from certain tasks 
or duties on the grounds of religion or 
belief 
    
Requests to post or distribute literature 
or leaflets relating to a religion or belief 
    
 
10.  Does your workplace make provision for any other type of flexibility, adaptations 
or exceptions to accommodate the religion or belief of staff? Please use this box 










11.  Does your workplace provide support or networking groups covering any of the 





o LGB (lesbian, gay, bisexual) 
o race 
o religion or belief 
o transgender 
  




12.  Please respond to the following statements. You may choose only one option 











My workplace provides 
adequate training for 
employees on avoiding 
discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief 
      
My workplace does not 
provide advice or 
guidance on law, policy 
and practice in relation to 
religion or belief that is 
tailored to the work that 
we do 
      
My workplace relies on 
external sources of 
advice or guidance on 
law, policy and practice in 
relation to religion or 
belief 
      
My workplace does not 
have adequate policies 
and procedures in place 
to deal with the day-to-
day accommodation of 
religion or belief 
 
 






My workplace effectively 
communicates the 
outcomes of any 
complaints, grievances or 
disputes in the area of 
religion or belief to all 
those that need to know 
      
If complaints, grievances 
or disputes relating to 
religion or belief arise in 
my workplace, managers 
are poorly-equipped to 
resolve them before they 
escalate 
      
My workplace provides 
adequate advice and 
support about how to 
resolve disputes that 
might arise between 
claims based on religion 
or belief and claims 
based on another equality 
strand 
      
My workplace provides 
mediation to resolve 
disputes that might arise 
in the workplace between 
claims based on religion 
or belief and claims 
based on another equality 
strand 
      
My workplace fails to deal 
effectively with prejudice, 
harassment and bullying 
in relation to religion or 
belief 
      
My workplace regularly 
reviews service delivery 
to ensure equality of 
treatment on grounds of 
religion 
      
It is difficult to discuss 
religion or belief openly 
and with respect in my 
workplace 
      






13.  If you are a public body or an organisation carrying out public functions, please 












I am aware of the 
extension of the 
Public Sector 
Equality Duty to 
include religion or 
belief 
      
I do not know where 
to go for guidance 
about the Public 
Sector Equality Duty 
in relation to religion 
or belief 
      
I do not understand 
what the Public 
Sector Equality Duty 
requires in relation 
to religion or belief 
      
The Public Sector 
Equality Duty will 
make a significant 
difference to the way 
my organisation 
approaches equality 
in relation to religion 
or belief 






















You and your workplace 
 












I know where to go for 
guidance on the law 
regarding equality and 
human rights and 
religion or belief 
      
I know where to go for 
advice on policies or 
procedures in my 
workplace regarding 
equality and human 
rights and religion or 
belief 
      
I am not confident in 
my ability to determine 
what is reasonable 
accommodation of 
religion or belief in the 
workplace 
      
I am confident in my 
understanding of the 
legal definition of 
religion or belief 
      
I am not confident in 
my understanding 
about the core 
practices and beliefs 
of different religions 
and beliefs 
      
I am unsure if I could 
effectively handle a 
situation where a 
claim based on 
religion or belief 
appears to conflict 
with another equality 
strand 












15. We list below several legal cases in which domestic courts have considered 
matters of equality and human rights and religion or belief. Please indicate your level 
of knowledge of each case. You may choose one option per row.  









LB Islington v Ladele (concerning the 
right of a Christian registrar to refuse to 
have civil partnership duties assigned to 
her) 
   
McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd 
(concerning the right of a Christian 
counsellor to refuse to offer psycho-
sexual therapy to homosexual partners) 
   
Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull 
(concerning Christian hoteliers who 
wished to let rooms only to heterosexual 
married couples) 
   
Eweida v British Airways (concerning the 
right of an employee to wear a visible 
cross) 
   
Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
(concerning the right of a nurse to wear 
a crucifix) 
   
Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough 
Council (concerning the right of a school 
support worker to wear a niqab veil 
covering her face) 
   
Noah v Desrosiers (concerning the 
rejection of an applicant for a job in a 
hairdressing salon because she was a 
Muslim who habitually wore a headscarf) 
   
Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of 
Finance (concerning an unsuccessful 
homosexual applicant for a post of 
Diocesan Youth Officer) 
   
Grainger plc v Nicholson (concerning 
whether a belief in man-made climate 
change is a philosophical belief 
protected by equality law) 








16.  Please indicate the degree to which you consider these cases to have broad 
significance for the handling of religion or belief in the workplace, where 5 
equals very significant with wide applicability and 1 equals no significance.  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 Don’t 
know 
LB Islington v Ladele (concerning the right of 
a Christian registrar to refuse to have civil 
partnership duties assigned to her) 
      
McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd (concerning the 
right of a Christian counsellor to refuse to 
offer psycho-sexual therapy to homosexual 
partners) 
      
Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull (concerning 
Christian hoteliers who wished to let rooms 
only to heterosexual married couples) 
      
Eweida v British Airways (concerning the right 
of an employee to wear a visible cross) 
      
Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital 
NHS Foundation Trust (concerning the right 
of a nurse to wear a crucifix) 
      
Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council 
(concerning the right of a school support 
worker to wear a niqab veil covering her face) 
      
Noah v Desrosiers (concerning the rejection 
of an applicant for a job in a hairdressing 
salon because she was a Muslim who 
habitually wore a headscarf) 
      
Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of 
Finance (concerning an unsuccessful 
homosexual applicant for a post of Diocesan 
Youth Officer) 
      
Grainger plc v Nicholson (concerning whether 
a belief in man-made climate change is a 
philosophical belief protected by equality law) 
      
 
Additional comments 
17.  Please use this box to add details of any example(s) of issues relating to 
religion or belief that have arisen in your workplace and how they were handled 
or resolved.  
 
 






18.  Please use this box to add any further information which you think is important 










Thank you. The survey is now complete. 
 
Once you click 'done', your responses will go directly to the Human Rights and Social 
Justice Research Institute where they will be securely stored.  
 
This research will be completed in October 2011 and is likely to be published by the 







Appendix 7  Workplace survey: results 
 
Survey  
This survey was designed to elicit responses from those responsible for handling 
matters relating to religion or belief in the workplace. It consisted primarily of closed 
questions with a prescribed range of options. It was open for on-line responses from 
20 June to 15 July 2011. Given the self-selecting nature of the respondents, it was 
not designed to yield statistically significant data. The survey had 47 respondents. Of 
those identifying their organisation, 70 per cent (28/47) were from the public sector, 
22 per cent (9/47) from the private sector and eight per cent (3/47) from the 
charitable or voluntary sector. Most respondent organisations had 500+ staff (40/47), 
with most (39/47) based in England, Wales, or both, and 5/47 identified as 
internationally-based organisations. Only one respondent said their workplace was 
associated with a religion or belief (Islam).  
 
Personal attitudes towards centrality of religion or belief and reasonable 
accommodation  
Three quarters of the respondents who answered the question (33/45) felt that a 
person‟s faith is central to their identity and employers should take full account of 
religion or belief requirements of staff. Ninety-one per cent of respondents (41/45) 
said that it was not always possible to take full account of such requirements of staff, 
but reasonable accommodation should be made. Only 16 per cent (7/44) agreed that 
„a person's religion or belief is their private affair and should be kept out of the 
workplace‟. 
 
Provision for religion or belief in the workplace 
The majority of respondents said their workplace made active provision for religion or 
belief: 80 per cent who answered the question (36/45) had a multi-faith, prayer, 
reflection or quiet room in their workplace; 56 per cent (25/45) had special washing or 
changing facilities; and 72 per cent (31/43) provided for special dietary requirements.    
 
Policies or procedures relating to religion or belief 
The survey asked a series of questions relating to whether employers had policies or 
procedures in place to enable them to respond systematically to requests to 
accommodate employees‟ religion or belief (this did not necessarily indicate that 
requests would be accommodated, but that there was a mechanism for considering 
requests consistently). The following figures show the proportion of respondents who 
answered the question stating that their workplace had policies or procedures in 
place to deal with these specific types of request: 






 Flexibility around time off work to permit observance of religion or belief - 67 per 
cent (30/45).  
 
 Flexibility during the working day to permit observance of religion or belief - 70 
per cent (31/45).  
 
 Wearing of clothing, jewellery or symbols in observance of religion or belief that 
are exceptions to general dress codes - 42 per cent (19/45). 
 
 Display of symbols associated with religion or belief in the workplace (for 
example, on a wall or in a vehicle) - 16 per cent (7/45).  
 
 Abstaining from certain tasks or duties on the grounds of religion or belief - 34 
per cent (15/44). 
 
 Posting or distributing literature relating to a religion or belief - 16 per cent 
(7/45). 
  
Some respondents commented that reasonable decisions could be made in the 
absence of formal policies or procedures relating to religion or belief; one noted that 
the existence of specific policies might even cause resentment since requests 
relating to religion or belief should be considered in the same way as any requests 
for flexible working.  
Support or networking groups for employees 
Respondents were asked if their workplace provides support or networking groups 
covering different equality strands: 58 per cent who answered the question (18/31) 
said that their workplace had a group concerned with religion or belief. This was less 
than the number of lesbian, gay or bisexual network groups (71 per cent; 22/31) and 
groups for those with a disability (68 per cent; 21/31). However, it was more than for 
groups covering gender or race (each 55 per cent; 17/31); transgender (38 per cent; 
12/31) or age (36 per cent; 11/31).  
 
Training for employees 
Around 76 per cent of respondents who answered the question (32/42) said that their 
workplace provided adequate training for employees on avoiding discrimination on 






Support for decision-makers  
The survey asked questions about how well managers were supported to make 
decisions and resolve disputes concerning religion or belief. Around six in 10 of 
respondents who answered the question (26/42) found that their workplace provided 
advice or guidance on law, policy and practice in relation to religion or belief that is 
tailored to the work they do. Almost three-quarters (31/42) considered their 
workplace to have adequate policies and procedures in place to deal with the day-to-
day accommodation of religion or belief.  
 
When asked whether managers were „poorly-equipped‟ to resolve complaints, 
grievances or disputes relating to religion or belief before situations escalated, two-
thirds of those who answered the question (26/40) disagreed. However, less than 
half of respondents (18/41) considered that their workplace effectively communicates 
the outcomes of any complaints, grievances or disputes in the area of religion or 
belief to all those that need to know.  
 
Almost 60 per cent of respondents who answered the question (27/41) said their 
workplace provides adequate advice and support about how to resolve disputes that 
might arise between claims based on religion or belief and claims based on another 
equality strand; 56 per cent (23/41) said that their workplace provides mediation to 
resolve such disputes.  
 
Workplace culture 
When asked if their workplace „fails to deal effectively with prejudice, harassment and 
bullying in relation to religion or belief‟, 81 per cent (33/41) who answered the 
question disagreed, and no respondent agreed with the statement. When asked if „it 
is difficult to discuss religion or belief openly and with respect in my workplace‟, 
around 68 per cent (28/41) disagreed with this statement, and 12 per cent (5/41) 
agreed. Almost half of respondents who answered the question (20/41) reported that 
their workplace regularly reviews service delivery to ensure equality of treatment on 
grounds of religion. 
  
Respondents’ knowledge and understanding 
Respondents indicated high levels of confidence in their ability to make decisions and 
access suitable guidance about the handling of religion or belief. Around 96 per cent 
of those who answered the relevant question (37/39) knew where to go for guidance 
on the law regarding equality and human rights and religion or belief. A similar 
percentage knew where to go for advice on policies or procedures in their own 
workplace. Around three-quarters of those who answered the question (28/39) were 
confident in their ability to determine what constitutes reasonable accommodation of 






religion or belief in the workplace. When asked whether they were „unsure‟ if they 
could effectively handle a situation where a claim based on religion or belief 
appeared to conflict with another equality strand, 62 per cent (24/39) disagreed. 
Twenty-one per cent (8/39) expressed a lack of confidence.  
 
Most respondents (31/39) were confident in their understanding of the legal definition 
of religion or belief (this contrasted with some interviewees‟ uncertainty surrounding 
the definition of „belief‟ arising from cases such as Grainger plc v Nicholson, which 
established that belief in man-made climate change warrants protection from 
discrimination (see section 5.2). As noted below, this case was unfamiliar to 
respondents. 
 
Respondents were slightly less confident in their understanding about the core 
practices and beliefs of different religions and beliefs: around half (20/39) expressed 
confidence but a third (12/39) expressed a lack of confidence. 
 
Respondents’ knowledge of case law  
The survey asked about respondents‟ knowledge of particular legal cases and their 
view of how applicable the cases were to their own work. The cases that were most 
familiar to the 39 respondents who answered the question were (in order of 
familiarity) Eweida v British Airways, Hall and Preddy v Bull and Bull, Ladele v 
London Borough of Islington and Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital NHS 
Foundation Trust, McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd and Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan 
Borough Council. In each of these cases, those expressing some or detailed 
knowledge of the case exceeded those with no knowledge; for example, 92 per cent 
(36/39) had some or detailed knowledge of Eweida.  
 
Cases where the reverse was true include Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of 
Finance, Noah v Desrosiers and Grainger plc v Nicholson: between five and seven in 
10 respondents who answered the question had no knowledge of these cases. This 
result may be partly attributable to the greater media coverage of the first set of 
cases.  
 
Perceived significance of case law 
The survey also asked about the broad significance of these cases for the handling 
of religion or belief in the workplace. Generally, the more familiar a case, the more it 
was considered to have wide applicability. For example, Eweida was not only the 








Public sector equality duty 
The majority of respondents who answered the question (34/37) were aware of the 
extension of the public sector equality duty to include religion or belief, and most 
(31/37) knew where to go for guidance about the duty. Most respondents conveyed 
an understanding of what the duty requires in relation to religion or belief (30/37). 
Very few (8/37) agreed that the duty will make a significant difference to the way their 
organisation approaches equality in relation to religion or belief. See section 9.4 for a 
discussion of the public sector equality duty. 






Appendix 8  Summary of selected legal cases  
 
For an analysis of a range of legal cases and issues relating to religion or belief, see 
Addison (2007); Howard (2011b); Knights (2007); Rivers (2010); Sandberg (2011a); 
and Vickers (2008). Selected sources which focus on a specific case or cases are 
referred to after each case summary. 
 
Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council UKEAT/0009/07/MAA, 30 March 
2007 
The claimant, a junior classroom assistant, argued that a school's action in refusing 
her request to wear a face veil amounted to direct discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief. Her claim failed as the reason for her treatment was because she 
wanted to cover her face and any teacher wanting to cover their face would have 
been similarly treated; therefore it was not less favourable treatment on the ground of 
religion and belief. Azmi also claimed indirect discrimination and the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal (EAT) held that although Muslim women would be put at a particular 
disadvantage by such a rule, the rule was nevertheless justified: the school had 
conducted a trial with her teaching with and without the veil and found that she was 
more effective in teaching the children when she did not wear her veil. The school 
had made the decision based upon these classroom observations. An exacerbating 
factor was that the claimant had not covered her face when she attended the job 
interview or signalled that her religious beliefs placed any limitation on her working. 
The case established the principle that indirect discrimination may be justified if it is 
for a compelling reason connected to a person‟s ability to do their job. 
 
Judgment available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2007/0009_07_3003.html. 
 
Further reading: Hill and Sandberg (2007); Howard (2011a); McColgan (2009); 
Vickers (2010). 
 
Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and 
Wales) CA/2010/0007, 26 April 2011 
A Leeds-based adoption agency, Catholic Care, sought - unsuccessfully - to amend 
its charitable objects so as to permit it to restrict its service to mixed-sex couples. The 
agency argued that restricting its service in this way (and thereby continuing to raise 
donations and prevent its closure) was a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits discrimination. It argued that the service 






agencies and local authorities. The Charity Tribunal rejected these arguments. It held 
that the agency‟s aim of maximising placements for children was legitimate, but 
would not be achieved by its proposed method. Moreover, the possible closure of the 
service did not outweigh the detriment to same sex couples and the detriment to 
society generally of permitting the discrimination.  
 




Further reading: Stychin (2008).  
  
Chaplin v Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust ET Case No. 
1702886/2009, 6 April 2010 
Chaplin, a nurse, had for many years worn a crucifix on a chain over her uniform as a 
manifestation of her religious conviction. The NHS Trust asked her to remove it, 
stating that it contravened a newly introduced policy restricting the wearing of 
jewellery. This policy was based on national guidance aimed at minimising the risk of 
cross-infection, as well as the risk that dangling jewellery might snag, be grabbed by 
a patient or come into contact with a wound. A proposal that the chain be attached 
with a magnetic clip only partially met the hospital‟s concerns. Chaplin rejected 
alternative suggestions; for example, that she wear the crucifix under a high-necked 
T-shirt or pinned inside a pocket. As a consequence she was removed from her 
nursing duties and redeployed to a post that did not have the same uniform 
restrictions. A minister of Chaplin‟s church, the Free Church of England, gave 
evidence to the effect that it was not part of the church‟s doctrine that its adherents 
should wear crucifixes. The Employment Tribunal (ET) held that Chaplin had not 
been subjected either to direct or indirect religious discrimination. A majority held that 
she had not shown that the uniform policy put Christians as a group at a particular 
disadvantage. This was enough to dispose of the claim. A minority held that Chaplin 
and another nurse had been placed at a disadvantage but that this was justified. The 
case is currently (2011) being taken to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).  
 
Judgment available at:  
http://employment.practicallaw.com/2-506-0380?q=chaplin%20nhs. 
 
Further reading: Pitt (2011). 
 
 






Copsey v WWB Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932 
Copsey, a Christian, refused a contractual variation in his working hours which 
included regular Sunday working. After rejecting various compromises, he was 
dismissed. The ET decided - and the EAT upheld - that the dismissal had been for 
business, not religious, reasons. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether 
Article 9 was engaged and if so whether the interference had been justified. In 
dismissing Copsey‟s appeal, the Court found that Article 9 was not engaged because 
Strasbourg case law had established that where religious beliefs were incompatible 
with working hours, the applicant was free to resign (the „specific situation‟ rule; see 
section 5.4). However, notably, the Court criticised the specific situation rule, saying 
that Strasbourg jurisprudence „did not represent a body of consistent decisions‟ in 
cases where the employer, rather than the employee, sought to vary the employee‟s 
working hours. LJ Rix stated that the ultimate guarantee of employees‟ right to 
freedom of religion is self-abnegation: „It is, however, to forestall the need for such 
ultimates that a concern for human rights exists‟.  
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/932.html. 
 
Further reading: Hambler (2008); Leader (2007). 
 
Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80 
Eweida, a member of check-in staff at British Airways (BA), attended work wearing a 
visible silver cross on a chain. BA asked her to conceal the cross as part of its 
uniform policy. She refused to do so and was sent home on unpaid leave. BA then 
took steps to amend its uniform policy to allow staff to display a faith or charity 
symbol while wearing the uniform. Eweida returned to work and began procedures 
claiming direct and indirect discrimination and harassment. None of those claims 
were upheld either at the initial ET or the EAT. At the Court of Appeal, Eweida 
pursued a single ground of appeal: that the EAT had been wrong to find that in order 
for her indirect discrimination claim to succeed, she was required to show that the 
uniform policy put or would put Christians at a particular disadvantage. Eweida 
argued that it should be enough to show that she alone suffered that disadvantage 
on the grounds of her religion. The Court rejected this argument. It held that her 
complaint arose from a personal objection neither arising from any doctrine of faith, 
nor interfering with her observance of it and never raised by any other BA employee. 
The case is currently (February 2012) being taken to the ECtHR.  
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/80.html. 
 






Grainger Plc v Nicholson EAT Case No. 0219/09/ZT, 3 November 2009 
Nicholson was the head of sustainability at Grainger plc until he was dismissed in 
July 2008. He argued that his dismissal was due to his belief in man-made climate 
change and amounted to discrimination. The ET held that a belief in man-made 
climate change and the alleged resulting moral imperatives was capable, if genuinely 
held, of being a philosophical belief for the purposes of the Employment Equality 
(Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. The employer appealed to the EAT, which 
followed ECtHR jurisprudence on the definition of philosophical belief. Accordingly, to 
warrant protection, a belief must: be genuinely held; be a belief and not an opinion or 
viewpoint based on the present state of information available; relate to a weighty and 
substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion, and importance; be worthy of respect in a democratic society; 
not be incompatible with human dignity; and not conflict with the fundamental rights 
of others. The EAT also held that beliefs in a political philosophy or based in science 
can be qualified as „philosophical beliefs‟ as long as they are not objectionable 
(based on racist or homophobic ideas). 
 
Judgment available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2009/0219_09_0311.html. 
 
Further reading: Pitt (2011); Vickers (2010). 
 
Bull and Bull v Hall and Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83 
Hall and Preddy, civil partners, booked a double bedroom at a private hotel owned 
and operated by Mr and Mrs Bull. Upon arrival, the couple was informed that the 
hotel did not allow unmarried persons to share a double room and the couple had to 
seek accommodation elsewhere. The Bulls stated that their policy did not have to do 
with sexual orientation, but with extramarital sex, based on their Christian 
convictions. For this reason, they also denied accommodation in double bedrooms to 
unmarried heterosexual couples. The County Court had held that Hall and Preddy 
had suffered both direct and indirect discrimination. Under the Equality Act (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2007, there was no material difference between marriage 
and a civil partnership. The Bulls‟ refusal to allow Hall and Preddy to occupy the 
double room which they had booked was because of their sexual orientation: this 
was direct discrimination. The County Court went on to consider the indirect 
discrimination claim and upheld that as well. The Bulls appealed. The Court of 
Appeal agreed with the County Court that the hotel‟s rule directly discriminated 
against Mr Preddy and Mr Hall. It noted the owners‟ right to manifest their religion 
and protection from religious discrimination. However, the judges ruled that religious 






belief does not offer an exemption from laws that everyone running a business has to 
follow. 
  
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2012/83.html&query=Preddy&method=all.  
 
Further reading: Sandberg (2011b). 
 
Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 
Ladele was a registrar employed by the London Borough of Islington, who refused on 
grounds of religious conscience to perform civil partnership ceremonies. Islington 
insisted that she should undertake at least some of these duties, disciplined her and 
threatened her with dismissal. The ET found that Islington had discriminated directly 
and indirectly against Ladele on the ground of religion or belief; its policy of requiring 
all registrars to perform civil partnership duties put individuals who held an orthodox 
Christian belief (that marriage was a union between one man and one woman for life) 
at a disadvantage when compared with others who did not hold that belief. The EAT 
overturned this ruling. The case went up to the Court of Appeal. Islington argued that 
Ladele was in breach of its published „Dignity for All‟ equality and diversity policy. The 
Court held that Islington‟s policy of designating all registrars as civil partnership 
registrars had a legitimate aim of fighting discrimination. Moreover, Ladele was 
employed in a public role by a public authority; she was being required to perform a 
„purely secular task‟ as part of her job and her refusal to perform that task „involved 
discriminating against gay people in the course of that job‟. The fact that other local 
authorities had decided not to designate registrars who shared Ladele‟s beliefs as 
civil partnership registrars did not undermine the Court‟s finding that she was neither 
directly nor indirectly discriminated against, nor harassed. The case is currently 
(February 2012) being taken to the ECtHR.  
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/1357.html. 
 
Further reading: Hambler (2010); Sandberg (2010b; 2011b); Stychin (2009); Vickers 
(2010). 
 
McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs EAT Case No. 0223/07/CEA, 
31 October 2007 
McClintock was a Justice of the Peace serving on the family panel. As part of his 
duties he had to decide whether children should be placed in care, fostered or 
adopted. He objected to the possibility that he might be required to place a child with 






insufficient evidence that such a placement was in a child's best interest and he felt 
that children were being treated as guinea pigs in the name of „politically correct‟ 
legislation. His request was refused and he resigned from the family panel. He 
complained that he had been subject to direct and indirect discrimination and 
harassment on the grounds of religion or belief. Both the ET and the EAT held that 
there had not been any direct discrimination, since McClintock had not made it plain 
that his objection arose from a religious or similar philosophical belief as distinct from 
his concern that placing children with same sex couples was a social experiment. 
The EAT held that even if it had been found that McClintock had suffered indirect 
discrimination, „the Department was fully justified in insisting that magistrates must 
apply the law of the land as their oath requires, and cannot opt out of cases on the 
grounds that they may have to apply or give effect to laws to which they have a moral 
or other principled objection‟. 
 
Judgment available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2007/0223_07_3110.html. 
 
Further reading: Hambler (2010). 
 
McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880 
McFarlane was employed as a counsellor by a firm that provides relationship 
counselling services. He is a Christian who believes homosexuality to be sinful. He 
petitioned not to work with same-sex couples undergoing psychosexual therapy, but 
an exemption could not be made. McFarlane then agreed to undertake psychosexual 
therapy with same-sex couples if asked, but his employer found him reluctant to do 
so. The ET dismissed his claim of direct discrimination and found that the indirect 
discrimination had been proportionate to the aim of „ensuring that no person received 
less favourable treatment on the basis of personal or group characteristics‟. The EAT 
upheld this decision. The Court of Appeal, relying on Ladele, refused a petition for 
leave to appeal. It found that indirect discrimination was established according to 
outcomes rather than to the actor‟s motives. More generally, in response to a witness 
statement by a former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, Laws LJ concluded 
that to give legal protection or preference to a particular moral position because it 
was faith-based would be „deeply unprincipled‟, since to do so would give effect to 
subjective opinion; instead, „the State, if its people are to be free, has the 
burdensome duty of thinking for itself‟. The case is currently (2011) being taken to the 
ECtHR.  
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/880.html. 
 






Further reading: Sandberg (2010a; 2011b). 
 
Noah v Sarah Desrosiers ET Case No. 2201867/2007, 29 May 2008 
The claimant applied for employment at a hair salon. She was told that if she were to 
work there she would have to remove her headscarf, as employees were to display 
contemporary hairstyles. She was not offered employment and the position was not 
filled. The ET found that there had been no direct discrimination but that there had 
been indirect discrimination. Although the job was not given to an alternative 
candidate, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations also applied to 
job applicants. The tribunal found that the requirement for hairdressers to have their 
own hair visible was not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The 
employer had placed too much weight on the need to display modern hairstyles and 
not wearing a headscarf did not constitute a requirement for the job. 
 
Judgment available at: http://employment.practicallaw.com/3-382-6228. 
 
Further reading: Woodhead with Catto (2009) 
 
R (Amicus - MSF Section) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] 
EWHC 860 (Admin) 
This case concerned the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
2003. These contain exceptions allowing employers to discriminate on grounds of 
sexual orientation where this amounts to a genuine occupational requirement, and a 
further specific exception where the employment is for the purposes of an organised 
religion or as regards access to a benefit where this is by reference to marital status. 
The central issue in the case was whether the balance struck by the Regulations was 
so broad as to go outside the scope of exceptions permitted by the EU Framework 
Employment Directive - as trade unions argued in their application that it did. The 
High Court found the Regulations to be compatible with the Directive and with the 
ECHR. However, the judgment emphasised the very narrow scope of the exceptions. 
For example, it was clear from parliamentary material that the employment exception 
was intended to be very narrow, and, as a derogation from the principle of equal 
treatment, it had to be construed strictly. It established that there will be very few jobs 
in which it will be permissible to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation. It also 
established that the basis for the discrimination for the purposes of an organised 
religion - for example, that it is required so as to comply with the doctrine of the 
religion or to avoid conflicting with the strongly-held convictions of a significant 
number of its followers - must meet an objective test and not be determined by the 
subjective motivation of the employer.  
 






Further reading: Rubenstein (2004); Sandberg (2011b). 
 
R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15 
Begum, a Muslim high school student had for two years worn as her school uniform 
the shalwar kameeze (loose tunic and trousers). Later, she attended school wearing 
a jilbab, which conceals the shape of arms and legs. The school refused to allow her 
to wear the jilbab as her uniform. Begum did not return to school and applied for 
judicial review of the decision, claiming breach of her right to manifest her religion or 
belief under Article 9 and her right to education under Article 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR. 
The High Court dismissed her application but the Court of Appeal found that there 
had been a violation of Article 9. The school appealed and the case went to the 
House of Lords. The majority of Lords held that there was no interference with Article 
9 in a situation where a girl voluntarily accepted a place at a school with knowledge 
of its uniform policy which did not permit the wearing of a jilbab and in a situation 
where she could have chosen to attend a school where the jilbab was permitted. The 
minority held that Article 9 was engaged but that the interference was justified. The 
school had taken immense pains to devise a uniform policy that respected Muslim 
beliefs, was demonstrably acceptable to Muslim opinion and had the legitimate aim 
of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/15.html. 
 
Further reading: Hill and Sandberg (2007); Howard (2011a); Leader (2007); Malik 
(2008b).   
  
R (E) v JFS Governing Body [2009] UKSC 15, 19 December 2009 
This case concerned the admissions policy of a state-funded school for Orthodox 
Jews which gave preference when oversubscribed to applicants who were 
recognised as Jewish by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR) on the basis of 
matrilineal descent. The mother of the child involved had converted to Judaism under 
the auspices of a non-orthodox synagogue and her conversion was not recognised 
by the OCR. The Supreme Court was asked to determine whether this was a test of 
ethnicity (which is unlawful) or a religious test (which, for schools with a religious 
character, is not). The Supreme Court ruled by a narrow margin that the school was 
acting on the basis of ethnic origin. Five Justices held that there had been direct 
racial discrimination for which there exists no defence; two concluded that there had 
been indirect racial discrimination which could not be justified. The minority held that 
there had been no racial discrimination and that the school had made a legitimate 
selection on the grounds of religion.  
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2009/15.html. 






Further reading: Barber (2010); Cranmer (2010a); Graham (2012) 
 
R (Ghai) v Newcastle City Council & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 59 
Ghai, a Hindu, asked Newcastle City Council to dedicate land for the construction of 
open air funeral pyres. The council stated that it was not possible to do so since 
current legislation on cremation (Cremation Act 1902 and the Cremation Regulations 
2008) requires that cremations are carried out in a properly-equipped building that is 
far from roads and homes. The High Court held that there had been an interference 
with Ghai‟s right to manifest his religion under Article 9(1) but that this was justified 
under Article 9(2). It was within the remit of the secretary of state to conclude, as he 
had, that a significant number of people would find both the principle and the reality 
of open air cremation to be a matter of offence. Before the Court of Appeal, Ghai 
claimed that his religious beliefs would be satisfied if he was cremated within a 
building, provided that the cremation was by fire rather than electricity and that 
sunlight could shine directly on his body. The Court focused on the technical issue of 
what a „building‟ was for the purposes of the Cremation Act 1902. It concluded that 
Ghai‟s wishes could be accommodated without necessarily infringing the legislation 
on cremation. Unlike the High Court, the Court of Appeal did not engage with the 
question of whether Ghai had a fundamental right under Article 9 for his body to be 
disposed of in a particular way or whether, if he did, a restriction on this right could be 
justified by reference to some broader interest.  
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2010/59.html. 
 
R (Johns) v Derby City Council [2011] EWHC Admin 375 
The case concerned a Pentacostalist Christian couple, previous foster carers, who 
wished to become short-term foster carers with Derby City Council, but whose 
application was deferred because their negative views about same-sex relationships 
were not in line with the National Standards for Fostering Services. The Johns 
applied for a judicial review of the decision to defer and as part of that case the court 
considered direct discrimination on grounds of religion or belief. A declaration and 
application for permission to apply for judicial review were refused. The High Court 
ruled that the local authority was entitled to explore the extent to which prospective 
foster carers' beliefs might affect their behaviour and their treatment of a child being 
fostered by them. The Court further concluded that if the local authority did not have 
regard to such matters, it could found itself in breach of both its own guidance and 
the national minimum standards. 
 






R (Playfoot) (A Child) v Millais School Governing Body [2007] EWHC (Admin) 
1698 
Playfoot, a school pupil, wished to wear a „purity‟ ring as a symbol of her religiously-
motivated commitment to celibacy before marriage. This contravened her school‟s 
uniform policy and she was refused permission to wear it. Her application for judicial 
review was refused because the wearing of the ring was not considered to be a 
manifestation of her belief. There was no interference with Article 9 because the 
claimant had voluntarily accepted the school‟s uniform policy. She was not obliged by 
her religious faith to wear the ring and the school offered her other means by which 
she could express her belief without undue hardship or inconvenience, such as 
attaching the ring to her bag. The court also rejected the claimant‟s complaint that 
she had been treated less favourably than Muslim girls who were allowed to wear 
headscarves and Sikh girls who were allowed to wear kara bangles. The school had 
reached carefully considered decisions on each occasion it had been called upon to 
permit exceptions to the uniform policy. 
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2007/1698.html. 
 
Further reading: Howard (2011a). 
 
R (Watkins-Singh) v The Governing Body of Abedare Girls’ High School [2008] 
EWHC (Admin) 1865 
Watkins-Singh, a 14-year-old Sikh pupil, was asked to remove her kara bangle at 
school because it contravened the school‟s uniform policy. She continued to wear the 
kara and was given a series of fixed-term exclusions. In challenging this decision, her 
legal team relied on race and religious discrimination rather than on Article 9. This 
distinction allowed the court to distinguish the claim from Article 9 case law. The 
judgment sidestepped the question of whether the wearing of the kara was obligatory 
to the claimant; disadvantage would also occur where a pupil was forbidden from 
wearing an item that was exceptionally important to his or her religion or race, even if 
it was not an actual requirement of that person‟s religion or race. Having established 
that Watkins-Singh had suffered disadvantage, the judgment turned to the issue of 
justification. The disadvantage was found not to be justified; the kara was a small and 
unostentatious symbol and it could not be argued that wearing it might undermine the 
aim of the uniform policy of fostering community spirit. Again, the judgment 
distinguished the claim from Article 9 case law such as Begum and Playfoot.   
 
Judgment available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/1865.html. 
 
Further reading: Howard (2011a). 






R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others, ex parte 
Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 
This case was brought by head teachers, teachers and parents of children at four 
independent Christian schools where disciplinary measures included the use of mild 
corporal punishment. Claiming to speak on behalf of a „large body of the Christian 
community‟, they contended that the ban on corporal punishment in schools 
(contained in the Education Act 1996, section 548) was incompatible with their belief 
that it was part of the duty of education in a Christian context. They argued that the 
ban breached their right to freedom of religion under Article 9 and the right of parents 
to ensure that their children‟s education conforms to their religious and philosophical 
convictions (under Article 2 or Protocol 1 ECHR). The lower courts dismissed their 
claim, largely by reference to the Article 9(1) question of interference. The House of 
Lords held that there had been interference with the appellants‟ right to freedom of 
religion. It held that to limit protection only to beliefs which are respectable or of 
which the court approves is inappropriate: „in matters of human rights the court 
should not show liberal tolerance only to tolerant liberals‟. However, the interference 
was justified under Article 9(2). The ban was prescribed by law, was necessary in a 
democratic society to protect the rights and freedoms of others and had the 
legitimate aim of protecting children and promoting their well-being.  
 
Judgment available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldjudgmt/jd050224/will-1.htm. 
 
Further reading: McColgan (2009). 
 
Reaney v Hereford Diocesan Board of Finance ET Case No. 1602844/2006, 17 
July 2007 
Mr Reaney, an applicant for the position of Youth Officer for the Diocese of Hereford, 
was recommended by an interviewing panel for the position, pending the approval of 
the Bishop. During the interview he discussed his sexuality. After meeting Mr 
Reaney, the Bishop informed him that he was not being appointed for the position, as 
the Bishop was concerned about the solidity of the claimant‟s expressed commitment 
to celibacy. The ET found that the Bishop could not rely on the exception from the 
rules prohibiting discrimination against a job applicant on grounds of sexual 
orientation if the job is for purposes of an organised religion. In the circumstances of 
the case, it was unreasonable for the Bishop not to trust an assurance from the 
claimant (and other evidence relating to character) that he would meet a requirement 
not to enter into a sexual relationship with another person during the period of the 







Judgment available at: 
http://thinkinganglicans.org.uk/uploads/herefordtribunaljudgment.html. 
 
Further reading: Sandberg (2011b).
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This report examines the law in relation to equality, human 
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